

THE MONIST

A Quarterly Magazine

Devoted to the Philosophy of Science

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER.

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CHICAGO

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1911

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THE MONIST

ON THE MNEMONIC ORIGIN AND NATURE OF AFFECTIVE TENDENCIES.¹

I.

IF we observe the behavior of the various organisms from the unicellular up to man, we see that a large number of their processes, and especially the most important ones, may be regarded as manifestations of a tendency of the organism to maintain or to restore its "stationary" physiological state (to use the term of Ostwald's energetics).

In other words, if we call "affective" that particular class of organic tendencies which appear subjectively in man as "desires" or "appetites" or "needs" and objectively in both man and animals as "movements" completed or incipient (except those that have become mechanical in character), then a large number of the principal "affective tendencies" thus defined may be at once reduced to the single fundamental tendency of each organism to preserve its "physiological invariability."

For instance, we see that hunger, the most fundamental of all affective tendencies, is in reality nothing but the tendency to keep, or restore that qualitative and quantitative condition of the nutritive system of the body which will make possible a continuation of the stationary metabolic state. This tendency of an organism towards the invariability of its own metabolism has become, in the course of its phyletic evolution, an inherent propensity to pass

¹ Translated for *The Monist*.

through all the temporary physiological states that could re-establish this necessary condition within it, hence, a tendency to perform all movements that have nourishment for their object; yet in doing this it has never relinquished its original character. This results directly from the fact that all inclination to procure new food ceases as soon as the internal nutritive system of the animal has attained its normal state.

Accordingly, the hydra or sea anemone does not react positively to food except when its metabolism reaches a state requiring more nutriment, "unless," says Jennings, "metabolism is in such a state as to require more material"; for instance, when the large sea anemone *Stoichactis helianthus* does not experience a sensation of hunger, a bit of food placed upon its disk occasions the same characteristic "rejecting reaction" as if it were any other disturbing object. And all other organisms, the higher as well as the lower, behave in exactly the same fashion.²

Schiff's experiments of injecting nutritive substances into the veins of dogs are direct evidence, on the other hand, that the fundamental condition of hunger is the absence of histogenetic substances in the blood, for these injections resulted not only in nourishing the animal but also in allaying its hunger.

Moreover the fact that hunger, especially as long as it is only moderate, assumes in man the form of a particular localized sensation originating in the wall of the stomach and being the sole cause of the activities induced by real hunger, is—it is scarcely necessary to state—a natural consequence and of but secondary importance. It is only one of many forms in which we see the *substitution of the part for the whole*, and this characteristic phenomenon of all mnemonic physiological processes is true also for the

²H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 202, 205, etc. New York, MacMillan, 1906.

tendency to physiological invariability, which is also essentially mnemonic as we shall see more clearly later on. These peculiar sensations localized in the gastric mucous membrane and produced by its swelling or by some other more or less similar change caused by the empty condition of the stomach, usually take place before or simultaneously with the actual lack of histogenetic substance in the blood, and so finally became representative or vicarious signs of hunger.

The same is true of thirst and of its localization in the upper part of the alimentary canal.

We might pass on from hunger and thirst to the other more or less fundamental organic "appetites" or "needs." All would show us in their different manifestations that they are all directed simply and solely toward the restoration of the stationary physiological state, which has been lost or in some way disturbed.

Thus there exists for every animal species an *optimum* of environment with reference to the degree of saturation of the solution in which the animal lives, to the temperature or to the intensity of light, etc., above and below which the organism cannot maintain its normal physiological state and which the animal makes every effort to maintain.

So for instance we see that the infusorium *Paramecium* at 28° C. reacts negatively to a rising but not to a falling temperature, whereas at 22° C. it reacts negatively to a falling but not to a rising temperature. We see also that the *Euglena* in a moderate light reacts negatively to a decrease but not to an increase in the intensity of light, whereas in a stronger light the reaction is exactly reversed.³

The tendency of organisms to invariability in their

³Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, pp. 294-295.

stationary physiological state consequently resolves itself into a tendency to invariability in their external and internal environments. Thus for instance, oysters and actinians close when exposed to the air; that is, they behave so as to keep the standard of moisture unaltered within themselves and in their immediate surroundings.⁴

To the invariability of environment is due also the position which the organism takes with relation to the direction of the various forces to which it is exposed, especially gravity. Hence the tendency to preserve or restore its normal position. Thus, for instance, the ameba draws in its pseudopodia when they come in contact with solid non-edible bodies; but if it is lifted off the bottom of the aquarium and is suspended in the water it stretches out its pseudopodia in all directions. As soon as one of these touches a solid object, the ameba takes hold of it, draws its body over to it, and again resumes its original position. Likewise a starfish when inverted tries to turn over, that is, to return to its normal environmental conditions with relation to gravity.⁵

All "needs" to throw off substances which have been produced by the general metabolism and which the organism can no longer use, are likewise no exceptions to this general rule. For, although the need for eliminating them may be called forth by certain vicarious local sensations capable of evoking the act of expulsion in advance, yet in reality, whether in the case of the smallest and simplest infusorium or of the most highly developed vertebrates, it is due only to the circumstance that the accumulation of this waste material within the organism would eventually disturb its normal physiological state.

To this class of eliminative affective tendencies the sexual hunger seems to belong. For we know that certain

⁴H. Piéron, *L'évolution de la mémoire*, pp. 29, 74. Paris, Flammarion, 1910.

⁵K. C. Schneider, *Vorlesungen über Tierpsychologie*, pp. 5, 57. Leipsic, Engelmann, 1909.

recent theories are inclined to assign the whole organism rather than any one definite part of the body as the seat of sexual hunger just as in the case of hunger proper, and at the same time to regard it as due to the need of eliminating the germinal substance.⁶

It may be that just as infusoria after a certain number of bipartitions become subject to "senescence" (Maupas) so also the germinal substance constantly produced in the adult organism, especially when it has undergone the reducing divisions, may be subject to a similar degeneration if it has not also experienced the requisite caryogamic rejuvenation. Therefore it seems quite plausible that "sexual hunger" is originally nothing but the tendency of the organism to free itself of this "senile corruption" which the germinal substance, being in its nature a nuclear substance awaiting fertilization, produces by means of its hormonal secretions, or substances of disintegration, and spreads throughout the entire organism.

The more or less brilliant or striking "wedding garment" which nearly all animals assume when in love, arises from an abnormal condition of general hypersecretion occasioned again by the hormonal products of the germinal substance. At any rate it shows how deep is the physiological disturbance caused in all somatic cells by the germinal substance. The effort to expel so disturbing an element then becomes a tendency to copulation as means of effecting this expulsion. Hence the fundamentally selfish character (*nature foncièrement égoïste*) of sexual love which Ribot rightly emphasizes: "In the immense majority of animals, and frequently in men, the sexual instinct is not accompanied by any tender emotion. The act once accomplished, there is separation and oblivion."⁷

⁶ See, for instance, though only in certain respects, J. Roux, *L'instinct d'amour*, ch. I, "Base organique de l'instinct sexuel." Paris, Baillière, 1904.

⁷ Th. Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, p. 258. Paris, Alcan, 1908

It still remains to explain why copulation of the sexes is the only means of eliminating the germinal substance, whereas the single individual is sufficient for the removal of all other more or less similar waste matter.

It is easy to suppose that the reason lies in the peculiar nature of the substance itself, and there are two circumstances that may perhaps, if considered together, contribute a little to the desired explanation: First, the attraction exerted at a distance by the ovum on the spermatozoid by means of secretions diffused in all directions; and second, the fact that hermaphroditism probably preceded sexual dimorphism in the phylogeny of pluricellular organisms. Still we cannot conceal the fact that the phylogenetic process, which by this elimination has become so closely associated with copulation, is still far from a satisfactory explanation.

But even in this incomplete form the hypothesis which attributes to the sexual instinct no further significance than a tendency to eliminate a disturbing element, permits us to present this instinct in very different light from that in which it has hitherto appeared. For were this hypothesis to be accepted, the sexual instinct would not have originated and developed for the "good" of the species, but of the individual. It would therefore not represent the "will of the species" imposing itself upon the individual, as most people now maintain with Schopenhauer, but much rather would it mean here as always the "will" of the single individual; that is, the usual tendency to keep unchanged its stationary physiological condition. And instead of seeing in it with Weismann and all neo-Darwinists a new evidence of the alleged omnipotence of natural selection, Lamarck's principle of individual adaptation combined with the in-

heritance of acquired characters would be sufficient to account for this as well as for all other instincts.

Moreover, the "elimination" hypothesis is sufficient by itself to explain certain peculiarities of this impulse which would be quite incomprehensible from the standpoint of Schopenhauer and the neo-Darwinians.

Ribot, for instance, is surprised that an instinct which is so exceedingly important for the continuance of the species is so often exposed to certain perversions which seem to involve its complete negation.⁸

The fact that such perversions are common accords poorly with the hypothesis that the only reason for the existence of such an instinct is the need for the continuance of the race.

Finally, the fact that both animals and man now desire copulation or even certain secondary sexual relations for their own sakes—hence independently of the act of the elimination of the germinal substance, perhaps even in default of any to eliminate,—this also, as we shall better appreciate later on, is only the consequence of the mnemonic law already mentioned of the substitution of the part for the whole, and of its derivative, the law of the transference of affective tendencies. According to this law all phenomena that constantly accompany the satisfaction of certain affectivities become also in their turn objects of desire, and all habits acquired for the satisfaction or in the satisfaction of certain affectivities likewise become affective tendencies.

If the sexual instinct also, on account of its origin, can be referred to the class of tendencies which serve to maintain the stationary physiological condition of the organism, then the above law is open to no exception as far as the fundamental organic tendencies are concerned. Hence we can sum it up in the following words:

⁸ Ribot, *La psych. des Sent.*, pp. 263, 265 (Engl. ed., pp. 257, 259).

Every organism is a physiological system in a stationary condition and tends to preserve this condition or to restore it as soon as it is disturbed by any variation occurring within or without the organism. This property constitutes the foundation and essence of all "needs", of all "desires," of all the most important organic "appetites." All movements of approach or withdrawal, of attack or flight, of taking or rejecting which animals make are only so many direct or indirect consequences of this perfectly general tendency of every stationary physiological condition to remain constant. We shall soon see that this tendency in its turn is only the direct result of the mnemonic faculty characteristic of all living matter.

This single physiological tendency of a general kind, accordingly, is sufficient to give rise to a large number of the most diversified particular affective tendencies. Thus every cause of disturbance will produce a corresponding tendency to repulsion with special characteristics determined by the kind of disturbance, by its strength, and by the measures capable of avoiding the disturbing elements; and for every incidental means of preserving or restoring the normal physiological condition, there will be a quite definite corresponding tendency such as "longing," "desire," "attraction" and so forth.

Even the instinct of self-preservation—when understood in the usual narrow sense of "preservation of one's own life"—is only a particular derivative and direct consequence of this very general tendency to preserve physiological invariability. For every condition which would eventually lead to death first presents itself as a mere disturbance, and it is only as such that the animal tries and learns to avoid it. Jennings's ameba, for instance, which had been completely swallowed by another ameba, but had succeeded in getting away, did not in all probability flee from a phenomenon that endangered its life, but from a

condition in its environment which even though a profound disturbance, was nevertheless nothing but a disturbance.

It is well known that Quinton was the first to develop a theory that organisms tend to maintain in their internal intercellular environment the same chemical and physical conditions that obtained in the primordial environment when life first appeared on earth.⁹

But it is easily seen that our theory is limited to a consideration of the tendency to invariability only so far as it manifests itself each moment by the behavior of each individual. Therefore instead of serving as a far too one-sided starting point for the explanation of the evolution of species it forms the basis upon which all the most important affective tendencies of the animal world may be built up.

As a factor of invariability for the individual, this tendency to preserve its stationary physiological condition is indeed one of the most important factors in the variation and progress of the species, but in quite a different way from that pointed out by Quinton. For from this tendency arose and developed the power of motion which is the greatest difference between plants and animals, and with which also has kept pace the development and perfection of the whole motor apparatus, including that of the nerves and senses, which plays so important a part in determining the characteristics which distinguish the different zoological species.

Finally as a factor of individual invariability it has proved by its effect on man to be one of the most conspicuous factors in all social evolution, for we may well say that technical inventions and industrial products from the first cave dwellings, the first skins used for clothing, the first discovery of fire to the most complex attainments of to-day have tended constantly more or less, directly or indirectly,

⁹R. Quinton, *L'eau de mer, milieu organique*. Especially Book II, "Loi générale de constance originelle," pp. 429-456. Paris, Masson, 1904.

towards one single goal, namely the artificial maintenance of the greatest possible constancy in the environment, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for preserving physiological invariability.

II.

Closely connected with this inherent fundamental property of every organism to strive to preserve its normal physiological condition or to restore it as soon as it is disturbed, is still another attribute which in its turn becomes the source of new affectivities.

For as soon as the previous stationary condition cannot be restored by any means, that is by any movements or change of location, the organism disposes itself in a new stationary condition consistent with its new external and internal environment. In this way there originate a large number of new phenomena called "adaptations."

Thus, for instance, Dallinger's classical experiments on the acclimatization of lower organisms—suggested by the observation that a mass of organisms usually living in water of a normal temperature, also live and flourish in the hottest spring,—have proved that infusoria may gradually become accustomed to a constantly higher temperature so that finally after years of continuous slow increase in the degree of heat they can stand a temperature so high that any other individual not acclimated would certainly die if subjected to it. It is likewise known that the same species of protozoa are found in both fresh and salt water, and that it is possible to accustom fresh-water amebas and infusoria to a salt habitat which would have killed them at the start,—and there are more instances of the same kind.¹⁰

¹⁰ See C. B. Davenport and W. E. Castle, "On the Acclimatization of Organisms to High Temperatures."—*Archiv für Entw.-Mech. der Organismen*, II, 2. Heft, July, 1895.—C. B. Davenport and R. V. Neal, "On the Acclimatization of Organisms to Poisonous Chemical Substances," *loc. cit.*, II, 4. Heft, Jan. 1896.

One feature of special interest to us is the fact that the new conditions of the environment to which the animal gradually becomes accustomed tend in time to become his *optimum*. "This individual adaptation (e. g., to a different proportion of salt) is affected in accordance with the rule that the conditions of density under which an individual is living, tend to become in time the *optimum* conditions for that individual."¹¹

This may be observed even in plant organisms. *Plasmodia* of the Myxomycetes die when plunged suddenly into 1 or 2% glucose solutions, and even draw back from $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{4}$ % solutions, and yet they may gradually become accustomed to 2% solutions so that they finally show by their behavior that they prefer their new environment to the original one without glucose.¹²

The diatom *Navicula brevis* ordinarily shuns even the weakest light and tries to hide itself in the darkest part of the drop of water in which it is being observed. However, if a culture is placed in the bright light of a window for two weeks, it exhibits exactly the opposite tendency and makes for the brightest part of the drop as soon as it is removed again to its former position in a weak light.¹³

The common actinia (*Actinia equina*) often found clinging to rocks in all possible positions with relation to the force of gravity, sometimes with the axis of the body directed upward, sometimes downward and sometimes to one side, seems to become so accustomed to its position that it tries to assume the same one when removed to another spot. For instance, if several actinians found in various positions are collected and placed in an aquarium, "they

¹¹ Davenport and Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

¹² E. Stahl, "Zur Biologie der Myxomyceten," *Bot. Zeit.*, Mar. 7, 14 and 21, 1884, p. 166.

¹³ Davenport and Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

show in attaching themselves a distinct tendency to assume the same position they had formerly held."¹⁴

We might bring forward innumerable other examples but are here chiefly concerned with pointing out their significance. They show that the new physiological state arising from adaptation to the new environment, when once it has supervened and has existed a certain time within the organism, tends thereafter to preserve or restore itself. This tendency of a past physiological state to remanifest or reproduce itself is nothing but the tendency inherent in every mnemonic accumulation to "evoke" itself again. Hence it is a tendency of a purely mnemonic nature.

From this then it follows directly that the tendency to physiological invariability from which originate, as we have seen, the most important organic affective tendencies of all organisms must be equally mnemonic in nature. For if according to the above-mentioned examples an entirely new and recent physiological state is nevertheless able to leave behind a mnemonic accumulation producing a distinct tendency to its own restoration, it is easy to understand that just because the normal physiological state has lasted so much longer it must possess a correspondingly stronger mnemonic tendency toward its restoration whenever it is disturbed.

This then implies that each of the innumerable different elementary physiological states, of which each is effective at one definite point of the organism and all combined constitute the general physiological state, possesses the faculty of depositing independently a "specific accumulation" from all indications similar to that deposited in the brain by each of the nervous currents which make up the different sensations and leave behind a mnemonic residue capable of being reactivated or revived. By "specific accumulations" of the various nervous currents we mean here only that

¹⁴ Piéron, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

every accumulation is capable of giving as discharge only that particular specificity of the nervous current by which this accumulation has itself been deposited.

The extension of this faculty of "specific accumulation" to all physiological phenomena in general accords with the hypothesis that nervous energy is the basis for all the phenomena of life. If in the psycho-mnemonic phenomena properly so called the action of nervous energy produced by "discharge" or by stimulation of the respective center appears in the foreground, whereas the specific physico-chemical phenomena accompanying the discharge remain in the background so that until recently they were quite overlooked, it would be—according to the fundamental concept of Claude Bernard on the essential identity of all the different forms of irritability of living matter—a difference of degree only but not of essence, inasmuch as true physiological phenomena accompanying the respective stimulation (muscular contraction, glandular secretion, etc.) appear with greater distinctness, whereas the specific nervous phenomena which likewise accompany this physiological activity are less perceptible. In this way we have tried to explain the fundamental mnemonic property of all living substance which has recently been especially emphasized by Hering, Semon and Francis Darwin, and also to explain the most essential and significant biological phenomena proceeding from it either directly or indirectly.¹⁵

By this extension of the mnemonic faculty to all elementary physiological phenomena we now obtain a somatic or visceral theory of the fundamental affective tendencies in the sense that the tendency toward physiological in-

¹⁵ Eugenio Rignano, *Ueber die Vererbung erworbener Eigenschaften*, Leipzig, Engelmann, 1907. (English translation by Basil Harvey in preparation, Open Court Publishing Co. French edition, Paris, Alcan, 1906; Italian edition, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1907). See especially the chapter on "The Phenomena of Memory and the Vital Phenomena." See also "Die Zentroepigenese und die nervöse Natur der Lebenserscheinung," *Zeitschr. f. d. Ausbau d. Entwicklungslehre*, II, 1909, Heft 8-9.—"Das biologische Gedächtnis in der Energetik," *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, VIII, and *Scientia*, XI, 3, 1909.

variability or toward the restoration of this or that previous physiological state corresponding to this or that previous environment, depends on innumerable elementary specific accumulations, differing from point to point of the body and whose combined potential energy would form as it were a "force of gravitation" toward that environment or those conditions which make possible the preservation or restoration of the combined physiological system represented by all these elementary accumulations.

Naturally in organisms supplied with nervous systems there would arise and be gradually developed side by side in cooperation with, and often as a substitute for, every one of these affective tendencies of purely somatic origin and seat, the affective tendency represented by the corresponding mnemonic accumulations which had been deposited in that particular zone of the nervous system directly connected with the respective points of the body. In man, for instance, this zone would be Flechsig's *Körperfühlsphäre* to which in certain cases may also be added the frontal zone.¹⁶

Now after the cerebral mnemonic accumulations had arisen phylogenetically under direct somatic action, they would finally have become able to represent by themselves, after all connection with the body had been severed, those former affective tendencies to which they owed their origin. And indeed this is true because of the two fundamental mnemonic laws of (1) the gradual independence of the part with reference to the whole and (2) the substitution of the part for the whole, which arise directly from the fact that every elementary specific accumulation when once deposited is capable of an independent existence. Therefore Sherrington's "spinal" dog, for instance, continued to experience the same repugnance to the flesh of other dogs,

¹⁶ P. Flechsig, *Gehirn und Seele*, pp. 19, 21-22, 92, 99-100. Leipsic, Veit, 1896.

to exhibit other similar affectivities and even the same emotions as the normal dog, though all of them are undoubtedly of phyletic somatic origin.¹⁷

But this cooperation and this possibility of an eventual substitution of the affective tendency whose seat is in the brain, for the corresponding affective tendency of somatic origin, does not prevent the former from being entirely in the control of the latter. Therefore modern psychology generally admits that the affective life "has its cause below in the variations of the cenesthesia, which is itself a resultant, a combination of vital operations."¹⁸

Nor does it in the least prevent affective tendencies from keeping all the fundamental properties which they owe to their mnemonic visceral origin, of which the most important are first the possession of a "diffuse" seat, and secondly that they are eminently "subjective."

For every stationary physiological system in equilibrium with regard to its environment permeates the whole organism and consequently also all that part of the brain in which this organism is reflected. Accordingly, in contrast to the mnemonic sense-accumulations each of which to all appearances has a seat distinctly localized at a single point or in a single center of the cortex of the brain, we have every reason to conclude that each affective tendency is made up of an infinitely large number of different elementary mnemonic accumulations, deposited respectively in every point of the body and in every corresponding point in the brain.

To this mnemonic physiological origin of the affective tendencies is also due their eminently "subjective" character; for the organism is equipped potentially with this

¹⁷ See C. S. Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, pp. 260-265. London, Constable, 1906. Cf. the pertinent discussion of these experiments by Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*, 2d ed., p. 292, London, Arnold, 1908; and Revault d'Allonnes, *Les inclinations*, pp. 101 ff., Paris, Alcan, 1908.

¹⁸ Ribot, *Psych. des sent.*, p. 10.

or that "idiosyncratic" affective tendency, with this or that "appetite," according to the various environments or conditions in which the species and the individual were placed for a longer or shorter time in the past, in other words according to their *individual history*.

Hence the subjectivity and infinite variety manifest in the needs, the appetites and desires and consequently in everything that furnishes an object of "affective evaluation."

III.

The hypothesis here presented of the mnemonic nature of all affective tendencies in general is further confirmed by other examples of more special affectivities which have also originated by way of "habit" and yet bear special relations to the environment since they refer only to one part or another of the organism and manifest an activity only periodically or intermittently. They are especially in evidence in the higher animals and in man most of all.

As a typical instance it will be sufficient to consider maternal love.

Evidently the habit of having certain relations of parasitism, or of symbiosis in general, with the progeny throughout a long series of generations has become gradually transformed in a mnemonic way into affective tendencies towards these relations.

"Comparative ethology," says Giard, "shows us most clearly that the relations between the parent organism and its progeny are in principle absolutely the same as those existing between a parasite and the animal it lives upon, and that after a period of unstable equilibrium in which one or other of the two connected organisms suffers to the advantage of its companion there is a tendency to the

establishment of a definite position of mutual (*mutualiste*) equilibrium."¹⁹

This is true for instance of the relations of internal incubation, which though first sought and effected by the embryo itself in some phase of its development for the purpose of nutrition or some other advantage, and at first simply endured by one of the parents, either father or mother, finally become actual "needs" to this parent.

It is likewise true of the relations of external incubation (brooding) which arise at first as the result of some particular circumstance and in this way become a habit. For instance the attachment manifested by the female spider *Chiracanthium carnifex* for her nest, whether it be her own or one of which she has taken possession, grows *with time*, that is with the length of her occupation of it. Hence "mother love" seems in her case to be really nothing but her attachment to a home to which she has become accustomed.²⁰

It is just the same with the brooding of birds and some reptiles which owes its origin to the pleasant sensation which the contact with the fresh eggs brings to the feverish condition accompanying the egg-laying process, but which by habit has become in itself an instinctive inclination.²¹

Finally as regards lactation the young have gradually developed secretions in the lactiferous glands by sucking the secretions of the perspiratory glands on the breast of the mother brooding over them, and thus they have at the same time so accustomed the mother to this process that lactation finally becomes an actual need for her. "With mammals we must look for the origin of the mutually symbiotic relations which unite mother and child in the phe-

¹⁹ A. Giard, "Les origines de l'amour maternel," *Revue des idées*, April 15, 1905, p. 256.

²⁰ A. Lécaillon, "Sur la biologie et la psychologie d'une araignée," *Année psychologique*, Année 10e, pp. 63-83. Paris, Nasson, 1904.

²¹ Giard, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

nomenon of lactation. The physiological disorders of pregnancy and parturition lead, among other very curious trophic effects, to an excessive secretion of the mammary glands which, as we know, are only a special localization of the sebaceous glands of the skin. The young animal in thus taking its first nourishment alleviates the discomfort of the female and thus becomes a means toward the comfort of its mother."²²

That the need for lactation is the origin of maternal love is shown by the fact that the mother who is deprived of her young tries to replace them by foster-nurslings. "The necessity of getting rid of a troublesome secretion is powerful enough sometimes to cause the female that lost her young to steal the progeny of another, and these robberies have been performed even by females that were still suckling their own young, the satisfaction of a need leading them, as is generally the case, to seek a still greater satisfaction which might lead even to excess."²³

In the cases observed by Lloyd Morgan, this need of the mother takes the form of a mother love solicitous for the nourishment of her young, and it is possible that it may actually represent to them the beginning of an unselfish attachment. "Further, I have seen both bitches and cats get up and again lie down so as to bring the teats into closer proximity to the mouth of any young which failed to find them. It has been noticed by a man who is a remarkably good observer and has had much to do with animals, and also by myself, that when a lamb is weakly and fails to find the teat, the mother not infrequently uses its shoulders, head and neck as a lever to place the lamb on its legs; and, having accomplished this, straddles over the lamb, and brings the teats against its lips; and these efforts are continued until the little animal sucks."²⁴

²² Giard, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-270.

²³ Giard, *loc. cit.*, p. 270.

²⁴ Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*, p. 115, New York, Arnold, 1896.

This example is very significant for it shows clearly how the necessity for the elimination of the milk must end in arousing an attachment for the nursling as the customary means for attaining this end, just as we have seen that the need for the elimination of the germinal substance must lead to an affectivity for the other sex, here again as the customary means to effect this elimination.

Just as "sexual attraction" ceases after the elimination of the germinal substance, so also does "mother love" disappear as soon as the need for lactation is no longer felt. "Maternal affection does not generally survive the causes which produced it and only vague traces of it are noticeable after lactation has ceased."²⁵

Finally, the fact that the mother's affection is stronger than that of the father, and that the parents' love for their children is stronger than that of the children for their parents confirms the hypothesis that all these affectivities have arisen exclusively by way of habit, for it shows that affection for those with whom we have certain relations is the more intense the more numerous and prolonged these relations are. "Among animals as a whole," remarks Ribot, "paternal love is rare and inconstant and among the lower representatives of mankind it is a feeble sentiment and forms but a slight bond."²⁶ Paternal love exists only where the union of the sexes is close, that is, where the communal life "creates a current of affection because of services rendered."²⁷

"Every one recognizes," says Pillon in his turn, "that the love of parents for their children exceeds in intensity the children's love for the parents, and that of the two parents it is the mother whose love is stronger for her child. . . . The reason is that in the mother's case much

²⁵ Giard, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

²⁶ Ribot, *Psych. des sent.*, 285.

²⁷ Ribot, *Psychol. des sent.*, p. 286.

more than with the father the love for the child is nourished and stimulated, because of her special functions, that is, by the constant performance of the actions it dictates."²⁸

But mother-love, and mutual love within the family in general, owing its origin to certain relations grown into habit, represents only one particular case of a universal law. For every other relation to person or things (no matter how special) which becomes in the slightest degree a habit finally appears for this very reason as something "desired." In every environmental relation whether general or particular is verified Lehmann's law of the "indispensability of the customary," which this investigator established for every stimulus to which one becomes accustomed and whose cessation arouses a need for its presence.²⁹

"I have a small clock in my room," a friend once wrote to G. E. Müller, "which will not run quite twenty-four hours with one winding. It often happens therefore that it stops. Whenever this occurs I notice it at once, whereas of course I do not hear it at all when it is running. The first time this occurred the sensation was somewhat as follows: it happened that I was suddenly aware of a very indefinite unrest, a sort of emptiness without being able to say just what the matter was. Not until after some reflection did I discover the cause in the stopping of my clock."³⁰

Moreover each of us has doubtless had opportunity to observe how things which are disagreeable at first finally become attractive from custom, and how such habits assumed in the course of man's life become as peremptory "needs" as those which we call natural needs. "Smokers, snuff-takers, and those who chew tobacco, furnish familiar

²⁸ F. Pilon, "Sur la mémoire et l'imagination affective," *Année philosophique*, XVII, 1903, pp. 69-70. Paris, Alcan, 1907.

²⁹ A. Lehmann, *Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefühlslebens*, pp. 194 ff. Leipsic, Reisland, 1892.

³⁰ G. E. Müller, *Zur Theorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit*, p. 128, Leipsic, Edelmann.

instances of the way in which long persistence in a sensation not originally pleasurable, makes it pleasurable—the sensation itself remaining unchanged. The like happens with various foods and drinks, which, at first distasteful, are afterwards greatly relished if frequently taken.”³¹

Thence arises the hankering after certain customary things which we suddenly miss: “In some animals there is produced a condition resembling nostalgia, expressing itself in a violent desire to return to former haunts, or in a pining away resulting from the absence of accustomed persons and things.”³²

Mere habit, therefore, is enough, as we have seen in the case of family love, to cause other similar affectivities also to originate and take root. Such are gregariousness, sociability, friendship, and the like: “The perception of kindred beings, perpetually seen, heard, and smelt, will come to form a predominant part of consciousness—so predominant a part that absence of it will inevitably cause discomfort.”³³

Finally we are all well aware of the powerful influence of the habits of life current in any family circle during the earliest years of a child’s life—“nurture” in its broad sense, as Galton would say—because from these habits arise and grow the feelings and moral tendencies which remain impressed upon the whole life as though they were “innate.”³⁴

In short from these few instances adduced simply in explanation of our position, we see how profound is the truth contained in the saying that habit is a “second nature.”

³¹ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology*, 4th ed., I, 287. London, Williams and Norgate, 1899.

³² Th. Ribot, *Essay on the Creative Imagination*, p. 95. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1906.

³³ Spencer, *op. cit.*, II, 626.

³⁴ Francis Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*, pp. 208-216. London, MacMillan, 1883.

But if to a certain extent we can see the most diverse tendencies originate by way of habit before our very eyes, then we may also attribute a similar mnemonic origin to all affective tendencies, since the nature of innate tendencies differs in no wise from that of acquired tendencies. Very similarly in the case of morphological evolution we may consider that Lamarckianism is quite justified in drawing from the few observable cases of adaptation acquired during life, the conclusion that the entire structure of the organism owes its existence to an infinite number of similar functional adaptations.

Hence we may complete the saying quoted above with the phrase that on the other hand "nature" is nothing but a "first habit."

IV.

The hypothesis of the mnemonic origin and nature of all affective tendencies finds still further support in a property which is inherent in all of them, namely their "transference" which likewise is itself essentially mnemonic and by which all other affectivities are derived from those of direct mnemonic origin and thus come to have an indirect mnemonic origin (Ribot's "law of transference").

For in consequence of the "substitution of a part for the whole," a fundamental mnemonic principle frequently mentioned above, it happens that merely parts or fragments of certain environmental relations, striven for originally in their totality, or that "analogous" environmental relations, i. e., those that are only partly similar to one desired, or that environmental relations constituting "means" suited to the attainment of an "end" and therefore its necessary precursors, or, in fine, that environmental relations which constantly accompany this "end," evoke the same affectivity as the original "end" itself. Hence this affectivity is "transferred" from the whole to the part, and this at-

tachment for the part then becomes so much stronger that this partial relation which is first sought as a substitute for the whole finally constitutes in its turn an habitual environmental relation henceforward desired or sought for its own sake quite apart from the real and original affective "transference."

This is the case for instance, as has been mentioned above, with regard to copulation, the customary means for the elimination of germinal substance, and also with regard to the secondary sexual relations as phenomena usually accompanying copulation. The "conquest" of the other sex though only a necessary means for the satisfaction of sexual appetite finally becomes with certain individuals an end in itself. The pleasure in seducing for its own sake, the "sexual vanity" of both male and female and the other similar affectivities are further instances.

The case is the same with the tearing to pieces of prey which was originally the customary means for satisfying hunger but finally gave place to cruelty for cruelty's sake.

"One half of the animal race live upon prey; and as it is delightful to eat so it must be delightful to kill. Pleasurable also must be all the signs of discomfiture, the helpless struggles and agonized gestures of the victim."³⁵

In man the love of victory for its own sake, ambition, thirst for power, desire for fame and glory, the endeavor to surpass his fellows, are all derived as consequences of further "transference."

In these and all other similar cases of affective transferences to environmental relations constantly becoming less material and more moral, besides the real proper affective transference which transforms the part into a new "end," there is always involved in man and in the higher

³⁵ Alexander Bain, *The Emotions of the Will*, 4th ed., London, Longmans Green, 1899, p. 65.

animals the cooperation of their own intellectual development.

For the intellect is constantly discovering new and unsuspected similarities between the most diverse phenomena, even between material and ethical phenomena, extending the same affectivities to the one class that are valid for the other; just as disgust for certain foods characterized by taste or odor as unwholesome extends to certain objects which can only be touched or seen (viscous bodies), and then, carrying the analogy still farther, even to simple "objects" or relations of an ethical order.³⁶

At the same time inasmuch as the intellect foresees with constantly increasing sharpness the external phenomena to be expected as effects of given causes, it continues to devise new means more indirect and more complex for attaining its end, and thereby to open a broader sphere of efficiency for "affective transference." For instance the weapon which was invented by man as means for self-preservation has rendered possible an affective transference to himself which is characteristic of the warrior and the hunter; and the earth which the agriculturist has utilized to provide his own nourishment has made possible that intense love for the soil frequent among farmers.

Furthermore, since the intellect also foresees with increasing certainty internal psychical processes, it calls into being a large number of new affectivities destined to prevent possible future affective tendencies from remaining unsatisfied. For instance the anticipation of future hunger gives even the satiated man the inclination to lay up food that is left from a meal, and to keep it in his possession. Thus arises in general the sense of ownership, and in the same way the anticipation of the innumerable other desires which civilized man cherishes to-day excites in him an

³⁶ Ribot, *Psych. des sent.*, p. 212.—*Essai sur les passions*, pp. 65 ff.

intense longing for wealth, covetousness and similar passions.³⁷

Finally, the intellect renders possible that infinite variety of shades of which affective tendencies are capable in man. For since it is able to observe from different points of view, simultaneously or nearly so, all environmental relations even when only slightly complex, it can evoke diverse affectivities at the same time, and these, as Bain would say, by association, combination, confluence, interference or mutual partial inhibition finally produce an exceedingly complex affectivity which is therefore capable of showing the finest imaginable gradations from one case to another according to the number and character of its component parts.

Thus, for instance, fear, anxiety and kindred feelings had already developed in animals from the instinct of self-preservation in its purely defensive form; but in man this latter gave rise also to all the propitiatory affectivities in innumerable varieties and shades, such as prostration, humility, hypocrisy, flattery and the like. Even the religious sentiment in its lowest forms is a direct consequence of this propitiatory affectivity, while the loftier religious sentiment and the kindred feeling experienced in the presence of the sublime are more highly developed and more complete forms of the same thing.³⁸

Similarly from the instinct of self-preservation in its double aspect, offensive and defensive at the same time, had already developed in the higher animals the instinct to attack and all the different varieties of counter-attack; but in man this instinct has assumed the most varied forms and shades from deepest hatred to a scarcely perceptible antipathy, from rapacity to the merest envy, and from the

³⁷ Spencer, *Princ. of Psychol.*, I, 488 f.—Ribot, *Psychol. des sent.*, 110, 269-270.

³⁸ For instance, see Ribot, *Psych. des sent.*, p. 100, and E. Rignano, "Il fenomeno religioso," *Scientia*, XIII, 1, 1910.

most violent thirst for revenge to the slightest resentment. The noble sentiment of justice is a very remote and hardly distinguishable derivative of the same instinct.³⁹

How high may be the degree of complexity which can thus be attained is attested, for instance, by maternal love which has grown from the purely bodily necessity for lactation to the tenderest feelings of the noblest self-denial, and especially also by conjugal affection which has been transformed from coarse brutal sexual appetite to an harmonious cooperation of the gentlest and most delicate moral affectivities.⁴⁰

Yet it is easily comprehensible that it would be useless and impossible to stop here to investigate all of the affectivities and their slightest shades which have in this way attained their origin and development in the higher animals and especially in man. Let these few indications suffice to render intelligible the fact that as soon as the organism has acquired in the direct mnemonic way a stock of affective tendencies and the intellect has attained its proper development, the number of affectivities which may be derived by "transference" and by "combination," that is to say, by indirect mnemonic means, is infinite.

V.

But few words are needed to indicate the place of affective tendencies among those fundamental psychical phenomena which are most closely connected with them, such as the emotions, the will, and the states of pleasure and pain.

Emotions are only sudden and violent modes of activation of those very accumulations of energy of which the affective tendencies consist.

³⁹ See Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, pp. 117 f.—Ribot, *Psych. des sentiments*, pp. 229 f., 271 f.—*Problèmes de psychologie affective*, chap. III, "L'antipathie," Paris, Alcan, 1910.

⁴⁰ Spencer, *op. cit.*, I, 487 f.

Of course it is not always possible clearly to distinguish affective tendencies from emotions, since the former are perceptible neither objectively nor subjectively as long as they remain in a potential state, but become so at their activation which, when sudden and violent, represents the corresponding emotion. But the importance and necessity of distinguishing accurately between emotions and affective tendencies—a distinction however which is usually entirely neglected by most psychologists—lies in the fact that one and the same affective tendency may according to external circumstances give rise to the most diverse emotions, to the most diverse degrees of their intensity, or even to no emotion at all properly so called. For instance if we see a vehicle approaching at a distance we quietly step aside out of the way, but if it appears suddenly before us at an abrupt turn in the street we feel a strong emotional shock. And the same affective tendency of the dog towards a piece of meat can give rise to flight, anger, or the careful, coolly calculated search for a safe hiding place, according to the circumstances under which his dainty meal is endangered.

In short, every emotion, as Stout rightly emphasizes, presupposes an affective tendency, but the reverse does not follow; for an affective tendency even when in full activation need not always imply any emotion.⁴¹

Every affective tendency "impels" to action, that is, it not only "starts" but really "impinges" upon the organs of motion either directly as in the lower organisms or by the aid of the nervous system as in the higher. Therefore from the first moment of its activation it has the appearance of a "motion in the nascent state" (Ribot).

If its activation is sudden and intense the resulting activity of the motor muscles is accompanied by that of all the viscera. This "visceral cooperation" which thus

⁴¹ See G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*, 2d. ed., p. 305, London, 1907.

takes place in connection with the emotions properly so called, is not, as Sherrington believes, due solely to the fact that the rapidity and intensity with which the muscles are set in motion induces the immediate action of the viscera which furnish the muscles with the material for their energy, but also and especially because there is an overflow of nervous energy, which suddenly released in great quantities acts like a flood, and pours forth in numerous other tracks than those closely connected with the locomotor apparatus.⁴²

And this visceral commotion thus produced as a result of the sudden intense impulse, according to the well-known theory of James, Lange and Sergi, finds its centripetal echo in the brain in the form of an emotion.⁴³

Hence it is the affective tendency which impels us and not the emotion, as Sherrington maintains in accordance with the prevalent confusion between affective tendency and emotion which cannot be too greatly deplored, and the emotion is only the reaction of a too rapid and intense manifestation of this tendency.

On the other hand if on account of external conditions or the psychical disposition of the individual the activation of the affective tendency takes place neither too suddenly nor with too great intensity, then only are the requisite muscles called into play without any emotion. Thus the amount of useful work accomplished as a result of the discharge of the affective tendency is greater in inverse proportion to the amount lost in the coordinated movements of a purely emotional significance. This is the reason why we generally observe the greatest determination, the most tenacious persistence in transactions,⁴⁴ the

⁴² See Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, pp. 265f.

⁴³ See the famous article of W. James, "What is an Emotion?" *Mind*, April, 1884, pp. 188-205.—Renault d'Allonnes, *Les inclinations*, 108 f.

⁴⁴ See Renault d'Allonnes, *Les inclinations*, pp. 207 f.

most intense and feverish activity in "unemotional" individuals.

As regards the will, an act of volition takes place whenever an affective tendency directed towards a future goal triumphs over an affective tendency whose aim is for the present; in other words, whenever a far-sighted affectivity is victorious over a short-sighted one. It is not the man who sweating and panting after a long run throws himself down to drink eagerly from a spring, who exercises an act of volition, but rather the one who forbears to slake his burning thirst for fear of a greater future evil. Likewise no act of volition is exerted when an exhausted wanderer throws himself down to sleep, but rather when a mountain climber overcomes exhaustion in order to reach the desired goal. And the act of a man who on a momentary impulse falls upon his opponent at the slightest provocation with hard words and fisticuffs does not demand any will power, as does the conduct of the man who bridles his just anger in order coolly to estimate to its remotest consequences the most appropriate procedure to enter upon against the offender.⁴⁵

Essentially then the will is nothing else than a true and proper affective tendency which checks other affective tendencies because it is more far-sighted and which in its turn impels to action like all affective tendencies. "There is present in the action of will some desire of a good to be obtained or of an evil to be shunned, which imparts its driving force."⁴⁶

Two extreme instances deserve special mention, for they include all other cases. The first of these may again be divided into two.

Sometimes one of the affective tendencies is so strong

⁴⁵ Cf. E. Meumann, *Intelligenz und Wille*, pp. 181 f. (Leipsic, Quelle und Meyer, 1908), although differing in many points.

⁴⁶ Maudsley, *The Physiology of Mind*, p. 339. London, MacMillan, 1876.

and persistent that it constantly outweighs all others; it checks them if it is contrary to them and strengthens them if it is in harmony with them. Such an "hypertrophied" affective tendency is called "passion" (Ribot, Renda). If it is directed towards some present aim we say that it overthrows the will because it successfully withstands the inhibitive effect of every other affective tendency directed towards the future; if on the other hand its own aim is in the future, an "ideal" whose attainment may require the work of a lifetime, then we say that the individual is persevering, stubborn, unyielding, endowed with an iron will, because every other opposed affective tendency directed toward an immediate end dashes in vain against it.

On the other hand it sometimes happens that the two conflicting affective tendencies are evenly balanced. At one moment the far-sighted tendency gains greater force and seems to triumph by turning the mind to new consequences in the future, but the next instant the short-sighted tendency discovers new or more clearly recognized aspects in the object desired for the time being, and becomes more intense, threatening again to gain the upper hand. The individual then falls in a state we call "indecision." When a philosopher discovers by introspection that he is in this situation, he will easily realize that both affectivities exist together within him, that they are "flesh of his flesh," and that the slightest and most insignificant psychical occurrence is enough to cause either one to gain ascendancy over the other. It is clear that he can easily fall a prey to the illusion that nothing at all, any chance breath of wind, is enough to give one the preponderance over the other. This is the subjective illusion of free will which for many centuries has constituted the greatest and most difficult problem that philosophy has been called upon to solve.

Finally to come to the consideration of "pleasure" and "pain," it is the merit of the modern psychological school

that it has shown the fallacy of Bain's theory that the fundamental fact of animal life is the pursuit of "pleasure," in other words, the search for everything pleasant and the avoidance of everything unpleasant; and on the other hand that it has clearly emphasized that the conditions of pleasure and pain represent only the superficial part of the affective life, "of which the deep element consists in affective tendencies, positive or negative. . . . These are the elementary processes of affective life, of which pleasure and pain represent only the satisfaction or failure."⁴⁷

Since an activation of nervous energy accompanies every "satisfaction" of any affective tendency, and every "disappointment" corresponds to an interruption or cessation of this energy, pleasure really corresponds to every state of discharge or activation of the nervous or vital energy, and pain to every state of inhibition or suppression of it.

In fact "painful" is every act inhibitive of certain nervous activities; "unpleasant" every too perceptible change of surrounding conditions which renders impossible the continuance of the hitherto stationary physiological state, "agonizing" every sudden and violent change of environment which brings about the complete stoppage or destruction of life in one or another part of the organism, and "sad" is the individual when there is a general diminution of vital functions within his organism.

Inversely, it is "pleasant" to exercise one's muscle in play and sport; the cessation of a strained condition of the soul is a "relief," the return to an accustomed environment and the resumption of habits is "welcome," and in general full of "joy" and "pleasure" is every state in which the organism experiences a greater activity of nervous energy.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ribot, *Psychol. des sent.*, p. 2.—*Probl. de psych. aff.*, p. 16.

⁴⁸ See Ribot, *Psych. des sent.*, Part I, chapters I-III, especially pp. 52 f. and

It is sufficient here to indicate that the theory of the mnemonic origin of all affective tendencies which we have endeavored to explain and substantiate in this essay, offers a new argument in support of the modern psychological views with regard to the inmost nature of pleasure and pain. For in assigning to these affective tendencies the nature of mnemonic accumulations it implies that the fundamental principle of affective life can be nothing but the tendency to activation inherent in these accumulations, as is the case with every other accumulation of potential energy, and that therefore pain and pleasure, pleasant and painful states, can be nothing but the superficial and subjective side of this activation or of its inhibition.

VI.

Before terminating these few notes upon the nature of affective tendencies, we shall add a few remarks, which seem to us indispensable, on the fundamental character of these tendencies according to which they constitute a force, so to speak, with a definite end to be attained but with the path to be followed left undetermined.

Affective tendencies owe this property of gravitating toward an end while the means remain undecided, to the circumstance that they depend on the existence in a potential state of a certain general or local physiological system or state, which was determined in the past by the outside world as a whole or by individual particular relations to this outside world, and which now like every other potential energy simply endeavors to re-manifest itself as soon as it is released by the persistence or recurrence of even a small part of this environment or these environmental relations. For the result of the existence of this tendency is that the organism gravitates toward this environment

83 f.—W. Ostwald, *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, pp. 388 ff. Leipzig, Veit, 1905.

or these environmental relations rendering possible the recurrence of this physiological state, but it does not imply any "impulse" toward or "impingement" upon any one of the series of passing physiological states or movements which, even if they were capable of eventually bringing the organism back to the desired environment, nevertheless have nothing in common with the definitive physiological state itself which corresponds to this environment.

Only from the moment when one series of movements happens to bring the organism back to the desired environmental relations earlier than another one, will it have acquired an advantage over the others, and this result may be expressed by saying that the affective tendency has exercised a "choice" (James, Baldwin and the American school in general).

Hence it is only from that moment that the affective tendency will by mnemonic association constitute a force which "impels" these movements toward the end, just as certain reflex movements "impinge" on one another (Sherington). And only from that moment will these movements (so long as they have not become mechanical in the form of reflexes) be determined exclusively under the pressure of the corresponding affectivity or the equivalent "act of the will."

However, until this takes place the affectivity betrays no tendency at all to discharge in one path rather than in another, hence the great difference between the affective tendency or act of will on the one hand, and the reflex movement on the other. This reflex movement, by means of which the act so "chosen" when often repeated becomes by mnemonic accumulation gradually mechanical and quite independent of the whole, represents a tendency to discharge along one single given path which is determined in advance. It is a force whose point of application and direction are known beforehand, and might therefore be

indicated graphically by the customary arrow used to represent the forces of mechanics. On the other hand the affective tendency constitutes a force of which neither the point of application nor the direction are predetermined but only the point towards which it tends. It is a "disposable" energy to be applied at will to this or that act so long as it leads to the desired end. Therefore it can be represented at the same time quite indefinitely by any of the infinite number of arrows which fill the entire volume of a cone and converge at its apex.

The reflex movement admits therefore of but a single solution. On the other hand its affective tendency admits of an indefinitely large number of solutions so long as none of the possible movements has been performed by chance and given rise to a choice; or when there are numerous equivalent paths to the goal.

This possibility of many solutions constitutes exactly the "unforeseen," the "antimechanical" behavior dependent on the affectivity or will, in contrast to the predetermined mechanical behavior of reflex movements or of any such complex combinations of reflex movements as certain instincts exhibit.

Finally it is this fundamental property of the affective tendency of constituting in some degree a force gravitating toward that environment or those particular environmental relations which permit the reactivation of certain mnemonic accumulations forming this very tendency, which lends that environment or those environmental relations the appearance of a *vis a fronte* or "ultimate cause" differing very essentially from the *vis a tergo* or "actual cause" which alone is operative in inorganic nature.⁴⁹

The organism, writes Jennings, "seems to work toward a definite purpose. In other words, the final result of its

⁴⁹ See W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, I, pp. 7 f. London, Macmillan, 1901.

action seems to be present in some way at the beginning, determining what the action shall be. In this the action of living things appears to contrast with that of things inorganic."⁵⁰

Now this "final result of its action" exists really from the beginning in the form of mnemonic accumulation. For that environment or those special environmental conditions to which the animal is gravitating operate now as *vis a fronte* inasmuch as they were formerly *vis a tergo* and in so far as the physiological activities then determined by them in the organism have left behind a mnemonic accumulation which now itself constitutes the real and true *vis a tergo*, moving the living being.⁵¹

Thus it is clear that one and the same explanation applies to all the "finalism" of life. For from the ontogenetic development which creates organs that cannot perform their functions until the adult state, to the property of all physiological states determined by certain environmental conditions to remanifest themselves at the first appearance of phenomena usually preceding these conditions, but in no wise constituting them; from the perfect way in which the organism in its entirety is morphologically adapted to its environment before the latter can exercise its formative influence, to all the wonderful formations and special structures so exactly adapted to all the most probable conditions to which this organism might later be exposed; from the simplest reflex motions that are directed so perfectly toward the preservation and welfare of the individual to the most complex instincts by means of which animals prepare in advance for future conditions of which they themselves are probably ignorant—all these "finalistic" phenomena of life, identical in their nature, can be

⁵⁰ Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, p. 338.

⁵¹ E. Mach, *Die Analyse der Empfindungen*, 5th ed., pp. 70, 78, Jena, Fischer; English edition: Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1897.

explained as so many manifestations of a purely mnemonic nature, as we have seen in our earlier writings mentioned above.

And now in the present essay we see that affective tendencies, which are even more conspicuously "finalistic" manifestations, are likewise based upon the mnemonic property of living substance, and hence in the last analysis upon the faculty of "specific accumulation," a faculty belonging exclusively to the nervous energy which underlies all life.

This mnemonic property, this faculty of "specific accumulation," which by its absence leaves inorganic nature exclusively in the power of forces *a tergo* and deprives it of every finalistic aspect, is on the other hand everywhere present in organic nature and because of its presence makes the world of life a world apart, of which the most characteristic elements cannot be explained by the laws of physics and chemistry alone in the limited sense assigned to them to-day.

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FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE AND HIS DOCTRINE OF WILL TO POWER.

TO "boost" one's friends and to "knock" one's enemies constitutes the philosophy of no small number of men. It is true that most of these would be alarmed to think that so large a residuum of barbarism lingers in their breasts, but to this it amounts, however euphoniously it may be named. To these, striving for strength of individuality on their own part, and to those who, consciously or unconsciously, idolize this individuality when seen in others, as most of us do, it is refreshing to turn to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, the great modern philosopher of individualism.

It is true that one who vaguely feels that might is not only right but good, and who, unable to find a logical justification for this attitude, is seeking one who can give it a consistent formulation, has little to hope from Nietzsche. For if there was anything about which Nietzsche felt little concern that thing was consistency. He was beyond consistency just as his "superman" was "beyond good and evil." What is valuable in his work is not its fitness to convince but to persuade. It has in it all of the delightful, and at the same time all of the disgusting, features which belong to any philosophy that is pure emotionalism. What he utters in his books is not what he thinks but what he feels. His whole philosophy is the incoherent cry of a sensitive and suffering mortal, who knows that he has

been stung but does not take time to locate the wound. His books are filled with flashes of indignation and of deep, wild yearning for freedom from the decadence into which humanity has fallen, but are absolutely lacking in method and in sober judgment.

But despite this intrusion of so much of the personal equation in his philosophy Nietzsche's work is by no means insignificant. Its influence upon modern life, particularly in some places, has been immense. Despite, too, his contempt for consistency there is dominant in one phase of his work—and this is the central phase—a single, consistent strain. This is his doctrine of the Will to Power as the goal of life. To this doctrine, then, as the most notable defense of individualism extant, and to an estimate of its place in ethics, we shall turn.

I.

From what has been said above it will doubtless be suspected that an account of Nietzsche's life would throw light upon his work as philosopher. And so it does, though in a very unique manner. It will, therefore, be quite appropriate to look for a minute or two into his biography for some clue to his strangely extravagant philosophy.

To one who bears in mind the well-known fact that a man's philosophy is almost inevitably an expression of his temperament, it is doubly surprising to hear that Nietzsche, who prided himself on being the "Philosopher of the Immoral," "was," as Hugge says, "the perfection of a well-mannered boy and never did anything naughty." His whole life was a complete contradiction of his philosophy. Instead of in the company of the lion-natured beyond-man he grew up under feminine influences, his father having died when the boy was only five years old. In spite of the fact that he claimed to have learned from no one, he was a model student who got along well with

his classmates and wrote affectionate poems in honor of his school. Though he taught that God is dead and despised Christianity as the greatest scheme of revenge ever perpetrated by a malicious set of slaves, he was certificated from his school as strong in religion. A frenzied contemner of the slightest restraint, he was an exemplary soldier in the German army. An advocate of relentless struggle in which the weaker should be given no quarter, and a fierce denouncer of sympathy, he was obliged by circumstances to go to the Franco-Prussian war as nurse in the hospital instead of warrior in the field. A calumniator of pity, he was so deeply touched by the suffering which he saw there in the hospital that his health was permanently impaired by the shock. A worshiper of that mighty prowess to which he would have his superman attain, he was himself, throughout the greater part of his life, an invalid, obliged to resign his professorship at Basel because of ill health and to pass his time in various southern health resorts, for the most part a recluse shut up within a little room darkened that the light might not injure his eyes. Yearning to meet one more immoral than himself from whom he might learn, he was taken by his neighbors for a saint and presented with candles for his evening prayers. Certainly fate could not have been more ironical.

Startling as is this incongruity, it by no means argues insincerity. Indeed, however immature we may think his judgment, certainly insincerity is the last thing with which Nietzsche can be charged. There are passages in his books—and particularly in the *Zarathustra*—that are almost tragic with their burden of pathetic earnestness. Indeed it is out of this very incongruity between his ideals and attainments that his earnestness arises, and it was to it that reference was made above when it was said that the story of Nietzsche's life throws light upon his philosophy. He saw in his own life an extreme case of the de-

cadence of man. All that he was not and could not be he yearned for with a mighty yearning. This he idealized and preached as the goal of the beyond-man. It was not primarily because he hated the life about him that he urged a transvaluation of all values, but because he loved an ideal beyond, of which his own lack had made him feel its worth the more.

But there were other factors also in the making of the philosopher. Philosophy was his fate rather than his choice. By profession he was a philologist and professor of philology in the University of Basel. He was not without distinction in his profession and gave promise of no insignificant future. But the proper work of the philologist was too limited in scope to satisfy him. He hungered for the larger methods of philosophy. So he gradually drifted away from his philological orthodoxy and began to discuss questions affecting the relation of music to the origin of the Greek drama. Indeed a semi-philosophical music, like that of Wagner, was to him the deepest expression of life—an expression in which the inarticulate will in nature made itself felt. But such dabbling offended his musty fellow philologists and cost him the reputation which he had earned by his earlier books. But he cared not for the philologists and went on expounding Wagner. About this time, too, Schopenhauer's book came into his hands and influenced him profoundly. For a while he stopped here as a disciple of Schopenhauer, but the great German pessimist served only as a stepping stone to a more positive philosophy. As Nietzsche himself says, Schopenhauer only enabled him to find his true self. And so he passed on inevitably from the Will to Live to the Will to Power.

But as might be expected, each added step toward radicalism cost him the loss of more friends—friends whom he could not afford to spare, for he loved the friendship of

strong men and women. His friendship for Wagner, whom he had almost worshiped, was gradually turned to hatred. He broke with his publisher and being unable to find another was obliged to have his books published at his own expense. Even his sister, who had understood him best and had sympathized with him most, was for a time estranged from him. His books would no longer sell and he turned his hopes to the future for a hearing. Of one of his now best known books he had only forty copies printed intending to distribute them among his friends but could dispose of only seven of them—so forsaken was he.

It must not be understood from this that Nietzsche was personally disagreeable. He was not. He was ostracized only because of his too great nobility—a nobility which would not permit him to compromise a single point for the sake of ease. Most of these estrangements were due to some insincerity in the character of the friend which was forced upon Nietzsche's attention and which he could not endure. Some others, as that of his sister—happily only temporary—were due to mistakes. None was due to any fault of Nietzsche's.

It is true that Nietzsche himself courted this hard life. The principles by which he admits having governed his actions were by no means such as to soften the pricks against which he inevitably ran. But Nietzsche had only contempt for those who so conducted their lives that they might be able to sleep well. "Seek I happiness?" he has Zarathustra say, "I seek my work."

A few words regarding his metaphysics—in so far as he had any—may also throw light upon his ethical doctrine. His philosophy he bases upon the assumption that God is dead—that is, not only the God of popular tradition but also God as the ultimate ground of the universe. What he finds everywhere is will, and not only will to live but

will to power. Moreover this is not a unified world will but many unrelated wills, each equally legitimate. It is the business of each thing then to force its way in the universe. Things are only what they are made. They are not found; they are created. "The doer," he says, "alone learneth." Apart from doing there is nothing to learn for facts do not hang together in such a way as to constitute truth. There is in the universe as such no unity, no coherence. It is foolish to speak about truth for there is no truth that belongs to the objective world. Only a fool would attempt to be consistent. The self is primal, the self is sovereign. There is no truth except what it creates.

One should not, then, permit one's self to be dominated by the past and its institutions. The present does not grow out of the past and owes nothing to it. It merely comes as it is made and stands entirely by itself. Values should not, therefore, be brought over from the past. The old tables should be broken and each day should make its own tables. To bind the present to the past by cords of convention is to fetter the sovereign self.

But this self which is sovereign is only "an earth head which giveth significance to earth." "He who is awake and knoweth saith 'body I am throughout and nothing besides; the soul is merely a word for something in body.' " The wisdom on which men pride themselves is only instinct. The processes that run through the universe are merely mechanical processes which run themselves out and then are reversed. This is Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, the doctrine that "all things recur eternally, ourselves included. . . . so that all these years are like unto each other in the greatest and in the smallest things." I leave the world now to find it again just as I left it. "Thus *willeth* mine eternal fate. As a proclaimer I perish. The

hour hath now come when the perishing one blesseth himself. Thus endeth Zarathustra's destruction."

II.

"The perishing one blesseth himself. Thus endeth Zarathustra's destruction." It is just thus that Nietzsche escapes pessimism. If one must perish then let one welcome perishing. If one has ugly passions then let him fully allow those passions and they become beautiful. He alone who attempts to fight fate and to crush out his instincts finds evil in the world, and whoever finds evil at all finds infinite evil since things eternally recur. Since this, then, is fate let man accept it. Let him say, as the fallen Satan did, if such be his instincts, "Evil be thou my good." "Thou laidest thy goal upon thy passions," says Nietzsche, "and they became thy virtue and thy delight." Let *Amor fati* be your motto. What you can not help, willingly embrace and call it good. To the irrevocable "it was" say "thus would I have it" and it remains no longer evil.

It is clear then that there can be no general ethical principles. "This is my way; where is yours?" I answered unto those who asked me for the way. 'For *the* way existeth not.' Any attempt to reduce life to order would be to suppress it. It would be to restrain the sovereign self. Whether authority is imposed from without or whether it is self imposed it is denial of life. "Good men," says Nietzsche, "never speak the truth. Whoever obeyeth doth not know himself." The proper society is an anarchistic society in which each one forces his own way and in which those who are not strong enough for this voluntarily go to the madhouse. "The state," says Nietzsche, "is a liar in all tongues of good and evil; whatever it saith it lieth, whatever it hath it hath stolen. . . . Verily this sign (i. e., the sign of the state because it attempts to enforce an

impossible equality) pointeth to the will unto death. Verily it waveth hands unto the preachers of death."

Only that has value which contributes to life. That alone is evil which crushes down life. Power is the goal of man. The will to power is the sovereign will which justifies itself and any means that the attainment of its goal demands. It is not quantity but quality that counts. "Too many are born," says Nietzsche, "For the superfluous the state was invented." For the evolution of the man of power the rabble must be freely sacrificed. He is not bound by the conventions of society. He is beyond good and evil. He is a law unto himself. He is the creator of values. He is not bound by the ties of the past. History centers about *him*. If he wishes to be ruthless then ruthlessness is his right. Indeed it is to be the special pride of the beyond-man that he has hewn his way up. "A right," says Zarathustra, "which thou canst take as a prey thou shalt not allow to be given to thee."

For the beyond-man there must be an entire transvaluation of all values. The virtues of the good are merely compromises within the herd by which they have agreed not to destroy each other. They are the conventions of cowards, not of strong men. They make toward death and not toward life. "With whom," says Nietzsche, "is the greatest danger for the whole human future? Is it not with the good and the just? For the good can not create, they are always the beginning of the end." But the virtue of the beyond-man will be in his immorality. It will be in his strength, in his might, in his towering grandeur. "What is evil," says Nietzsche, "is man's best power. Man must become better and more evil. Thus I teach. The evil is necessary for the best of beyond-man."

In the first place the beyond-man will be free from pity. Pity is weakening. It is a millstone about the neck of one who is seeking for egoistic power. It must be

killed or it will kill. "Pity," says Nietzsche, "was the murderer of God. . . . He was suffocated with pity."

Nor will the beyond-man concern himself at all to serve the herd whether with or without pity. He will let the sick themselves wait upon the sick. This moral sickness which holds the herd in its grip is contagious so let him who has his health beware. Let him be strong and merciless. Let the strength of his posterity atone for the sacrifice of his neighbor. "Spare not thy neighbor," counsels Zarathustra, "for man is something that must be surpassed. . . . Let the future and the most remote be for thee the cause of thy to-day."

Voluptuousness, thirst for power, and selfishness—these are the virtues of the beyond-man. But such a program meant to Nietzsche something far deeper than license. It was not a passive but an intensely active scheme of life which he was proposing. Upon these virtues he did not pitch because they were in defiance of the current morality but because he found them indispensable in the making of the man of power. He did not wish to dispense with morality but to change and, as he thought, to deepen, its meaning. If Nietzsche's beyond-man is to be beyond good and evil he will never be, as Nietzsche urges, beyond good and bad.

Nietzsche is not at all to be taken as primarily a hater, though hatred is about all that he succeeds in expressing. He despised man only in contrast with beyond-man, in the way of whose coming, man, with the good and evil of his slave morality, was standing. It is only when man forgets that he is a means and not a goal—which indeed he usually does—that Nietzsche directs his polemic against him. It is this new doctrine that man's glory lies in the fact that he is a means and not a goal, a rope between man and beyond-man, that Zarathustra comes down from the cave proclaiming, like John the Baptist from the wilder-

ness. All must be sacrificed, not on account of any evil that is involved in itself, but for the bringing in of the beyond-man. "My great love unto the most remote," says Nietzsche, "commandeth spare not thy neighbor. Man is something that must be surpassed." "From love alone my despising and my warning bird shall fly up, and not out of the swamp." "Oh my brethren," he says again, "when I bade you break the good and the tables of the good it was only that I put man on board ship for his high sea. . . . Walk upright in time, oh my brethren, learn how to walk upright. The sea stormeth. Many wish to raise themselves with your help. The sea stormeth, everything is in the sea. Up, upwards, ye old sailor hearts! What? A fatherland? Thither striveth our rudder where our *children's* land is. Out thither, stormier than the sea, our great longing stormeth."

But the doctrine of self-assertion which Nietzsche is advocating is by no means utilitarianism. It is true that he sometimes characterizes the state of the beyond-man as happiness but it is a very vigorous and even tragic kind of happiness. It is joy rather than happiness—the joy that one has in his strength when he is striving mightily and mastering. It is by no means that passive satisfaction which the utilitarian means by happiness. Indeed when he uses the word happiness to describe the state of the beyond-man he usually pairs it off with its direct opposite. It is an unnameable something that is at once joy and sorrow. "Unutterable and nameless," he says, "is that which maketh my soul's pain and sweetness, and it is a hunger of mine intestines," and at another place in speaking of the *optimum* he says, "It is not his road to happiness of which I am now speaking, but his road to power, to action, to mightiest action, and actually, in most cases, his road to unhappiness."

But, it may be asked, granted that this ideal of power

is true, does it necessarily involve the complete overturning of our tables or would it be sufficient if only we would interpret broadly our old rules of morality? Can power be attained, as Nietzsche thought, only beyond good and evil? The answer, I think, is clear. If you have in mind the type of power that Nietzsche did, and if you set it up as the sole measure of worth, then our present standards must be transcended. There can be no doubt that society, as now organized, must sacrifice the individual to the mass. There is constantly a centripetal force drawing both extremes toward a common mean. The weak are protected and the overstrong held in check. There is a constant clamor for charity institutions on the one hand and for graduated income taxes on the other. The weak man is given a lift and the strong man is envied and calumniated. It is the average man in whose making we are interested. In a dispute the presumption is always against the man of Nietzsche's hope. We leave him to take care of himself. Nothing seems more unethical to-day than the doctrine that to him that hath shall be given and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath. A society in which the mass was sacrificed to the production of the individual of power who intended to use and enjoy his power entirely egoistically would be a society in which values had been indeed transmuted.

III.

The defects of this doctrine are, I think, obvious. In the first place very few persons would be willing to accept the metaphysics upon which it is based or at least upon which it would need to be based for one who was concerned about being consistent. A materialism so thoroughgoing as that which Nietzsche sometimes expresses would not find many advocates at the present day. How "an earth-head" could "give signifi-

cance to earth" is something that I for my part can not understand. If "the soul is merely a name for something in body" it is the name for something that is of at least equal dignity with the body and probably by far the most important part of life. But if this is true then Nietzsche's emphasis is largely misplaced. The instincts, which he would unstintedly sanction, are the part of man which he brings up from the brutes rather than down from the gods, and they have no sacredness except for him who yearns back toward the brute. The thing that is most characteristic of man is conscious control rather than instinct. Certainly history has abundantly shown that man is most completely man not when he is giving rope to his instincts but when, at many points, he is inhibiting these, or at least organizing them into a larger unity.

In the next place a purely emotionalistic and nominalistic philosophy is certainly untenable. Nietzsche says in one of his apothegms, "We do the same when awake as when dreaming; we only invent and imagine him with whom we have intercourse and forget it immediately." But if we really do invent him with whom we have intercourse we at least invent him in a much more coherent way than that in which dreams are made. No one who wishes to be in the least true to experience can maintain that nature is wholly plastic. It is given, at least in part, independently of the capricious self and must be taken account of. Facts may be strung within certain limits so as to suit human purposes but withal they have a character of their own which no single self can capriciously transmute.

The isolated self is not, then, and can never be, wholly sovereign. It is not wholly true, as Nietzsche asserts, that no one can learn who does not create. There is something beyond which constitutes truth, and to which the ego must adjust itself if it is not to commit suicide. A self is not isolated but is a member of a larger system whether

it wishes to be or not. If it could be divorced from this system it would cease to be a self. One need not become a member of any human society to be bound by limitations over which he has no control. His individual caprice is just as securely blocked by the inflexibility of nature as by any social compacts. One can therefore approximate to sovereignty much more nearly by accepting certain social limitations in exchange for physical ones, for from the limitations imposed by physical conditions one can free himself to any great extent only by cooperating with his fellows and by accepting whatever limitations such cooperation makes necessary. The acceptance of such limitations is not the will unto death, as Nietzsche thinks, but rather the will to a larger life. It does not destroy sovereignty; it makes toward sovereignty, as far as sovereignty is possible for man. Only thus, indeed, if at all, can the mighty man be brought forth.

In another of his apothegms Nietzsche says, "It is a terrible thing to die of thirst at sea. It is necessary that you should so salt your truth that it will no longer quench thirst." Now to die of thirst at sea is exactly the fate that would overtake the beyond-man. If he is to attain to strength he must have mighty battles to fight. He can not attain added prowess, nor even maintain that which he has acquired, except by engaging in new conquests. But his battle could not be against himself for his ideal is to affirm rather than to deny his instincts. It could be only against weakness—against the slave morality and his tendency to revert to this. But suppose that Nietzsche's doctrine should ever come to prevail and the beyond-man should cease to be looked upon as the immoral one, whom then should he despise that his ruggedness might grow by feeding upon his contempt? Clearly then the salt with which his truth was salted would have lost its savor. One can not be a sovereign and yet remain a fighter. Struggle,

if it is to be real, demands something foreign to the individual, which has a will of its own, and which limits the will of him who encounters it. A too plastic world is no place for the hero. His supreme success is at the same time his supreme failure.

Even though one be seeking for individualistic power he dare not cut himself off from his fellows. The road to strength does not lead through the wilderness but through the market place. One's deepest problems are those which spring out of one's relation to one's fellows. One is on the surest road to might when he is boasting others as well as himself—when he is a champion instead of an outlaw. It may be true, indeed, that such conquests in and for society will call for self-denial, but self-denial for the sake of some larger victory is by no means "will unto death." If the sense of mastery has worth it has equal worth in whatever sphere it be won. If therefore Nietzsche is right in contending that power is the goal of life the method which he proposes for acquiring that power would certainly defeat its own end. A policy of exclusion and of constant yea-saying can never lead to sovereignty. If one wishes to be sovereign he must first learn to be servant. It is, then, the code of the independent self, rather than that of the member of the herd, which is "the virtue that maketh smaller."

It is scarcely necessary to say here that Nietzsche lacks utterly the historic spirit. That fact is only too glaring on every page of his books. The real motives back of the reigning types of religion and of morality he entirely misapprehended. Whatever errors may be involved in any religion, religion is by no means, in origin and essence, a gigantic scheme of revenge. The will to self-control in society does *not* spring, as Nietzsche supposed, from either hatred of life or cowardice. My love for my neighbor is *not* my bad love for myself. I do not restrain myself within

the limits of moderation merely in order that I may sleep well. That Nietzsche saw no more in life than that shows only that he had not looked beyond the surface and that he saw only external authority and fraud in principles that are rooted in the very nature of life.

But the coming of the beyond-man we need not fear. Nietzsche looked for him as the culmination of the process of biological evolution. But evolution is not tending in that direction and is not at all likely to do so. Greater social solidarity, and not greater independence of the component parts, is the unmistakable drift. The beyond-man will be "beyond" only in the degree of his acquiescence in good and evil and not in his defiance of them. Social solidarity has always been a greater factor in survival than individual strength. The isolated beyond-man of Nietzsche's dream would have, then, less chance of surviving than a band of monkeys. Thus, instead of making toward death, pity, sympathy, and acquiescence in authority are the only conditions upon which life remains possible. A new type of morality which left these out could never lift man above himself.

IV.

But certainly Nietzsche was right when he maintained that life is primal. Knowledge and truth *are* for the sake of life. Facts are true only when they have been so formulated as to function efficiently in life. If they have not been so formulated a truer formulation is possible. Virtue, too, is nothing in itself. "Virtue for virtue's sake" is a perversion that well deserves the bitterest polemic. Too often it has been forgotten that the moral law, like the Sabbath, was made for man and not man for the law. Too often fulness of life is sacrificed to an outworn abstraction which is taken to be a principle having worth in itself. In

Nietzsche's time this dogmatism was particularly prevalent and his reaction against it was altogether proper.

He is right, too, in contending that standards of value must be transmuted and that the old tables must be broken. Rightly a table of virtues or of duties should never be made, for it can be at best only a gross approximation to what it should be. The occasion alone defines the duty. Each situation calls for a unique solution and can be solved only in terms of the expected contribution which will be made to life. Rightly there should be no moral law except what the self finds good as each particular occasion arises. Of course so free a self should have a criterion deeper than the moment's caprice, but in an ideal world the agent should not be hampered by any artificial formulas.

There is a certain amount of truth, too, in Nietzsche's doctrine of the sovereignty of the self. One has a right to resent being imposed upon. A self is a person and not a thing. In so far as a self is used merely as a tool it is not a self. Its selfhood consists in its autonomy. Obligation can not be imposed from without. It must be freely accepted. Even God could not impose obligation upon a self without retracting its selfhood. Nietzsche would be right, therefore, in spurning restraints if they were merely external. They can be justified only when they are self-imposed—a possibility which Nietzsche did not take with sufficient seriousness.

But a self-imposed or, which is the same thing, a self-accepted, restraint is quite consistent with the sovereignty of the self. It is of this kind that moral principles are. Social institutions are not thrust upon men by the gods or by cunning schemers. They are slowly evolved with the implied consent of those who accept them and are acquiesced in because they add to the fulness of life. The hardships which they chance to involve are accepted along with their blessings, for rational animals realize that when

they have accepted a scheme they have implied in its acceptance acquiescence in its consequences. Even, then, if they as individuals should suffer in consequence of those institutions such suffering would be no imposition from without upon the sovereign self.

Nietzsche's doctrine of the worth of the sense of power is not by any means without a parallel in the history of philosophy. It forms the core of all Fichtean and Hegelian philosophy. Life would be sterile without conquest, say the thinkers of this type. In such a world as that with which we are acquainted, at any rate, we can attain to character only through struggle and through suffering. Attainment, except as the culmination of such struggle, would be a tame affair. We prize things only in proportion to the effort which we must make to get them. The sense of mastery, the sense of power, has worth, and supreme worth. Life would lose much of its significance were the necessity for struggle, and the possibility of the sense of mastery which can come only with struggle, taken away. "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread" turns out to be a blessing and not a curse. The results of a game which can be put into statistical form are by far the least significant results. It is the sense of power that victory gives that counts for most.

But this craving for power is not merely an instance of human perversity. It is the deepest of all metaphysical facts. It is in terms of it that the universe is to be expressed. There is no reason why God should go beyond himself to create a world except that there might be a field for conquest and hence for the enrichment of being. And having created a world there is no reason why he should not have created it complete and perfect at a single stroke except the fact that power through conquest is better than static perfection. There is no other reason why God should permit the course of existence to roll on

through such a devious path, approaching its goal only in an asymptotical manner. God is not bound by any implications within the system of existent things. Why should he not, then, suspend the rules of the game and bring the world to its goal in a single leap? Nothing can limit an infinite self. By suspending the rules he could injure no one but himself.

Ah, but he would injure himself. He would annihilate himself just because, even for God, life lies in the quest. It is not the end but what is involved in attaining the end that counts. To abandon a purpose is to abandon selfhood, for a self can be defined only in terms of the pursuit of a specific goal. The reality is in the process, in the struggle. The worth, then, is not in the consummated victory, for this is infinitely far away, but in a progressive synthesis, in mastery, in power.

But if power has value for the whole it also has value for the particularizations of that whole. The finite life is a part, an aspect, of the divine life. What is God's is also man's and what is man's is God's. The infinite self is made up of his particular self-expressions. What, then, is a factor in his life must be a factor also in these. If conquest, and power through conquest, alone can constitute worth for God it must also constitute worth for man. For him, too, life must lie in the quest. The power that is his is not his alone. It is also his contribution to the whole, precisely because he is that whole in one of its phases of self-activity.

But perhaps such an excursion into a system of metaphysics with which many persons will not agree should not be attempted here. It is not necessary for our purpose. The logic of passion holds as well in a pluralistic as in a monistic universe—for an isolated finite self as well as for an infinite self. Indeed we impute it to the Infinite merely on the basis of what we see about us. It is the very essence

of passion to seek its antithesis — to desire a problem through the solution of which it may assert its mastery. If there were in the universe nothing but "an earth-head," as Nietzsche thought was the case, that earth-head would disintegrate the moment it had fought its last battle and won its last victory. That this is true shows what a vital place the struggle for mastery, for power, holds in life however life may be viewed.

But why, one may ask, should a self choose so painful a lot? Would not life be less tragic if one were satisfied with calmer joys? Why not pleasure instead of power? Is it not a sufficient justification of a policy of life that it enables one to sleep well? Well, one can only reply to him who wishes that the universe had been so made that most of us would not want it so. We can give no other reason for preferring power through struggle except that, despite its painful suspense and its hard knocks, it approves itself to us as valuable. Should one say, as the charcoal of Nietzsche's fable to the diamond, "Why so hard, brother?", it is sufficient reply to answer merely "Why so soft?" There is a joy in the sense of power which no amount of passive pleasure could ever equal. Very few of us, indeed, would be willing to exchange the militant life of this terrestrial sphere for a heaven of inactivity where we could wallow forever in the mud and bask eternally in the sunshine.

And so, when rightly defined, the will to power has a legitimate place in morality. Of course one must not define power merely in physical terms and one must realize that it can be truly attained only as it is shared. But thus shared and thus broadly defined it must find its place in any adequate scheme of life.

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MAX STIRNER, THE PREDECESSOR OF
NIETZSCHE.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, the author of "Thus Spake Zarathustra" and the inventor of a new ideal called the "overman," is commonly regarded as the most extreme egotist, to whom morality is non-existent and who glories in the coming of the day in which a man of his liking—the overman—would live *au grand jour*. His philosophy is an individualism carried to its utmost extreme, sanctioning egotism, denouncing altruism and establishing the right of the strong to trample the weak under foot. It is little known, however, that he followed another thinker, Johann Caspar Schmidt, whose extreme individualism he adopted. But this forerunner who preached a philosophy of the sovereignty of self and an utter disregard of our neighbors' rights remained unheeded; he lived in obscurity, he died in poverty, and under the pseudonym "Max Stirner" he left behind a book entitled *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*.

The historian Lange briefly mentioned him in his *History of Materialism*, and the novelist John Henry Mackay followed up the reference which led to the discovery of this lonely comet on the philosophical sky.

The strangest thing about this remarkable book consists in the many coincidences with Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. It is commonly deemed impossible that the famous spokesman of the overman should not have been

thoroughly familiar with this failure in the philosophical book market; but while Stirner was forgotten the same ideas transplanted into the volumes of the author of "Thus Spake Zarathustra" found an echo first in Germany and soon afterwards all over the world.

Stirner's book has been Englished by Stephen T. Byington with an introduction by J. L. Walker at the instigation of Benjamin R. Tucker, the representative of American peaceful anarchism, under the title *The Ego and His Own*. They have been helped by Mr. George Schumm and his wife Mrs. Emma Heller Schumm. These five persons, all interested in this lonely and unique thinker, must have had much trouble in translating the German original and though the final rendering of the title is not inappropriate, the translator and his advisers agree that it falls short of the mark. For the accepted form Mr. B. R. Tucker is responsible, and he admits in the preface that it is not an exact equivalent of the German. *Der Einzige* means "the unique man," a person of a definite individuality, but in the book itself our author modifies and enriches the meaning of the term. The unique man becomes the ego and an owner (*ein Eigener*), a man who is possessed of property, especially of his own being. He is a master of his own and he prides himself on his ownhood, as well as his ownership. As such he is unique, and the very term indicates that the thinker who proposes this view-point is an extreme individualist. In Stirner's opinion Christianity pursued the ideal of liberty, liberty from the world; and in this sense Christians speak of spiritual liberty. To become free from anything that oppresses us we must get rid of it, and so the Christian to rid himself of the world becomes a prey to the idea of a contempt of the world. Stirner declares that the future has a better lot in store for man. Man shall not merely be free, which is a purely negative quality, but he shall be his own master; he shall become an owner

of his own personality and whatever else he may have to control. His end and aim is he himself. There is no moral duty above him. Stirner explains in the very first sentence of his book:

"What is not supposed to be my concern! First and foremost, the good cause, then God's cause, the cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom, of humanity, of justice; further, the cause of my people, my prince, my fatherland; finally, even the cause of mind, and a thousand other causes. Only *my* cause is never to be my concern. 'Shame on the egoist who thinks only of himself!'"

Stirner undertakes to refute this satirical explanation in his book on the unique man and his own, and a French critic according to Paul Lauterbach (p. 5) speaks of his book as *un livre qu'on quitte monarque*, "a book which one lays aside a king."

Stirner is opposed to all traditional views. He is against church and state. He stands for the self-development of every individual, and insists that the highest duty of every one is to stand up for his ownhood.

J. L. Walker in his Introduction contrasts Stirner with Nietzsche and gives the prize of superiority to the former, declaring him to be a genuine anarchist not less than Josiah Warren, the ideal of the small band of New England anarchists. He says:

"In Stirner we have the philosophical foundation for political liberty. His interest in the practical development of egoism to the dissolution of the state and the union of free men is clear and pronounced, and harmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy of Josiah Warren. Allowing for difference of temperament and language, there is a substantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon. Each would be free, and sees in every increase of the number of free people and their intelligence an auxiliary force against the oppressor. But, on the other hand, will any one for a moment seriously contend that Nietzsche and Proudhon march together in general aim and tendency,—that they have anything in common except the daring to profane the shrine and sepulcher of superstition?"

"Nietzsche has been much spoken of as a disciple of Stirner, and, owing to favorable cullings from Nietzsche's writings, it has occurred that one of his books has been supposed to contain more sense than it really does—so long as one had read only the extracts.

"Nietzsche cites scores or hundreds of authors. Had he read everything, and not read Stirner?

"But Nietzsche is as unlike Stirner as a tight-rope performance is unlike an algebraic equation.

"Stirner loved liberty for himself, and loved to see any and all men and women taking liberty, and he had no lust of power. Democracy to him was sham liberty, egoism the genuine liberty.

"Nietzsche, on the contrary, pours out his contempt upon democracy because it is not aristocratic. He is predatory to the point of demanding that those who must succumb to feline rapacity shall be taught to submit with resignation. When he speaks of 'anarchistic dogs' scouring the streets of great civilized cities, it is true, the context shows that he means the communists; but his worship of Napoleon, his bathos of anxiety for the rise of an aristocracy that shall rule Europe for thousands of years, his idea of treating women in the Oriental fashion, show that Nietzsche has struck out in a very old path—doing the apotheosis of tyranny. We individual egoistic anarchists, however, may say to the Nietzsche school, so as not to be misunderstood: We do not ask of the Napoleons to have pity, nor of the predatory barons to do justice. They will find it convenient for their own welfare to make terms with men who have learned of Stirner what a man can be who worships nothing, bears allegiance to nothing. To Nietzsche's rhodomontade of eagles in baronial form, born to prey on industrial lambs, we rather tauntingly oppose the ironical question: Where are your claws? What if the 'eagles' are found to be plain barnyard fowls on which more silly fowls have fastened steel spurs to hack the victims, who, however, have the power to disarm the sham 'eagles' between two suns?

"Stirner shows that men make their tyrants as they make their gods, and his purpose is to unmake tyrants.

"Nietzsche dearly loves a tyrant.

"In style Stirner's work offers the greatest possible contrast to the puerile, padded phraseology of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* and its false imagery. Who ever imagined such an unnatural conjuncture as an eagle 'toting' a serpent in friendship? which performance is told of in bare words, but nothing comes of it. In Stirner we are treated to an enlivening and earnest discussion addressed to serious

minds, and every reader feels that the word is to him, for his instruction and benefit, so far as he has mental independence and courage to take it and use it. The startling intrepidity of this book is infused with a whole-hearted love for all mankind, as evidenced by the fact that the author shows not one iota of prejudice or any idea of division of men into ranks. He would lay aside government, but would establish any regulation deemed convenient, and for this only *our* convenience is consulted. Thus there will be general liberty only when the disposition toward tyranny is met by intelligent opposition that will no longer submit to such a rule. Beyond this the manly sympathy and philosophical bent of Stirner are such that rulership appears by contrast a vanity, an infatuation of perverted pride. We know not whether we more admire our author or more love him.

"Stirner's attitude toward woman is not special. She is an individual if she can be, not handicapped by anything he says, feels, thinks, or plans. This was more fully exemplified in his life than even in this book; but there is not a line in the book to put or keep woman in an inferior position to man, neither is there anything of caste or aristocracy in the book."

It is not our intention to enter here into a detailed criticism of Stirner's book. We will only point out that society will practically remain the same whether we consider social arrangements as voluntary contracts or as organically developed social institutions, or as imposed upon mankind by the divine world-order, or even if czars and kings claim to govern "by the grace of God." Whatever religious or natural sanction any government may claim to possess, the method of keeping order will be the same everywhere. Wrongs have been done and in the future may still be committed in the name of right, and injustice may again and again worst justice in the name of the law. On the other hand, however, we can notice a progress throughout the world of a slow but steady improvement of conditions. Any globe-trotter will find by experience that his personal safety, his rights and privileges are practically the same in all civilized countries, whether they are republics like Switzerland, France and the United States,

or monarchies like Sweden, Germany and Italy. At the same time murders, robberies, thefts and other crimes are committed all over the world, even in the homes of those who pride themselves on being the most civilized nations. The world-conception lying behind our different social theories is the same wherever the same kind of civilization prevails. Where social evils prevail, dissatisfaction sets in which produces theories and reform programs, and when they remain unheeded by reaching a certain climax, leads to revolution.

Stirner's book begins with a short exhortation headed with Goethe's line,

"My trust in nothingness is placed."

He discusses the character of human life (Chap. I) and contrasts men of the old and the new eras (Chap. II). He finds that the ancients idealized bodily existence while Christianity incarnates the ideal. Greek artists transfigure actual life; in Christianity the divine takes abode in the world of flesh, God becomes incarnate in man. The Greeks tried to go beyond the world and Christianity came; Christian thinkers are pressed to go beyond God, and there they find spirit. They are led to a contempt of the world and will finally end in a contempt of spirit. But Stirner believes that the ideal and the real can never be conciliated, and we must free ourselves from the errors of the past. The truly free man is not the one who has become free, but the one who has come into his own, and this is the sovereign ego.

As Achilles had his Homer so Stirner found his prophet in a German socialist of Scotch Highlander descent, John Henry Mackay. The reading public should know that Mackay belongs to the same type of restless reformers, and he soon became an egoistic anarchist, a disciple of Stirner. His admiration is but a natural consequence of

conditions. Nevertheless Mackay's glorification of Stirner proves that in Stirner this onesided world-conception has found its classical, its most consistent and its philosophically most systematic presentation. Whatever we may have to criticize in anarchism, Stirner is a man of uncommon distinction, the leader of a party, and the standard-bearer of a cause distinguished by the extremeness of its propositions which from the principle of individualism are carried to their consistent ends.

Mackay undertook the difficult task of unearthing the history of a man who, naturally modest and retired, had nowhere left deep impressions. No stone remained unturned and every clue that could reveal anything about his hero's life was followed up with unprecedented devotion. He published the results of his labors in a book entitled "Max Stirner, His Life and His Work."¹ The report is extremely touching not so much on account of the great significance of Stirner's work which to impartial readers appears exaggerated, but through the personal tragedy of a man who towers high over his surroundings and suffers in the misery of poverty and failure.

Mr. Mackay describes Stirner as of medium height, rather less so than more, well proportioned, slender, always dressed with care though without pretension, having the appearance of a teacher, and wearing silver- or steel-rimmed spectacles. His hair and beard were blonde with a tinge of red, his eyes blue and clear, but neither dreamy nor penetrating. His thin lips usually wore a sarcastic smile, which however had nothing of bitterness; his general appearance was sympathetic. No portrait of Stirner is in existence except one pencil sketch which was made from memory in 1892 by the London socialist Friedrich Engels, but the criticism is made by those who knew Stirner that his features, especially his chin and the top of his head,

¹ *Max Stirner, sein Leben und sein Werk.* Berlin, Schuster, 1898.

were not so angular though nose and mouth are said to have been well portrayed, and Mackay claims that he never wore a coat and collar of that type.

Stirner was of purely Frankish blood. His ancestors lived for centuries in or near Baireuth. His father, Albert Christian Heinrich Schmidt of Anspach, a maker of wind-instruments, died of consumption in 1807 at the age of 37, a half a year after the birth of his son. His mother, Sophie Eleanora, née Reinlein of the city of Erlangen, six months later married H. F. L. Ballerstedt, the assistant in an



PENCIL SKETCH OF MAX STIRNER.

The only portrait in existence.

apothecary shop in Helmstedt, and moved with him to Kulm on the Vistula. In 1818 the boy was sent back to his native city where his childless god-father and uncle Johann Caspar Martin Sticht and his wife took care of him.

Young Johann Caspar passed through school with credit, and his schoolmates used to call him "Stirner" on account of his high forehead (*Stirn*) which was the most conspicuous feature of his face. This name clung to him throughout life. In fact his most intimate friends never

called him by any other, his real name being almost forgotten through disuse and figuring only in official documents.

Stirner attended the universities of Erlangen, Berlin and Königsberg, and finally passed his examination for admission as a teacher in gymnasial schools. His stepfather died in the summer of 1837 in Kulm at the age of 76. It is not known what became of his mother who had been mentally unsound for some time.

Neither father nor stepfather had ever been successful, and if Stirner ever received any inheritance it must have been very small. On December 12 of 1837 Stirner married Agnes Clara Kunigunde Burtz, the daughter of his landlady.

Their married life was brief, the young wife dying in a premature child-birth on August 29th. We have no indication of an ardent love on either side. He who wrote with passionate fire and with so much insistence in his philosophy, was calm and peaceful, subdued and quiet to a fault in real life.

Having been refused appointment in one of the public or royal schools Stirner accepted a position in a girls' school October 1, 1839. During the political fermentation which preceded the revolutionary year of 1848, he moved in the circle of those bold spirits who called themselves *Die Freien* and met at Hippel's, among whom were Ludwig Buhl, Meyen, Friedrich Engels, Mussak, C. F. Köppenn, the author of a work on Buddha, Dr. Arthur Müller and the brothers Bruno, Egbert and Edgar Bauer. It was probably among their associates that Stirner met Marie Dähnhardt of Gadebusch near Schwerin, Mecklenburg, the daughter of an apothecary, Helmuth Ludwig Dähnhardt. She was as different from Stirner as a dashing emancipated woman can be from a gentle meek man, but these contrasts were joined together in wedlock on October

21, 1843. Their happiness did not last long, for Marie Dähnhardt left her husband at the end of three years.

The marriage ceremony of this strange couple has been described in the newspapers and it is almost the only fact of Stirner's life that stands out boldly as a well-known incident. That these descriptions contain exaggerations and distortions is not improbable, but it cannot be denied that much contained in the reports must be true.

On the morning of October 21, a clergyman of extremely liberal views, Rev. Marot, a member of the Consistory, was called to meet the witnesses of the ceremony at Stirner's room. Bruno Bauer, Buhl, probably also Julius Faucher, Assessor Kochius and a young English woman, a friend of the bride, were present. The bride was in her week-day dress. Mr. Marot asked for a Bible, but none could be found. According to one version the clergyman was obliged to request Herr Buhl to put on his coat and to have the cards removed. When the rings were to be exchanged the groom discovered that he had forgotten to procure them, and according to Wilhelm Jordan's recollection Bauer pulled out his knitted purse and took off the brass rings, offering them as a substitute during the ceremony. After the wedding a dinner with cold punch was served to which Mr. Marot was invited. But he refused, while the guests stayed on and the wedding carousal proceeded in its jolly course.

In order to understand how this incident was possible we must know that in those pre-revolutionary years the times were out of joint and these heroes of the rebellion wished to show their disrespect and absolute indifference to a ceremony that to them had lost all its sanctity.

Stirner's married life was very uneventful, except that he wrote the main book of his life and dedicated it to his wife after a year's marriage, with the words,

"Meinem Liebchen
Marie Dähnhardt."

Obviously this form which ignores the fact that they were married, and uses a word of endearment which in this connection is rather trivial, must be regarded as characteristic for their relation and their life principles. Certain it is that she understood only the negative features of her husband's ideals and had no appreciation of the genius that stirred within him. Lauterbach, the editor of the Reclam edition of Stirner's book, comments ironically on this dedication with the Spanish motto *Da Dios almen-dras al que no tiene muelas*, "God gives almonds to those who have no teeth."

Marie Dähnhardt was a graceful blonde woman rather under-sized with heavy hair which surrounded her head in ringlets according to the fashion of the time. She was very striking and became a favorite of the round table of the *Freien* who met at Hippel's. She smoked cigars freely and sometimes donned male attire, in order to accompany her husband and his friends on their nightly excursions. It appears that Stirner played the most passive part in these adventures, but true to his principle of individuality we have no knowledge that he ever criticized his wife.

Marie Dähnhardt had lost her father early and was in possession of a small fortune of 10,000 thalers, possibly more. At any rate it was considered quite a sum in the circle of Stirner's friends, but it did not last long. Having written his book, Stirner gave up his position so as to prevent probable discharge and now they looked around for new resources. Though Stirner had studied political economy he was a most unpractical man; but seeing there was a dearth of milk-shops, he and his wife started into business. They made contracts with dairies but did not advertise their shop, and when the milk was delivered to

them they had large quantities of milk on hand but no patrons, the result being a lamentable failure with debts.

In the circle of his friends Stirner's business experience offered inexhaustible material for jokes, while at home it led rapidly to the dissolution of his marriage. Frau Schmidt complained in later years that her husband had wasted her property, while no complaints are known from him. One thing is sure that they separated. She went to England where she established herself as a teacher under the protection of Lady Bunsen, the wife of the Prussian ambassador.

Frau Schmidt's later career is quite checkered. She was a well-known character in the colony of German exiles in London. One of her friends there was a Lieutenant Techow. When she was again in great distress she emigrated with other Germans, probably in 1852 or 1853, to Melbourne, Australia. Here she tasted the misery of life to the dregs. She made a living as a washerwoman and is reported to have married a day laborer. Their bitter experiences made her resort to religion for consolation, and in 1870 or 1871 she became a convert to the Catholic Church. At her sister's death she became her heir and so restored her good fortune to some extent. She returned to London where Mr. Mackay to his great joy discovered that she was still alive at the advanced age of eighty. What a valuable resource her reminiscences would be for his inquiries! But she refused to give any information and finally wrote him a letter which literally reads as follows: "Mary Smith *solemnly avowes* that she will have *no more* correspondence on the subject, and authorizes Mr. ———² to return all those writings to their owners. She is ill and prepares for death."

The last period of Stirner's life, from the time when

²The name of the gentleman she mentions is replaced by a dash at his express wish in the facsimile of her letter reproduced in Mr. Mackay's book (p. 255.)

his wife left him to his death is as obscure as his childhood days. He moved from place to place, and since his income was very irregular creditors pressed him hard. His lot was tolerable because of the simple habits of his life, his only luxury consisting in smoking a good cigar. In 1853 we find him at least twice in debtor's prison, first 21 days, from March 5 to 26, 1853, and then 36 days, from New Year's eve until February 4 of the next year. In the meantime (September 7) he moved to Philippstrasse 19. It was Stirner's last home. He stayed with the landlady of this place, a kind-hearted woman who treated all her boarders like a mother, until June 25, 1856, when he died rather suddenly as the result of the bite of a poisonous fly. A few of his friends, among them Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Buhl, attended his funeral; a second-class grave was procured for one thaler 10 groats, amounting approximately to one American dollar.

During this period Stirner undertook several literary labors from which he possibly procured some remuneration. He translated the classical authors on political economy from the French and from the English, which appeared under the title *Die National-Oekonomen der Franzosen und Engländer* (Leipsic, Otto Wigand, 1845-1847).

He also wrote a history of the Reaction which he explained to be a mere counter-revolution. This *Geschichte der Reaction* was planned as a much more comprehensive work, but the two volumes which appeared were only two parts of the second volume as originally intended.

The work is full of quotations, partly from Auguste Comte, partly from Edmund Burke. None of these works represent anything typically original or of real significance in the history of human thought.

His real contribution to the world's literature remains his work *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, the title of which is rendered in English *The Ego and His Own*, and this,

strange to say, enthrones the individual man, the ego, every personality, as a sovereign power that is not subject to morality, or rules, or obligations, or duties of any kind. The appeal is made so directly that it will convince all those half-educated and immature minds who after having surrendered their traditional faith find themselves without any authority in either religion or politics. God is to them a fable and the state an abstraction. Ideas and ideals, such as truth, goodness, beauty, are mere phrases. What then remains but the concrete bodily personality of every man of which every one is the ultimate standard of right and wrong?

It is strange that neither of these philosophers of individuality, Nietzsche or Stirner, has ever taken the trouble to investigate what an individual is. Stirner halts before this most momentous question of his world-conception, and so he overlooks that his ego, his own individuality, this supreme sovereign standing beyond right and wrong, the ultimate authority of everything, is a hazy, fluctuating, uncertain thing which differs from day to day and finally disappears.

The individuality of any man is the product of communal life. No one of us could exist as a rational personality were he not a member of a social group from which he has imbibed his ideas as well as his language. Every word is a product of his intercourse with his fellow-beings. His entire existence consists in his relations toward others and finds expression in his attitude toward social institutions. We may criticize existent institutions but we can never do without any. A denial of either their existence or their significance proves an utter lack of insight into the nature of personality.

We insert here a few characteristic sentences of Stirner's views, and in order to be fair we follow the condensation of Mackay (pp. 135-192) than whom certainly we

could find no more sympathetic or intelligent student of this individualistic philosophy. Stirner claims the ancients came to the conclusions that man was spirit. They created a world of spirit, and in this world of spirit Christianity begins. But what is spirit? Spirit has originated from nothing. It is its own creation and man makes it the center of the world. The injunction was made, thou shalt not live to thyself but to thy spirit, to thy ideas. Spirit is the God, the ego and the spirit are in constant conflict. Spirit dwells beyond the earth. It is in vain to force the divine into service here for I am neither God nor man, neither the highest being nor my being. The spirit is like a ghost whom no one has seen, but of whom there are innumerable creditable witnesses, such as grandmother can give account of. The whole world that surrounds thee is filled with spooks of thy imagination. The holiness of truth which hallows thee is a strange element. It is not thine own and strangeness is a characteristic of holiness. The specter is truly only in thine ownhood Right is a spleen conferred by a spook; might, that is myself. I am the mighty one and the owner of might Right is the royal will of society. Every right which exists is created right. I am expected to honor it where I find it and subject myself to it. But what to me is the right of society, the right of all? What do I care for equality of right, for the struggle for right, for inalienable rights? Right becomes word in law. The dominant will is the preserver of the states. My own will shall upset them. Every state is a despotism. All right and all power is claimed to belong to the community of the people. I, however, shall not allow myself to be bound by it, for I recognize no duty even though the state may call crime in me what it considers right for itself. My relation to the state is not the relation of one ego to another ego. It is the relation of the sinner to the saint, but the saint is a

mere fixed idea from which crimes originate (Mackay, pages 154-5).

It will sometimes be difficult to translate Stirner's declarations in their true meaning; for instance: "I am the owner of mankind, I am mankind and shall do nothing for the benefit of another mankind. The property of mankind is mine. I do not respect the property of mankind. Poverty originates when I can not utilize my own self as I want to. It is the state which hinders men from entering into a direct relation with others. On the mercy of right my private property depends. Only within prescribed limits am I allowed to compete. Only the medium of exchange, the money which the state makes, am I allowed to use. The forms of the state may change, the purpose of the state always remains the same. My property, however, is what I empower myself to. Let violence decide, I expect all from my own.

"You shall not lure me with love, nor catch me with the promise of communion of possessions, but the question of property will be solved only through a war of all against all, and what a slave will do as soon as he has broken his fetters we shall have to see. I know no law of love. As every one of my sentiments is my property, so also is love. I give it, I donate it, I squander it merely because it makes me happy. Earn it if you believe you have a right to it. The measure of my sentiments can not be prescribed to me, nor the aim of my feelings determined. We and the world have only one relation towards each other, that of usefulness. Yea, I use the world and men." (Pp. 156-157.)

As to promises made and confidence solicited Stirner would not allow a limitation of freedom. He says: "In itself an oath is no more sacred than a lie is contemptible." Stirner opposes the idea of communism. "The community of man creates laws for society. Communism is a communion in equality." Says Stirner, "I prefer to depend

on the egotism of men rather than on their compassion." He feels himself swelled into a temporary, transient, puny deity. No man expresses him rightly, no concept defines him; he, the ego, is perfect. Stirner concludes his book: "Owner I am of my own power and I am such only when I know myself as the only one. In the only one even the owner returns into his creative nothingness from which he was born. Any higher being above, be it God or man, detracts from the feeling of my uniqueness and it pales before the sun of this consciousness. If I place my trust in myself, the only one, it will stand upon a transient mortal creator of himself, who feeds upon himself, and I can say,

"Ich hab mein Sach' auf nichts gestellt."

"In nothingness I placed my trust."

We call attention to Stirner's book, "The Only One and His Ownhood," not because we are overwhelmed by the profundity of his thought but because we believe that here is a man who ought to be answered, whose world-conception deserves a careful analysis which finally would lead to a justification of society, the state and the ideals of right and truth.

Society is not, as Stirner imagines, an artificial product of men who band themselves together in order to produce a state to the benefit of a clique. Society and state, as well as their foundation the family, are of a natural growth. All the several social institutions (kind of spiritual organisms) are as much organisms as are plants and animals. The cooperation of the state with religious, legal, civic and other institutions, are as much realities as are individuals, and any one who would undertake to struggle against them or treat them as nonentities will be implicated in innumerable struggles.

Stirner is the philosopher of individualism. To him the individual, this complicated and fluctuant being, is a

reality, indeed the only true reality, while other combinations, institutions and social units are deemed to be mere nonentities. If from this standpoint the individualism of Stirner were revised, the student would come to radically different conclusions, and these conclusions would show that not without good reasons has the individual developed as a by-product of society, and all the possessions, intellectual as well as material, which exist are held by individuals only through the assistance and with the permission of the whole society or its dominant factors.

Both socialism and its opposite, individualism, which is ultimately the same as anarchism, are extremes that are based upon an erroneous interpretation of communal life. Socialists make society, and anarchists the individual their ultimate principle of human existence. Both are factors and both factors are needed for preserving the health of society as well as comprehending the nature of mankind. By neglecting either of these factors, we can only be led astray and arrive at wrong conclusions.

Poor Stirner wanted to exalt the ego, the sovereign individual, not only to the exclusion of a transcendent God and of the state or any other power, divine or social, but even to the exclusion of his own ideals, be it truth or anything spiritual; and yet he himself sacrificed his life for a propaganda of the ego as a unique and sovereign being. He died in misery and the recognition of his labors has slowly, very slowly, followed after his death. Yea, even after his death a rival individualist, Friedrich Nietzsche, stole his thunder and reaped the fame which Stirner had earned. Certainly this noble-minded, modest, altruistic egotist was paid in his own coin.

Did Stirner live up to his principle of ego sovereignty? In one sense he did; he recognized the right of every one to be himself, even when others infringed upon his own well-being. His wife fell out with him but he respected

her sovereignty and justified her irregularities. Apparently he said to himself, "She has as much right to her own personality as I to mine." But in another sense, so far as he himself was concerned, he did not. What became of his own rights, his ownhood, and the sweeping claim that the world was his property, that he was entitled to use or misuse the world and all mankind as he saw fit; that no other human being could expect recognition, nay not even on the basis of contracts, or promises, or for the sake of love, or humaneness and compassion? Did Stirner in his poverty ever act on the principle that he was the owner of the world, that there was no tie of morality binding on him, no principle which he had to respect? Nothing of the kind. He lived and died in peace with all the world, and the belief in the great ego sovereignty with its bold renunciation of all morality was a mere Platonic idea, a tame theory which had not the slightest influence upon his practical life.

Men of Stirner's type do not fare well in a world where the ego has come into its own. They will be trampled under foot, they will be bruised and starved, and they will die by the wayside. No, men of Stirner's type had better live in the protective shadow of a state; the worst and most despotic state will be better than none, for no state means mob rule or the tyranny of the bulldozer, the ruffian, the brutal and unprincipled self-seeker.

Here Friedrich Nietzsche comes in. Like Stirner, Nietzsche was a peaceful man; but unlike Stirner, Nietzsche had a hankering for power. Being pathological himself, without energy, without strength and without a healthy appetite and a good stomach, Nietzsche longed to play the part of a bulldozer among a herd of submissive human creatures whom he would control and command. This is Nietzsche's ideal, and he calls it the "overman."³

³ The translation "superman" is a solecism, for it is unnecessarily a com-

Here Nietzsche modified and added his own notion to Stirner's philosophy.

Goethe coined the word "overman" (*Ueberschensch*) in German and used it in the sense of an awe-inspiring being, almost in the sense of *Unmensch*, a man of might without humanity, whose sentiments are those of Titans, wild and unrestrained like the powers of nature. But the same expression was used in its proper sense about two and a half millenniums ago in ancient China, where at the time of Lao-tze the term *chün jen* (君人), "superior man," or *chün tze*, "superior sage," was in common usage. But the overman or *chün jen* of Lao-tze, of Confucius and other Chinese sages is not a man of power, not a Napoleon, not an unprincipled tyrant, not a self-seeker of domineering will, not a man whose ego and its welfare is his sole and exclusive aim, but a Christlike figure, who puts his self behind and thus makes his self—a nobler and better self—come to the front, who does not retaliate, but returns good for evil,⁴ a man (as the Greek sage describes him) who would rather suffer wrong than commit wrong.⁵

This kind of higher man is the very opposite of Nietzsche's overman, and it is the spirit of this nobler conception of a higher humanity which furnishes the best ideas of all the religions of the world, of Lao-tze's Taoism, of Buddhism and of Christianity. Stirner in his personal life is animated by it, and, thinking of the wrongs which the individual frequently suffers in a bureaucratic state through red tape and unnecessary police interference and other annoyances, he preaches the right of the individual and treats the state as non-existent—or rather as a spook, an error which exists only because our spleen endows it with

bination of the Latin *super* and Saxon *man*. Say "superhuman" and "overman" but not "overhuman" nor "superman."

⁴ *Lao-tze's Tao Teh King*, Chaps. 49 and 63.

⁵ For a collection of Greek quotations on the ethics of returning good for evil, see *The Open Court*, Vol. XV, 1901, pp. 9-12.

life. A careful investigation of the nature of the state as well as of our personality would have taught Stirner that both the state and the individual are realities. The state and society exist as much as the individuals of which they are composed,⁶ and no individual can ignore in his maxims of life the rules of conduct, the moral principles, or whatever you may call that something which constitutes the conditions of his existence, of his physical and social surroundings. The dignity and divinity of personality does not exclude the significance of superpersonalities; indeed the two, superpersonal presences with their moral obligations and concrete human persons with their rights and duties, cooperate with each other and produce thereby all the higher values of life.

Stirner is onesided but, within the field of his onesided view, consistent. Nietzsche spurns consistency but accepts the field of notions created by Stirner, and, glorying in the same extreme individualism, proclaims the gospel of that individual who on the basis of Stirner's philosophy would make the best of a disorganized state of society, who by taking upon himself the functions of the state would utilize the advantages thus gained for the suppression of his fellow beings; and this kind of individual is dignified with the title "overman."

Nietzsche has been blamed for appropriating Stirner's thoughts and twisting them out of shape from the self-assertion of every ego consciousness into the autocracy of the unprincipled man of power; but we must concede that the common rules of literary ethics can not apply to individualists who deny all and any moral authority. Why should Nietzsche give credit to the author from whom he drew his inspiration if neither acknowledges any rule which he feels obliged to observe? Nietzsche uses Stirner as Stirner declares that it is the good right of every ego to use his

⁶ See the author's *The Nature of the State*, 1894, and *Personality*, 1911.

fellows, and Nietzsche shows us what the result would be—the rise of a political boss, a brute in human shape, the overman.

Nietzsche is a poet, not a philosopher, not even a thinker, but as a poet he exercises a peculiar fascination upon many people who would never think of agreeing with him. Most admirers of Nietzsche belong to the class which Nietzsche calls the "herd animals," people who have no chance of ever asserting themselves, and become hungry for power as a sick man longs for health.

Individualism and anarchism continue to denounce the state, where they ought to reform it and improve its institutions. In the meantime the world wags on. The state exists, society exists, and innumerable social institutions exist. The individual grows under the influence of other individuals, his ideas—mere spooks of his brain—yet the factors of his life, right or wrong, guide him and determine his fate. There are as rare exceptions a few lawless societies in the wild West where a few outlaws meet by chance, revolver in hand, but even among them the state of anarchy does not last long, for by habit and precedent certain rules are established, and wherever man meets man, wherever they offer and accept one another's help, they cooperate or compete, they join hands or fight, they make contracts, they cooperate, and establish rules and the result is society, the state, and all the institutions of the state, a government, the legislation, the judiciary and all the intricate machinery which regulates the interrelations of man to man.

P. C.

BECOMING.

[Intimate friends of the late Major John Wesley Powell know that he was not only an anthropologist of high standing, an organizer and a born executive, a chief, educator and a reformer, for which qualities the University of Heidelberg conferred upon him the unusual honor of a doctor's degree, but that he also was a poet. In a former number of *The Monist* (Vol. V, No. 3) we published his poem on "The Soul," and we here insert another poem which describes evolution under the title "Becoming."]

OLD RIDDLE.

In marble walls as white as milk,
All lined with skin as soft as silk,
A golden apple doth appear,
In ambient bath of crystal clear.
There are no portals to behold,
Yet thieves break in and steal the gold.

SONG.

Island of beauty encircled
With girdle of filigree wave
Woven by tempest of ocean
Where tide follows moon as a slave—
Dream of my childhood, I love thee,
The home of my ancestors brave.

Glorious oak on the island
That stands by my forefather's home,
Down where the breakers are roaring,
Becrowned with their beautiful foam,
Why from thy shade have I wandered,
In turbulent regions to roam?

Musical robin of greenwood,
With bosom in blushes a gleam,
Ever your memory haunts me
In moment of silence supreme,
Borne from the scenes of my childhood,
To revel in many a dream.

THE ISLAND.

The sands of hill an island may become;
For summer shower gathers them in rills,
The brook receives them, bears them on to creek,
Which gives to river, it to ocean vast,
And then beneath the waves the sands are stayed—
An island egg in nest of sea is laid.

The island germ is fed by every rain
That falls among the hills where rivers run;
More sands from year to year and age to age
Come down with rains that fall from roaring storms
That ever ride on air from sea to land,
Until through waves there bursts an island grand.

THE OAK.

A seed a giant tree at last becomes;
For, planted well in soil of ocean's isle,

A treelet bourgeons from the acorn's heart,
Which penetrates the earth with hungry roots
And stretches arms to reach vivific light,
Its leaves in love with day, its roots with night.

And many a storm the creeping rootlets feed,
And many a zephyr caters deft to leaves,
And many a sunbeam leaves the orb of light
In journey swift past meteor and cloud
To marry crystal drops of summer rain
With yearning molecules of southern breeze,
Until as oak the treelet vies with pine
And bears in sturdy arms the pendent vine.

THE ROBIN.

An egg with turkis spots a robin holds:
The germ, sequestered safe in marble walls,
Is warmed to life by mother's tender care,
Who gathers crumbs from cottage tables cast
And fruit from meadow, copse, and forest tree.
The nestling, sconced in honeysuckle home,
Is neophyte that yet must learn to roam.

On welcome store of food the birdlet grows,
Evolving fingered feet with clasping skill
To perch upon the blossom-bearing bough,
With wings to hover over land and sea,
And eyes to revel far in scenes of light,
And tongue to give a loving mate delight.

THE LESSON.

The bird that sings on island tree,
The tree that stand on ocean's isle,

The isle that sleeps in boundless sea,
Forever poet's thought beguile.
O, beautiful isle, O, glorious tree,
O, musical bird, teach wisdom to me!

The word of truth is this they give to him
Who ponders well the meaning deep of world:
What is ne'er was, and will not be again;
What is becomes by increments minute,
And wondrous transformation is performed—
The hills dissolve, an island grows apace;
From storm and air the seed becomes a tree;
While atoms join to make the bird so fair,
The robin-redbreast, flying through the air.

THE COMING OF ISLANDS.

O, beautiful isle of the sea—
Embraced in its billowy arms,
Caressed by its pulsating tides
And kissed by its tremulous waves
And fed by the rivers of land—
Your life is the wine of the land!

The isle that gems the shore shall mainland be
And tide-swept bank shall mountain summit crown,
Plateau shall be submerged as ocean floor,
And lofty peak beneath the deep sea sink,
In sure obedience to cosmic force
As alternating generations come,
When land to sea and sea to land gives birth,
Evolving continental forms of earth.

THE COMING OF TREES.

O, glorious tree of the isle—
Upborne on its wave-beaten breast,
Caressed by the matinal wind
And kissed by the vesperine breeze
And fed by the nourishing storm—
Your life is the wine of the storm!

In long procession through the æons come
The arborescent generations vast,
Evolving with the many forms of land;
The fit to life, unfit to death consigned;
In adaptation yielding everywhere—
With sweet consent in zones of tempered wind,
With lusty growth where tropics ardent woo,
And gnarled conformity to arctic storms—
Till earth is clothed with multitudinous forms.

THE COMING OF BIRDS.

O, musical bird of the tree—
Becradled on pendulous bough,
Caressed by the bountiful leaves
And kissed by the odorous flowers
And fed on the beautiful fruit—
Your life is the wine of the fruit!

Then tribes of birds adown the ages come,
In generations numbered like the years,
With fitting kind for every habitat
For such as win sweet life by high emprise
With winged endeavor, giving form and skill

In flight from tree to tree and clime to clime,
While groves and sky are filled with music sweet—
A vast inheritance of plume and song,
Evolving as the ages course along.

THE NEW CREATION.

To him who lingers e'er on narrow shore
Nor heights of land nor depths of sea are known;
For pleasure's flotsom, tossed on folly's foam,
With flow and ebb of purpose strong and weak,
Forever chafes the marge of common life,
While days and years pass on in weary strife.

The wise man goes beyond the seeming thing—
The rocks and shoals of hither shore of cause—
Abroad on strandless, wide, unfathomed sea
Of being, doing, and becoming world,
And, borne afar by sail of thought, he learns
That new creation which the prophets saw
Is cryptic growth of universal law.

SONG.

All islands encircled by murmuring sea,
All trees that are clustered in musical grove,
All birds of the forest that joyfully sing,
A tale of becoming in harmony bring.

In bed of the sea is the nest of the isle,
In heart of the isle is the nest of the tree,
In arms of the tree is the nest of the bird,
And voice of the nestling in music is heard.

The cantion they warble on morn of their birth,
Continued as daybreak encircles the earth,
While longitudes wheel to the matinal light,
Is heard as the æons proceed in their flight.

From croak of the frog to the voice of the lark,
From creeping of reptile to soaring of bird,
The way of becoming is long, very long—
The wonderful theme of their matinal song.

We come, O we come down the mystical years,
Unreckoned in lore of the sages and seers,
Through bundles of ages, as time gathers sheaves,
We come like the army of vernal-tide leaves.

CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE REVELATION OF PRESENT EXPERIENCE.

Dr. Edmund Montgomery, the hermit philosopher of Liendo plantation, has written another book¹ which contains in a popular form the gist of his philosophy. Instead of reviewing this book we prefer to let Dr. Montgomery speak in his own words. He may be characterized as a scientific mystic who stands in awe at the mystery of existence and especially of organized life. He devotes much space to the vexatious problem of idealism and realism. He opposes religious superstitions; he rejects them and yet favors a teleological interpretation of nature and bases his monism upon a mental substance as ultimate reality. The extracts of his views are here given in his own words:

"It is safe to say that the world-revelation contained in the present experience of cultured man is most consistently and positively recognized by help of the collective results attained in the various provinces of scientific research. It is relevant, then, to inquire what sort of general survey our scientifically enlightened thinking is at present justified in constructing on the strength of this newly acquired information. (Page 1.)

"The physical medium in which all life is carried on is apparently the same for animals as for man, yet in man it has become transfigured into a supersensible world of transcendent import. (5). To get to understand the gradual formation and memorized fixation of the latent content of our conscious microcosm is a more fundamental task than the mere analysis of this content, when it becomes manifest in actual awareness ready-made. (6).

¹ *The Revelation of Present Experience*. Boston: Sherman French & Co., 1910. His large work, *Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization*, was discussed at length in *The Monist*, XIX, 582. Since this review was written Dr. Montgomery passed away on April 17 at his home on the Liendo Plantation near Hempstead, Texas. For further particulars of his life and death see *The Open Court* of June, 1911, p. 381, and *The Monist* of October 1909, p. 582.

"A flame may to some slight extent illustrate the true nature of consciousness. A flame, as visual phenomenon, is the fleeting but sustained result of the process of combustion. Consciousness, as sentient phenomenon, is the fleeting but sustained result of the process of vital organization. In order to sustain the flame entirely new amounts of combustible raw-material have to be supplied. In order to sustain consciousness the integrity, and therewith the efficiency of vital organization has to be maintained by assimilation of new complemental material. A flame, as visual phenomenon, is itself a forceless outcome of the process of combustion. Consciousness, as a sentient phenomenon, is a forceless outcome of the process of vital organization. The visual flame, an ideal product of real combustion, illuminates into present awareness the manifold content of the field of vision. Consciousness, an ideal product of real vital organization, resuscitates in present awareness the manifold latently preserved and memorized content of past experience, as guidance for present and future actions. (7-8).

"Grossly insufficient as it will sound, life, as merely physically or perceptually revealed, consists in a specific cycle of motions maintaining the constitution and vitality of the living substance of which all organisms are composed. This specific cycle of motions is set going by definite stimulating influences that impinge from outside upon the highly complex and mobile chemical compound, disintegrating it to some extent. Whereupon the disintegrated substance reintegrates itself from within by force of indwelling affinities. Chemically expressed, it resaturates itself by combining with complemental material afforded by the medium. Whenever and wherever on our Mother Earth this process of alternate disintegration and reintegration has taken place in ever so rudimentary a manner in what proves to be an integrant chemical compound, there life has originated. It has not fallen from the skies as a creation ready-made. Nor has a separate vitalizing imponderable principle seized upon ponderable material and coerced it into structural arrangements, imparting to it the endowments and efficiencies displayed by organisms. The unfathomable awe-inspiring mystery attaching to life in its multitudinous manifestations lies altogether in the intrinsic endowments mysteriously accruing to it in ever heightened modes of efficiency accompanying its structural development. Surely a creative result most mysteriously attained. (9-10).

"It is a chimerical expectation to think that one can ever arrive at a valid interpretation of organic life in its relation to the environ-

ment and the world at large, either by viewing the whole as consisting exclusively of mental modes, generally conceived as a system of self-evolving concepts, or as a conglomeration of self-associated sensations; or on the other hand, by viewing the whole as a combination of mere material configurations consisting of aggregated atoms mechanically actuated.

“Idealists deceive themselves with words when they believe they can consistently account in mental terms for any fact or occurrence of perceptible nature. (12-13).

“Naturalists, on the other hand, look upon living organisms as mere intricate mechanical contrivances, constructed out of ordered aggregations of inert material particles, and being set going by imparted modes of motion; to such mechanistic and materialistic naturalists the apparently astounding activities of these definitely grouped arrangements of material elements or so-called organisms, are really nothing but unwilling motor-performances of the material mechanism, running their course wholly independent of the accompanying psychical by-play. (15).

“The utter insufficiency of this view comes, however, glaringly to light when living organisms are held to be composed of inert material particles actuated by imparted motion or transferred energy. (16).

“It is almost cruel, moreover, to remind the advocates of the physical theory of biological occurrences, that during their occupation with these materialistic and mechanistic explanations, they lose sight of their own mentally guided and mentally cognizing activities, which alone enable them to apprehend and conceive what they consider to exist and to occur outside their own perception and conception. Evolving the logical consequences to which their mechanistic views necessarily lead, they can find no legitimate way of reaching mind or consciousness in general, and therewith no way to the very consciousness within which their own reality-depleted conception of organic life has its exclusive existence. Such downright *reductio ad absurdum* of the purely mechanical conception of life and nature in general would deserve to evoke Homeric laughter, if it had not, in physics at least, proved pragmatically so exceedingly fruitful in the cause of enlightenment and liberation from gross superstitions.

“Employed as a working hypothesis in the precise investigation and exact discrimination of sense-revealed natural occurrences, with no pretensions as regards a true and valid interpretation of their

real nature, physical science has claims on our gratitude and admiration that surpass all estimates. (18-19).

"It is evident that without an extra-conscious matrix, which latently preserves past experience, no conscious content whatever would arise into actual awareness. Pure idealism would then have no world-revelation as subject-matter to idealistically interpret. . . . In fact every kind of idealism derives its entire content from that extra-conscious source. (22).

"The consistent materialistic and mechanistic view excludes from its interpretation of nature all participation of modes of conscious awareness as superfluous epiphenomena, which merely accompany but nowise influence what causatively and necessarily happens in a world of moved matter. The consistent idealistic view, on the other hand, denies altogether the existence of an extra-conscious physical or perceptible world. Physics, then, has no room for mind; psychics no room for matter. In modern times, ever since Descartes bisected nature trenchantly into an extended material substance and an unextended thinking substance, this dualism of matter and thought, of body and mind, has given rise to no end of philosophical perplexities, until weary of so much contention, physicists as well as psychists found rest at last in the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism.

"Although an unsatisfactory compromise, it has to be conceded that by trusting to the materialistic horn of the psychophysical dilemma the great advantage is gained of looking upon perceptible objects and occurrences as existing in all reality in an external world independent of being perceived, allowing them, moreover, to be accurately described, measured, and their invariable connections positively ascertained, so that by these definite signs they can at all times be discriminated as positively recognized realities. (25). Trusting, on the other hand, to the lead of the idealistic side of the psychophysical dilemma, one reaches the incontestable fact that all subjective or individual experience consists of mental phenomena; that therefore all physical knowledge, however positive and reliable, turns out to be after all wholly a mental possession made up of specific percepts and concepts. Philosophically speaking, the perceptible world is being apparently entirely absorbed by mind. (26).

"Now as neither materialism nor idealism can account for memory, but has nevertheless to invoke its aid in order not to remain void of content, the fundamental task of philosophy and science is epistemologically to demonstrate the existence of the real permanent

matrix which latently harbors preserved and memorized past experience. Such desiderated matrix has to be positively shown to constitute a real substance. And under real substance is philosophically and scientifically understood an entity which maintains its own identity and efficiency unimpaired, while producing or emitting a sustained manifestation of natural phenomena, being in fact the proximate source of the becoming of conscious appearances. In Kant's words: "In it (substance) alone is to be sought the seat of the fruitful source of the appearances.' (27).

"Idealism, admitting but one single- all-inclusive mental content, has even boldly to deny the independent substantial existence of individual human beings. This denial of our self-existence is rather a serious matter that closely concerns all of us, as it has been virtually the cause of no end of fanatical nature-perverting beliefs and practices. (29).

"The only mental or ideal existence we are actually aware of is the all-revealing conscious content, and this has as such obviously no power whatever to forcibly affect the outside world, and to make itself directly known to any outside percipient. Fancy you and me to be pure ideal or spiritual beings, or for that matter to be the mere flesh and blood perceptible beings we really are. It is a positive fact that anyway we can nowise become directly aware of, nowise perceive the content of our respective consciousness. (30).

"But if human beings do not consist of mental or ideal stuff, nor of what is held to be material stuff, of what do they really consist? They evidently consist of non-phenomenal, substantial stuff that has power to compel to arise in the conscious content of beholders their symbolical representation, and that contains latently preserved a vast store of memorized past experience. Their presence and their superficial characteristics become revealed by means of percepts mostly visual and tactual. Their sundry activities are made known by means of definite motions of these percepts. All this information, minutely serviceable as it is, consists only of emblematic signs. To gain a somewhat adequate idea of how profoundly the real human being's nature remains enigmatic in this mere perceptual revelation let us imagine that within the conscious content of an observer the bodily percept of another human being visually arises, sense-compelled. Nothing has affected the observer's vision save a specifically constituted impingement of what are called ethereal vibrations. Thereupon within his subjective sphere of special luminosity a definitely shaded and colored form makes its appearance,

which is recognized as representing a human being. Noticing the characteristics, features and motions of the visually aroused apparition within his conscious content the observer interprets the significance of these perceptual signs entirely by means of his own intrinsically gathered and memorized experience, supplementing what is essentially implied by the signalized vision. He himself, by dint of his own mental endowments, fills the empty visual form with as much or as little meaning as his own introspective experience allows. (31-32).

"The real human being has been shown to be a perceptible, power-endowed, extra-conscious entity, that compels through sense-stimulation—mostly of a vicarious character—a perceptual representation called his body to arise in the conscious content of beholders. This real human being is thus revealed to the actual awareness of outsiders solely by means of this perceptual bodily appearance. To himself the awareness of this visual and tactual body is likewise a mere perceptual, sense-aroused appearance within his own conscious content. (35).

"The animal (is) developed into a human being by the acquisition of speech, engendered in social intercourse.... Without the use of linguistic signs conceptual thinking is impossible.... and rational conduct is rendered mentally possible by memorized past experience, consciously apprehended (37-41).

"Life had a most humble mundane beginning in a mere see-saw movement of alternate disintegration from without, and reintegration from within, manifest in the perceptually revealed primitive living substance.... Hunger and assimilation of restitutive nutriment on the part of the organic individual would secure only its own preservation, and life would have become extinct on our globe in a single generation—fulfilling thereby without much ado the fervently professed desire of the ascetics. This would infallibly have happened of the process of the creative development of vital endowments, to which we owe our own existence, did not involve the 'wicked' propagation of 'sinful' individuals, and therewith the preservation of the 'fallen' race. (50-51).

"What is so strikingly witnessed in the circumscribed life-history of insects, namely, that their entire vital activity, from beginning to end of their career, is directed toward the propagation of their race; a predetermined reproductive end-result arrived at unbeknown to themselves—this unmistakably teleological process affords a certain analogical insight into what productively occurs in phyletic organic

development. (55)...The world as revealed in the symbolical medium of sentience and consciousness is obviously a new creation; something newly arising into perceptual existence. It has become toilsomely embodied in what perceptually appears as specifically organized vital structure. (56).

"The principal results in the scientifically valid interpretation of the perceptible world-revelation have been gained by close observation and exact numerical determination of the behavior of the sense-compelled appearances arising within the conscious content of the observer. These appearances faithfully, though only symbolically, reflect what really happens in the sense-compelling, extra-conscious world. Consequently such scientific interpretation of phenomenal appearances, however exact, can yield only phenomenalist information in terms of extension and motion. The intrinsic significance of the perceptual appearances and their motor changes has to be supplied by the experiencing subject's own organically memorized and systematized knowledge. (59).

"Rational enlightenment, mostly scientifically attained, has liberated progressive nations from many terrifying and pitiless superstitions, also from the former thralldom of utmost intolerance, which mercilessly inflicted the cruelest penalties on unbelievers in the tenets of this or that dominant theological creed. In order entirely to overcome the injurious and unjustifiable anthropomorphic conception of a creative power, volitionally and intentionally in control of all that happens in nature, it will be well to get to understand that our own will and our own intelligence, which are obviously the real prototypes upon which are patterned the will and intelligence ascribed to a postulated deity, are utterly powerless to impart or change under given conditions any property or mode of behavior of the interacting constituents of the cosmic order and its procedure. (68)...In the fashioning of organisms the surpassing incomprehensibility of creative might is most strikingly evinced. (70).

"On the whole the conviction has preponderated that true reality is revealed by conception and not by perception. The consistent outcome of this prevalent persuasion is that the real world is of ideal consistency, and has its real being in mind, consciousness or spirit. (75)...What are called laws of thought, often looked upon as super-humanly normative, receive no less their validity from vitally organized correspondence of conceptual thinking to what such thinking applies to. (86).

"What is deemed objective in nature, or above it, is not directly

given in experience, but only inferred from certain actually given subjective data within the conscious content. It is obvious, then, that subjectively revealed spacial forms, for instance, inferred to have their real existence in an objective extra-conscious world, have of necessity to conform to subjective space-perception, of which they are—as thus actually experienced—sense-compelled determinations. (87-88).

"In cultured communities, social conduct and social development have become the chief concern of humanized existence. (90).... And here justice and benevolence reveal themselves as the leading principles that make for progressive humanization, and for realization of the social ideal. This ideal of social solidarity is conceived as a state, in which all humanity is imagined to share in the benefactions of a rationally and ethically cultured life. (91)

"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity are sublime watchwords to steadfastly remind us of the far-off humanitarian goal. But that goal cannot be reached before a great majority of individuals composing the social community have constitutionally attained a degree of humanization that renders them socially congenial and capable of consistently performing the duties involved in the realization of the ideal state" (92).

THE CHRIST MYTH OF DREWS.

The object of this book¹ is to prove that the Jesus Christ of Christianity is a pre-Christian Hebrew sun- and fire-god by the name of Jesus, identical with Joshua, Elijah, John the Baptist and other assumed Hebrew forms of these gods, whom the writers of the New Testament transformed into a human being, represented as having lived in the first century of our era under the name of Jesus, though such an historical Jesus never existed.

In order to prove that there was such a pre-Christian God the author presents to the reader, especially in the first part "The pre-Christian Jesus" but also in the second part "The Christian Jesus", an enormous amount of information and material taken from the comparative study of ancient religions. The facts given in this way will be of great value even to the reader who can not follow the author in the final conclusions he draws from them, for they show how many different pre-Christian conceptions and ideas, mythical,

¹ *The Christ Myth*. By Arthur Drews. Translated from the third edition (revised and enlarged) by C. Delisle Burns. Open Court Pub. Co., 1910.

mystical, ritualistic, sacrificial, speculative, etc., from Pagan and Jewish sources entered into the formation of the Christian Christ-idea. Whether we follow the author or not in his final conclusions, we must fully agree with him that the Christ myth, the idea of a dying and risen saviour-god who brings life and immortality out of death, is rooted deeply and firmly in the many pre-Christian ideas of the kind just mentioned and is a natural outgrowth of them.

The author shows that Parseeism influenced Judaism deeply in regard to the Saviour and Messiah idea; that even far distant India may have furnished material both from the side of Vedic and Buddhistic religion; that other religions of antiquity such as those of ancient Babylonia and Egypt furnished the same idea, though in different ways, of the dying and resurrected god, at bottom the yearly waning of the sun and the death of vegetation either by winter in more northern, or by the dry season in more southern climates and its revival in the spring; he shows also that the actual human sacrifices, in order to assist nature in its revivification, or the bloodless imitation ceremonies in connection with the early festivals of the dying and resurrected god, entered into the idea of the Christian Christ; he shows that much mythical, mystical and speculative language of exactly the same terms in Mithraism, Mandaeism and other cults entered into the religious language of Christianity regarding its Christ and the relations of believers to him; he shows the influence of Parsee, Vedic, Buddhistic and Greek metaphysical thought in the formation of Christian metaphysical ideas, the idea of the divine wisdom, the divine word or the Logos, standing as a mediator between the far-away God and his creation, a kind of emanation or sonship of God becoming incarnate; he shows that Christianity in fact furnished nothing new whatever in the ethical sphere and that the highest moral thought of Christianity is to be found previously both in Judaism and paganism; that the picture of the ideal, perfect, just, suffering man, as we have it in Christianity, is furnished likewise by Plato and Seneca; he shows that the ideas of the union of man with God through sacred rites, baptism, sacred meals, etc., such as we have in Christianity, were deeply rooted in pre-Christian customs; he shows how strong was the pre-Christian idea of propitiatory death, in that even the death of martyrs dying for their religion as in the Maccabean insurrection was considered redemptive for the whole people; in short the author furnishes in a very skilful way such an enormous amount of valuable material showing what a host of different ideas entered into

the formation of Christianity to make it a thoroughly syncretic religion, that the reader is fully repaid thereby for acquiring the book.

The writer of *The Christ Myth* might have added other strong arguments for the syncretical character of Christianity and its outgrowth from previous thought. When speaking of Philo and his influence upon the Fourth Gospel he might have shown how the letter to the Hebrews is still more thoroughly impregnated by Philo even to exactly the same terminology. When speaking of the dying and resurrected gods of pre-Christian religions and the effects of this thought upon the ancient human mind, he might have shown still more strikingly that this idea of the dying and rising god, referring originally only to processes of nature, was transferred into the purely spiritual and religious sphere. He might have referred to the Egyptian burial liturgy in which occur the following words regarding the deceased: "Not as dead does he go away, but as living; as true as Osiris lives, he also will live; as true as Osiris has not died, he also will not die; as true as Osiris has not been destroyed, he also will not be destroyed." (If instead of "Osiris" we place "Christ" we have a fully Christian burial liturgy). He might have referred to the words of the priest in the Greek mysteries at the height of the mystical cult:

"Be confident, initiates, the God is saved,
And also we from sufferings will be saved."

If it had been more in the interest of the author of *The Christ Myth*, he might also have stated how much of the mythical matter related of the assumed god Jesus, and god-forms identical with him, was also related of historical persons. He might have pointed to the fact that not only Plato, Augustus and others were said to have been divinely-begotten sons of virgins, but that exactly the same story told of Joseph, the father of Jesus, is told of the father of Plato, who did not consummate the marriage with Plato's mother till after the child's birth; that a star appeared at the birth of Augustus and great signs preceded the death of Cæsar; that the Roman senate attempted to prevent the birth of Augustus; that in the apotheosis of a Cæsar witnesses were required to appear before the senate to testify that they had seen the soul of the emperor ascend to heaven; that at the birth of Apollonius of Tyana a chorus of swans sang; and that as late as in the Middle Ages the story of the dying and resurrected god was transferred to Frederick I, Barbarossa, who was to arise and bring again the glory of the old empire.

While, as has been said, the author of *The Christ Myth* places before the reader an enormous amount of valuable material for which we must be grateful, I think exception must be taken to the way in which he states certain assumptions and theories as facts which as yet lack definite proof. For instance, if the author accepts as a basis for his thesis the theories of Winckler and others, that all the heroes of the early Old Testament history from Abraham down to Elijah, and perhaps even further, are nothing but astral, zodiacal, solar and lunar gods, the reviewer in company with many others is willing to yield to this theory to a certain extent, as in the case of Samson where the solar characteristics are clear, even in the name itself (*Shimshon*, "the solar one"). Nevertheless he thinks it would be more cautious and in accordance with facts to assume that, as in the case of the Iliad, Odyssey and the Nibelungenlied, there may likewise be in early Hebrew history a mixture of the purely mythical and historical, nature-myths and early tribal and national history, in which it is sometimes very difficult to separate the purely mythical from the historical characters.

The Joshua (Greek *Jesus*) of the conquest of Canaan may have been a tribal sun-god, but the high priest Joshua who appears in the books of Zechariah and Ezra was surely no god. Likewise, if the Joshua of the conquest was a god, all consciousness of the fact was lost and he was considered an historical person (see 1 Kings xvi. 34), at least during the times of the Exile. Even in the eighth century B. C., as we can gather from such old prophets as Amos, Hosea and Micah, the history of the conquest as we find it in the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua was accepted. Micah vi. 7 speaks of Moses, Aaron and Miriam (the latter of whom Drews erroneously considers a sister of Joshua, see page 117) as historical persons, not as gods.

The patriarch Joseph may likewise have been a tribal sun-god, but it is very questionable whether when the Gospels represented Jesus as a son of the carpenter Joseph, a myth was still known, if ever such a one existed, relating that this sun-god Joseph was an artisan, i. e., a "world modeller" (p. 114) as in the case of the father of Agni, the god of fire, and Kinyras, the father of Adonis, where the sun-myth is entirely transparent.

If Elijah is a sun-god, his contemporary Ahab at least is historical and well attested by the Moabite stone. Elijah appears to me rather to be a genuine Oriental religious zealot. The miracles related of him and his final fiery ascension to heaven do not disprove

his historical character. Similar things are related of Mohammedan marabouts even to-day, and the miracles told about Empedocles, a character somewhat similar to Elijah in his stand against the mighty and his marvelous end, do not stamp him therefore as unhistorical. Further, to connect Elijah etymologically with *Helios* (sun) will only appeal to those ignorant of ancient languages and philological laws. And finally Elijah has played an important rôle as an historical prophet in Jewish literature, in the Gospels and the Talmud in connection with the Messianic hopes ever since Malachi iv. 5.

John the Baptist is to Drews another form of the sun-god. As he does not occur in the Old Testament, "under the name *Johannes* is concealed the Babylonian water-god *Oannes* (Ea)," another form of the sun-god, i. e., "the sun begins its yearly course with a baptism, entering after its birth the constellation of the Water-carrier and the Fishes" (p. 122).

As John the Baptist occurs in Josephus (*Ant.* XVIII, 5, 2) this passage is declared a Christian interpolation on the authority of the Jewish writer Graetz, though his authority is rejected when declaring the *Vita Contemplativa* of Philo a Christian forgery (p. 51). Whether Graetz declared the Baptist passage an interpolation because he considered John unhistorical is not said, nor is an appeal in this connection to a note in Schürer (*Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, etc.) more illuminating. I have read Schürer on Josephus in Herzog and Plitt's latest edition and find in his discussion of interpolations in Josephus not the least word on the passage of the Baptist. I am sure that to Schürer John is historical.

We ought to be extremely careful in declaring passages interpolated. Preconceived theories ought not to influence our judgment in this respect in the least. No one has a right to declare passages interpolated unless on the fact that they are wanting in some manuscripts, or on grounds which thoroughly show that they are imported foreign matter. If the passage on the Baptist (known to Celsus before 180) is a Christian interpolation, the interpolator must have been entirely ignorant of the accounts about the Baptist in the Gospels, for these contradict the Josephus passage in many respects and are written from an entirely different viewpoint.

In connection with John the Baptist the philology regarding the river Jordan² will again only appeal to those who base comparative philology on the similarity of sounds instead of on scientific prin-

²"*Eridanus*, the heavenly Jordan or year-stream (Egyptian *iaro* or *iero*, the river)" (p. 122).

ciples. This kind of philology occurring in so many places in *The Christ Myth* is one of the weakest points in the book and ought to be removed in future editions. Likewise if the method were correct that Drews applies to Hebrew names in which the word *El* (God) occurs, not one of the host of names for persons in the Old Testament containing *El* would signify a human being, but each would signify a god. (Compare on page 77: "*Israel*, the mighty God," "the earliest designation of the God of the Hebrews until displaced by *Yahveh*." A very questionable assertion!) Likewise, according to the same method, if all names for human beings, in which the syllable *jah* or *jeho* (abbreviation for *Yahveh*) occurs, would signify a god, there would be no end of such gods in the Old Testament. (Compare *Jehoshua* considered as a god.) It is to me extremely doubtful whether the very frequent names in the Old Testament in which the syllables *el* or *jah* or *jeho* appear would ever have been used for the designation of a god. According to the method applied by Drews we might with the same right consider Merodach Baladan, a king of Babylonia (Is. xxxix. 1) a god, but that name simply means "Merodach is ruler and lord."

It also seems to me incomprehensible that if *Jehoshua* were such a noted sun-god of the Hebrews we do not see the least trace or mention of his cult in the Old Testament or elsewhere in Jewish literature, while the cults of Tammuz, Moloch, Baal Peor, Cemoth and other gods, surely all different forms of the sun-god, are mentioned. But Drews furnishes direct proofs that Joshua or Jesus was a pre-Christian Hebrew god. Jesus is not only a sun-god but also a god of healing and saving (p. 58) identical with the Greek *Jasios* or *Jason*, i. e., "the healer," (another example of the weak philology of the book) and is mentioned as such in ancient documents. But Hebraists know that *Joshua* or *Jesus* means no such a thing as "healer" or "saviour." The Hebrew for "physician" is *ropeh*,³ and for "saviour" *moshia*,⁴ a hiphil participial form of the verb *jasha*, often occurring in the Old Testament as an attribute of God, as in the Greek *Zeus Soter*.

But what about the ancient documents? In a Parisian magic papyrus published by Wessely (line 3119 etc.), we read the words, "I exhort thee by Jesus the God of the Hebrews." While Drews considers this papyrus to be of pre-Christian times, other scholars say that it appears to date from the first half of the fourth century A. D., and that if in it Jesus is called the "God of the Hebrews,"

this does not necessarily point to a pre-Christian time but may just as well be due to Christian influence, in that Jesus is mistakenly conceived to be a god of the Hebrews by some conjurer; that just as the name of Solomon was made use of in conjurations (compare Josephus *Ant.* VIII, 2, 5) so the name Jesus was made use of not only by Christians but also by others who conceived his name to be powerful (compare Acts xix. 14).

The existence of the pre-Christian god Jesus is also assumed on the basis of another document. The great heresy expert Epiphanius (4th century A. D.) says in a very muddled way:⁵ "Upon these follow in order the *Nazoraioi*, who belong to the same time as they and who, whether existing before them or with them or after them, nevertheless are their contemporaries; for I can no longer tell exactly who followed the others. For they were, exactly as I said, contemporaries and had similar thoughts. But they did not attribute to themselves the name of Christ or Jesus but that of the *Nazoraioi*, and all Christians then were called likewise *Nazoraioi*. But it happened a short time before that they were called *Jessaioi* before they began to call the disciples of Jesus in Antioch Christians. And they were as I think called *Jessaioi* on account of Jesse. They either were called *Jessaioi* after Jesse the father of David or after the name of Jesus our Lord, because they went out from Jesus as disciples or because this is the etymology of the name of the Lord. For Jesus means in Hebrew the same as *therapeutes*, i. e., physician and saviour. Before they were called Christians they were called by this name somehow as a surname. From Antioch as said above, they began to call the disciples and the whole church of God Christians, but some called themselves *Nasaraioi* for the heresy of the *Nasaraioi* existed even before Christ and did not know anything of him. But all called the Christians *Nazoraioi* as also the accusers of the apostle do."

From this passage and a few more words in the above-mentioned magical papyrus reading (line 1549): "I conjure you by the *mar-parkourith nasaari*" and from the mention of the words *Jesus Nazarja* in a hymn of the Naassene sect, Drews, following Professor William Benjamin Smith of Tulane University in all this, draws the conclusion that there were two pre-Christian sects called *Jessaioi* and *Nazoraioi* who were closely related to each other, if not abso-

⁵ The following quotation from *Panar. Haer.*, XXIX, 6, is not given by Drews.

lutely identical (p. 59). They were so called from the divinity they adored, *Jesus Nasarja*, meaning the "saviour-protector."

To strengthen this assumption and the claim that the Christian sect of the *Nazoraioi* in the New Testament were not called thus from the home of Jesus, Nazareth, the existence of Nazareth in the first century is questioned on doubts raised in the article "Nazareth" in *Enc. Bibl.* (The exceedingly slim grounds for the non-existence of Nazareth in the first century I have exposed in my article, "Nazareth, Nazorean and Jesus," *Open Court*, June 1910).

In answer to the assumed *Nazarja* divinity identical with the god *Jesus*, and his adorers, the *Nazoraioi*, the following is to be said: The form *Nazarja* occurring in the hymn of the Christian gnostic sect of the Naassenes (who knew the Fourth Gospel and therefore were no pre-Christian sect) is nothing but the Syrian or Aramaic form for the Greek *Nazoraïos* in the New Testament, i. e., "he of Nazareth." This is proved by the Syrian translation of the New Testament. The Syrian *Nazarja* has nothing whatever to do with the Hebrew *Nazarjah*, "one whom Yahveh guards," (note the difference in the spelling of the last syllable in both forms). Another form, which Drews cites as identical with the Syrian *Nazarja*, and which occurs in the Talmud, namely *nozri*, also has nothing to do with the idea of protector. This form *nozri* is simply a Hebrew form denoting descent, i. e., "he of Nazareth," just as *Thimni* (Jud. xv. 10) means "one from Thimnatha" and *Beth-ha Shimshi* (1 Sam. vi. 14) "He from Beth Shemesh." The Syrian *Nazarja* and the Hebrew *Nozri* both mean the same as the Greek *Nazoraïos* of the New Testament, "he of Nazareth." Nevertheless the strongest blow which this whole pre-Christian *Jesus Nazarja* saviour-protector-divinity receives is the one dealt by Aramaic scholars, who say that at the times of Jesus the Palestinian Jews did not use the Hebrew verb *nazar* for "to guard" but the Aramaic *ne'tar*. In reproducing the theory of Professor Smith, Drews unconsciously weakens it (p. 59) by appealing to the "protector of Israel" (Ps. cxxi. 4) to prove that *Nazarja* means protector. Drews does not notice that in the Hebrew of that passage not the verb *nazar* but *shamar* is used which also means "protect." This bad mistake, which of course one ignorant of the original text does not notice, ought to be corrected in future editions. The whole passage of Epiphanius speaks for *Nazoraioi* as being the earliest name of the Christians rather than that of a pre-Christian sect, especially since it clearly distinguishes between *Nazoraioi* and the pre-Christian *Nasaraioi*, who according

to him rejected the Pentateuch and were vegetarians. The passage of Epiphanius and the other documents mentioned above afford at least a very uncertain basis upon which to build such a theory of a pre-Christian *Jesus-Nazarja* divinity.

But to another point. In bringing before the reader the extensive material from the comparative study of religion to prove his thesis, we notice that the author does not always distinguish sharply between earlier and later customs and ideas of Christianity. Nevertheless this ought to be done when we attempt to trace the first beginnings of Christianity. If Drews adduces "the Magi or kings" (p. 94) as the three stars in the sword-belt of Orion, we must remember that the Gospel speaks neither of kings nor of three persons and that the legend of the three kings is a very much later legend whose foundation on pagan myths we of course would not in the least dispute.

When speaking of Christian baptism and tracing its origin back to fire-worship (p. 119) the author says the Greek name for baptism is *photismos*, "enlightenment," but we must remember that in the New Testament no such a term is used for baptism though later ecclesiastical writers call catechumens expecting baptism soon, *photizomenoi*, without surely any thought of fire-worship.

On page 89 the flight of Mary into Egypt on an ass with the child Jesus is traced back to pictorial representations of the flight of the son of Isis on an ass out of Egypt, and here we must again remember that nothing of all this occurs in Matthew and that very probably the whole myth of the flight to Egypt is based on the allegorical use of Hosea xi. 1, the people of Israel, the son of Yahveh, being taken as the type of the Messiah.

The martyrdom of Stephen is traced back and according to Drews is made to rest on the constellation of Corona (Greek, *Stephanos*) becoming visible on the eastern horizon about Christmas (St. Stephen's day, December 26) but we must remember that both the December 25th as the birthday of Christ and the following day as the date of the martyrdom of Stephen are very, very much later institutions of the church.

Drews further connects the expression *Agnus Dei* (lamb of God) etymologically with the fire-god Agni and says that it is nothing else than *Agni Deus* (p. 145), but here he forgets that *Agnus Dei* is the later Latin translation of the Greek *ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* (John i. 29) and not the original expression.

When the cross of Christ is brought into connection with the

ancient fire-cross and other symbols, the author unconsciously admits that this comparison is not justifiable, since he himself rightly shows that the term *stauros* in the New Testament does not mean "cross" but simply "stake" and that marks of nails are first mentioned in the late Gospel of John (p. 147). It is doubtful whether Jesus was nailed to the cross, and even if he was fastened by nails, the cross was not necessarily of the shape \perp but may have been of the T shape which form the early so-called Epistle of Barnabas assumes, whose composition Drews places much earlier than the Gospel of John, even towards the end of the first century (p. 220). The author therefore has also no right to say that "the Saviour carrying his cross is copied from Hercules (Simon of Cyrene), bearing the pillars crosswise" (p. 241). If Drews shows that criminals in the time of Jesus were simply bound to the stake and left to die, what has the carrying of the stake to do with Hercules bearing the pillars "crosswise"? That condemned criminals had to bear the stake to the place of execution is related by classical writers.^a By the way if Simon of Cyrene is Hercules how does Drews explain that this Simon is said in Mark xv. 21 to be the father of Alexander and Rufus, persons of whom we know absolutely nothing, but who must have been well known in the Christian community where this incident was first related?

Some other strictures might be made concerning the method employed of using ideas and facts of very much later date than the times of the origin of Christianity, as for instance the use made of the Talmudic double Messiah, the Messiah ben Joseph and Messiah ben David (p. 80) corresponding as is said (p. 81) to the Haman and Mordecai of the Jewish Purim feast. Concerning the custom at this festival of executing one criminal, Haman, and releasing the other, Mordecai, under the mask of which custom Frazer believes that a Jewish teacher by the name of Jesus may have been executed, and which Drews accepts as an absolutely certain custom among the Jews, making much of it in favor of his thesis, we have not the least trace in Jewish literature nor proof of its existence. The Purim festival as we know it among the Jews is based entirely upon a romance, the Book of Esther, and of so late a date that it is not mentioned in the text-books of Hebrew archeology where all the other Hebrew festivals are treated extensively in regard to their origin. The writer of that tale undoubtedly brought the fictitious incident he relates into connection with some Persian or Babylonian

^a Cic., *De divin.*, I, 26; Valer. Max. XI, 7 and others.

custom or festival (ix. 19 etc.) but he evidently did not know anything certain about the meaning of the word *Pur*, which he translates "lot," though there is no such word for "lot" in Persian.⁷ Zimmern assumes the Purim feast to be of Babylonian origin, the New Year festival on which the gods under the presiding Marduk cast lots in an assembly (*puhru*) regarding the fate of the next year. If the custom to which Drews refers existed so late in history among the Jews, the meaning of it must have been totally lost to them, or else the author of Esther could not, as far as I can see, have tacked his story to it. Some commentators are inclined to believe that the Book of Esther was written by one of the many Jews in Mesopotamia or Persia. The book itself only came into the canon under very strong protest because of the ugliness of its extreme fanaticism.

The author of *The Christ Myth* surely makes very skilful use of many assumptions which he gives out as well proven facts in favor of his thesis, but it is doubtful whether in the long run they will stand the test. How careless the author is in making use of material in his favor without testing it, is shown on page 79, where he follows an interpretation of Dan. ix. 26, which the staunchest orthodoxy has followed for 1800 years, but which scientific investigation has rejected for over a century, and which even the neo-Platonist Porphyry and a Christian writer Julius Hilarianus of the fourth century had rejected. I refer to the orthodox interpretation that in this passage reference is made to the dying Christ. All scientific investigators refer it to the death of some historical personality, such as Alexander the Great, Seleucus Philopator or Onias III. The author is often too credulous in accepting his material and therefore too quick in suppositions, as when he lumps together all the different Marys of the New Testament, the mother of Jesus, the Magdalene, the mother of James the Less and Joses into the twofold form of the mother and the "beloved in the sexual sense of the word," of the God *Jasius* or *Joshua* (p. 117); or when he suspects the *Alpha* and *Omega* of Revelation to be concealed in *Ao* (*Aoos*) said to be a Greek form for *Adonis*, while philologists consider this latter form as probably the Doric *aos* for Attic *eos*, "the dawn"; or when he suspects Golgotha as being a site of ancient Adonis worship, because Golgos is said according to some scholia to have been a son of Adonis and Aphrodite, while Golgotha (Hebrew *Gulgoleth* = skull)

⁷ Cornill, *Einleitung ins Alte Testament*, p. 140.

may very simply only refer to the skull-shaped locality of the execution of Jesus.

* * *

Going over to the second part of the book, "The Christian Jesus," we fully agree with the author that without Paul Christianity would have remained a very restricted faith and would have made but little progress. The author clearly sees the important and dominant part which Paul took in the rising Christianity. He gives a very good description of Paul's metaphysics, his doctrine of sin and redemption, his mystical ideas of the union of God and man through Christ, and the magical power of baptism and the Lord's Supper, etc. Still, if "the information the Acts give as to Paul's life is for the most part mere fiction" (p. 166) and if all the Pauline letters are so extremely doubtful (p. 166 f.) regarding their authenticity as the author assumes, we can not very well understand why such an extended use is made of these letters in proving the thesis of the book, and why any passages in them running contrary to it are declared interpolations. If the letters were written "by a whole school of second century theologians" we should not expect that there would be much necessity for interpolations later. At least so it seems to the writer.

We also do not understand why, if the Acts are so very untrustworthy, so much use is made of them to prove the existence of a widely spread cult of the pre-Christian god, Jesus. From Acts xviii. 25 and other passages in the Acts, the conclusion is drawn that the preaching about Jesus of Apollos and others who knew only the baptism of John the Baptist, was a teaching about the pre-Christian god Jesus. Others who take the words of the Acts regarding the preaching of Apollos as the author of Acts meant them, simply see in the fact of Apollos knowing only of the baptism of John a proof that Jesus did not himself institute a special baptism as the last words of Matthew give it (evidently a later addition betraying itself by the formula "in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost") and that the baptism in the name of Jesus was only gradually introduced by the growing primitive church. The Acts surely contain many inaccurate statements, but the "we" passages incorporated into their second part at least seem to bear the stamp of genuineness. These even contain a mention of James, (xxi. 18) whom Paul (Gal. i. 19) calls "the (definite article, not a) brother of the Lord," evidently meaning a close relation to Jesus,

no spiritual brother or follower.⁸ What Jerome, a zealous advocate of the perpetual virginity of the mother of Jesus, said a few centuries later about this James, does not count.

As concerning the Acts, so also with regard to the authenticity of the Pauline letters we do not wish to start a long discussion. We will restrict ourselves to the following: Drews places the epistle of Clement of Rome at the end of the first century (p. 220). Now this letter mentions the first letter to the Corinthians by name (xlvi) referring to the dissensions in Corinth, discussed in the first chapter, and to Apollos and Kephas (the latter by the way seems to be considered a legendary character by Drews, according to the preface p. 20). Further, the letter of Clement has passages which remind us of passages in the letter to the Romans; it has passages which occur verbatim in the letter to the Hebrews (non-Pauline, but strongly testifying also to the humanity of Jesus, v. 7). I may just mention in connection here that Clement, of whom Drews says that he "is completely silent as to the Gospels," twice cites words which he attributes to Jesus, occurring in the Gospels (XLVI & XIII). To close my remarks on the authenticity of the Pauline letters, I will say that to me the extremely passionate, polemical, personal and individualistic character at least of the letters to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians and Philippians seems to be the strongest proof for their authenticity. I do not see how second century theologians could ever have invented this. Could Paul's pathetic wish (Rom. ix. 1), for instance, to be accursed for the sake of his people, ever have been invented by second century theologians, when the complete separation of Christianity from Judaism had long been an established fact?

Now to some points in "The Pauline Jesus."

"The form in which Paul grasped Christianity was that of an incarnation of God" says Drews on page 189. Still this form and representation of Paul's religion in his letters does not refer to any historical Jesus in which this incarnation took place. All that seems to look like this is mere phantom. Though the words seem to point to a human Jesus, they do not mean this. "It was not unusual among the heathen peoples for a man to be crucified in place of the Deity as a symbolical representative; although already at the time of Paul it was the custom to represent the self-sacrificing God only by an effigy, instead of a real man. The important point, however,

⁸The brothers of Jesus in 1 Cor. ix. 5 and mentioned by name in the Gospels are allegorized into "followers of the religion of Jesus" (p. 172).

was not this, but the idea which lay at the foundation of this divine sacrifice" (p. 188). "When Paul designated the Messiah Jesus as a bodily descendant of David according to the flesh, born of woman, he thought not at all of any concrete individuality which had at a certain time embodied the divinity within itself but purely of the idea of a Messiah in the flesh" (p. 190). All have thought thus far that the designations just mentioned "from the seed of David according to the flesh," "born of woman," and others, "born under the law," "delivered over in the last night," "crucified," "buried," "seen after death by his disciples" etc., occurring in the Pauline letters referred to an historical personality, but according to Drews they mean nothing of the kind. If any passages seem to speak too definitely about some historical personality Jesus, such as the above mentioned passage in Galatians which mentions "the brother of the Lord," or the passage in 1 Corinthians about the delivering of Jesus in the last night, or the passage on the different appearances of the Lord after his death in 1 Cor. xv, a passage which even a David Strauss considered as the oldest account of the visions the disciples had of their master, these passages are declared later interpolations. All that seems to point to an historical Jesus, says Drews, is as historical as what was said of the redeemers Hercules and Mithras (p. 178). Yet these were believed to have lived in antiquity while Paul refers to a person with whose disciples and brothers he had come into personal contact; and while Hercules is the offspring of Zeus and a human woman, and Mithra is born from the rock, Jesus according to Paul comes simply from the seed of David and is born of a woman.

When Drews in several places in his book speaks of the deification of other human persons in history; when he mentions Jewish gnostic sects, who imagined the Messiah to have become incarnate in Adam, Enoch, Abraham, and so on, finally to become incarnate in Jesus (p. 112); when he says that "the guiltless martyrdom of an upright man as expiatory means to the justification of his people was also not unknown to the adherents of the Law since the days of the Maccabean martyrs"; when he says "a captive criminal was looked upon as an imitation of the God sacrificing himself" (p. 188); it is hard to see why after all this he goes to the trouble of attempting to prove that there was no historical Jesus who could have been deified and considered a divine incarnation, and whose death could be taken as an expiatory death for mankind. Drews does not seem to consider at all that these possibilities could have

been further supported by the fact that Jesus very probably thought himself specifically and divinely chosen for his work and made claims which moved his followers to exalt him to a divinely sent saviour and redeemer. The author of *The Christ Myth* criticizes liberal theology for assuming "ecstatic visionary experiences" and "pathological states of over-excited men and hysterical women" among the causes of the historical foundation of Christianity (p. 268). But are these assumptions so very unreasonable? It is a well-known fact that in religion reason plays a very much less important rôle than feeling, and in the foundation of the great religions of the world the ecstatic, abnormal, and pathological states of mind of their founders have always been a very important factor. A. Meyer (*The Resurrection of Christ*) says: "Visions are in certain periods of history the necessary form of religious revelation. A visionary disposition possesses many morbid elements but in great men it is an heroic sickness."

But my review is already too long. I will therefore restrict myself to the remaining questions and remarks which further occurred as important to me while reading the book. I will give these as they occurred to me consecutively in reading the remainder of "The Pauline Jesus" and the following chapter, "The Jesus of the Gospels," without any special order, since each question or remark is independent of any of the other remarks or questions.

I may be mistaken, but is it probable (p. 186) that the first Christian missionaries in Antioch made any compromise with the more or less voluptuous Adonis cult? Paul in his letters at least does not speak in any very accommodating way of heathen cults.

If Antioch is rather the birthplace of Christianity and the spreading of Christianity did not start from Jerusalem (p. 210), why then does Paul so often return to Jerusalem, not only according to the Acts, but also according to his letters, keeping up his connection with the mother church and supporting it by collections from the churches he founded?

Is not the reiterated statement of Paul that he had seen the Lord (of course in a vision) upon which he bases his apostleship (1 Cor. ix. 1 and other places) as well as the older apostles in Judea, and at the same time the antagonism of his evangelization methods to the older apostles who considered themselves the more privileged as having stood nearer to the master, a proof of the existence of a Jesus, who had given no hint whatever as to the methods to be followed regarding pagan believers, and had con-

centrated all his efforts to the salvation of his own people in expectation of the near end?

Has our author, who places *The Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles* so very early, "perhaps even at the end of the first century" (p. 220), ever read this work? He claims that it speaks of a Jesus-God "in no wise the same as the Christian redeemer" (p. 62) and that it "cites Christ's words, such as stand in the Gospels, but not as sayings of Jesus." It seems to me that if this work when giving thanks to God for the eucharist repeatedly speaks of Jesus as "thy servant Jesus, through whom thou hast revealed to us life, knowledge and immortality, etc.," this does not sound very much as if referring to a Jesus-God. Besides this it *does* cite such words as those standing in the Gospels as sayings of the Lord, i. e., Jesus (VIII, 2; IX, 5). Evidently Robertson too on whom Drews depends had not read this work thoroughly. It is always better to search independently.

The same may be said of the secular testimonies concerning early Christianity, those of Tacitus, Pliny, (the passage on the persecution under Nero in Suetonius is not mentioned at all). The author rejects all these testimonies as forgeries (pp. 228 and 231). Has he made an independent investigation of all of them? If he had done so he might have found out how exceedingly slim are the grounds on which such authorities as Hochart and others reject these passages. The reviewer at least has experienced this by independent investigation and since that time he has become very suspicious in regard to "authorities." If the testimonies referred to are Christian forgeries, the only grounds for them must have been that the forgers foresaw the modern attacks on the historicity of Jesus, for there were no such reasons for forgery in their own times and what other reasons could have influenced them I do not understand. In regard to the Tacitus passage, on which the main attack is directed, I have asked the very pertinent question, why should just *this* passage be forged, when Sulpicius Severus, who cites it verbatim in regard to the Neronian persecution, also cites the same Tacitus verbatim in regard to other matters *not* dealing with Christianity. (See *Monist*, Jan. 1911).

If Schürer thinks that Josephus may not have meant James the brother of Jesus, (*Ant.* IX, 1) this ground is also not yet decisive.

If Drews cites the hyperbolic words of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas (which he places as early as 96 A. D., p. 220) that Jesus chose his apostles from the worst of sinners to preach his

gospel, in order to prove that he came to call not the righteous but sinners to repentance, adding that this was neither written by an apostle nor one of their pupils (which no one claims), these words at least seem to refer to an historical Jesus. Further they seem indeed "to be written after our Gospels," as they cite words occurring there, and they further do *not* seem to be written "at a time when the learned masters of the church had still a free hand to show their spirit and ingenuity in giving form to the evangelical story." If Drews places this epistle at 96 A. D. and rejects the Tacitus passage as well as the Pliny passage referring to persecutions in Bithynia about 111, how then could there be much of a church with learned masters at that time according to his view? The fact is rather that the critics place the letter of Barnabas about 25 years later, when all the Gospels very probably were in existence.

When Drews wrote "The Jesus of the Gospels," did he think of the strong proofs for an historical Jesus to be found in some of the parables, such as the parable of the evil husbandmen and the parable of the supper which the king made for his son? According to both parables (it does not matter whether Jesus spoke them in the form we have them or whether they were enlarged upon by the Gospel writers) punishment is dealt out to the evil doers, who, it is clearly hinted are meant for the Jewish people. That these parables speak of an historical Jesus, the final and most eminent of the prophets God sent to his disciples, as the parables put it, I should think is clear.

Jesus is a physician-god like Asclepius, on account of the miracles related of him (pp. 240, 264 and also 138). Still if (p. 240) Tacitus and Suetonius are referred to as relating miracles performed by Vespasian of the same nature as those done by Jesus, and "if the Old Testament stand as a model" in this respect, why is Jesus then necessarily a healer-god and not historical?

All along we have been told that Jesus was a pre-Christian God. But on page 246 it is said that the Gospels intentionally invented the deficiencies of Jesus that they record, i. e., temporary inability to do miracles, non-omniscience, moral imperfection, etc., in order "to paint the celestial Christ of Paul for the faithful as a real man and to treat his idea of humanity seriously." Liberal theologians have thus far considered these deficiencies of Jesus as a proof of a historical perfectly human Jesus, and even orthodox theologians look at them as showing how thoroughly God became

man, but now we are told that all this is only ingenious device. Our intelligence is often strongly taxed.

On page 36 Drews rightly says that in the view of a later age primitive gods become men, such as Achilles, Hercules, Siegfried, etc. He then adds that the elevation of men to gods is as a rule only found in the earliest stage of human civilization or in periods of moral or social decay, worthless flattery, etc. Well, were not the later Hellenic times such times, when "a Plato and Aristotle were honored after their death as godlike beings" (p. 267); when important generals and kings and emperors were deified, as also happened to Apollonius of Tyana, a contemporary of Jesus? If "it was merely an expression of personal gratitude and attachment, of overflowing sentiment" (p. 268) to render divine honors to eminent men, why should this not have happened to Jesus? "Primitive gods in a later age become men," it is true, but this process is generally a very long one. It will be hard to make people believe that the Jesus of the New Testament is the outcome of such a process. He springs up suddenly in history and the process of his deification is a comparatively short one and corresponds to the time in which similar processes of deification came about.

The ethical teachings of Jesus are truly (p. 257) no higher than those of other ancient moral teachers, Jewish or pagan, but is not the actual life of Jesus, especially among the lower classes, those looked down upon by the righteous, in order to save them, a good proof of his real humanity? It is just this life of Jesus which seems peculiarly real. Further, is not just the "egoistical pseudo-morals, his basing moral action on the expectation of reward and punishment in the future, his narrow-minded nationalism, his obscure mysticism with mysterious references to his heavenly father, etc." as Drews characterizes the teaching of Jesus (p. 257), a proof for the historical Jesus, or is all this only intentional invention of the Gospels again?

In order to prove his thesis that there is no historical truth in the Gospels and that the impression which Jesus is said to have made upon his time is the impression of a fictitious personage, Drews draws a comparison with Goethe's *Werther*, which produced an enormous impression though entirely fictitious (p. 257). But the great impression made by *Werther* is perhaps due to the concrete realities standing behind it, the suicide of young Jerusalem in consequence of a deep love for the wife of a friend and the inner and outer experiences of Goethe himself.

In the Gospels, and, we may add, the letters of Paul, there is likewise a mixture of historical truth and myth, of concrete reality and inner and outer experience. The tragical career of Jesus is surely not invented, nor is the impression he made upon his followers. According to page 264 "Christ is only another form of the club-gods of religious-social brotherhoods, such as Attis, Adonis, Mithras, etc., with their yearly bloody expiatory sacrifice, baptism of blood, forgiveness of sins and rebirth." But it is to be remarked that if Jesus is only such a club-god, why was not in his case also a yearly bloody expiatory sacrifice and a baptism of blood repeated? The death of the human Jesus was once for all time the death-knell of all such bloody sacrifices and perhaps just because he was human and no club-god.

If according to page 267 it was possible to create out of a pure idea the semblance of a concrete personality that never existed, first by Paul and then more fully by the Gospels and all this in a comparatively short time, why could not the reverse be true, to create out of an historical personality a divine incarnation? The latter process, if we take into consideration the peculiar mental and ecstatic state of the first followers of Jesus and of Paul, seems to us less of "a psychological puzzle" than the former process.

On page 271 we are told that the lowest stratum on which our canonical Gospels are based was a Judaistic literature which had the closest interest in the historical determination of Jesus's life. "Judaism in general and the form of it at Jerusalem in particular, needed a legal title on which to base its commanding position as contrasted with the Gentile Christianity of Paul; and so its founders were obliged to have been companions of Jesus in person and to have been selected for their vocation by him." "In Paul's lifetime the transformation of the Jesus faith into history did not take place as one can believe from his letters." In order to discredit the apostleship of Paul, the Judaists "made the justification for the apostolic vocation consist in this, that an apostle must not only have seen Christ risen but must also have eaten and drunk with him" (p. 270). While liberal theology is inclined to see in the coarse materialization of the appearances of Jesus to his disciples after his death later accretions to the original resurrection story as told in 1 Cor. xv, and this probably in opposition to the Docetics who taught that Jesus had only an apparent, not a real, body, even before his death, Drews thinks that all this was done by Judaistic Christianity with the set purpose of making Jerusalem the central seat

of authority. "For this reason the god Jesus was transformed into an historical individual whose central point of action was Jerusalem" and whose right successors were the Judaistic apostles.

The reviewer must confess that it took him a long time to understand this reasoning of Drews as to why and how the god Jesus was transformed into an historical individual. It is very intricate to see how the god Jesus was made historical and yet was not historical, especially since the author says (p. 272) "that the Pauline epistles themselves contain nothing to lead one to believe that the transformation of the Jesus faith into history took place in Paul's time," while on page 275 he says that "the Pauline Christianity was in earnest with the manhood of Jesus," speaking similarly in earlier pages (p. 191 etc.). It seems then that Paul, like the Judaists who laid the basis for the Gospels, as Drews says, only talked of Jesus as historical though he was not historical. This whole thing seems to me to be one great tangle. The matter becomes still more confused when we read that all this representation of the god Jesus as an historical man, though not historical, was done in order to meet the gnostics of whom Drews says that they "agreed with the Christians that Jesus had been human" (p. 274). If they agreed with the Christians that Jesus was human (I suppose Drews means to say that they represented Jesus as human though he was not human) why then all this trouble of Paul and the Gospels to meet them by making Jesus historical who was not historical?

On pages 278-281, the author speaks of the Fourth Gospel as mainly directed against gnosticism "though itself gnostic but fundamentally differing" from the views it meets by "asserting that the Logos was made flesh." In this connection Drews says: "The historical picture which came down to the writer of the Fourth Gospel was forcibly rectified by him and the personality of Jesus was worked up into something so wonderful, extraordinary and supernatural, that if we were in possession of the Fourth Gospel alone, in all probability the idea would hardly have occurred to any one that it was a treatment of the life-story of an historical individual." This seems to me to be an admission fatal to the theory of Drews, for it is just the great difference between the idealistic Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics and Pauline letters which make us surmise a human, historical Jesus behind the latter.

In the appendix, "The Religious Problem of the Present," the author criticizes much of the language and phraseology of liberal theology, as he also does in other passages throughout the book,

and to my opinion in many cases rightly. He criticizes especially that such liberals speak still of Jesus as "redeemer" and "the voice of God to us." Still when Drews himself says, giving his view of religion: "God must become man, so that man can become God, and be redeemed from the bounds of the finite, etc." (p. 296) and when he speaks of "the divine essence of mankind, the immanent Godhead" as "the inner Christ" to be worked out, etc., his phraseology does not differ very much from that of those he criticizes; perhaps after all he does not differ so much in the essential points of religion from those he criticizes. On page 290 he calls the phraseology of a liberal theologian, A. Meyer, concerning God in connection with Jesus, pantheistic. Yet he himself, speaking of "the tidal wave of naturalism, ever growing more powerful and sweeping away the last vestige of religious thought," thinks that "the sinking fire of religion must be transferred to the ground of pantheism in a religion independent of any ecclesiastical guardianship."

The Christ Myth is a good statement of one of the many present theories that Jesus never existed, and we hope that it may find many readers, in order that the actual truth may be probed to the bottom. But just for this reason it would have been desirable that the author in giving the facts on which he bases his theory, would have been less assertive and would have shown that the facts adduced are really well founded.

A. KAMPMEIER.

IOWA CITY.

RIGNANO'S THEORY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS

The transmission of acquired characters from parent to child was an old problem in the days before Darwin when the theories of preformism and epigenesis were pitted against each other. Preformism was also called evolution in the narrow and literal sense of the word, for the life of any creature was assumed to be simply an unfolding of the type latent in the germ. A real chicken, though invisible on account of its diminutive size, was supposed to lie hidden in the egg, while the epigenesis theory explained the successive stages of the life in both the race and the individual by additional growth. The discussion of this same problem was renewed by Weismann, who takes a very uncompromising position against Lamarck's view of the development of life through exercise of organs and specialization by use. Weismann denies altogether the inheri-

tance of acquired characteristics. It is commonly considered that the two positions, preformism and epigenesis, are incompatible because contradictory, that if one theory is true the other must necessarily be wrong; but Rignano is confident that he has found a middle ground.

Both parties are agreed that heredity is a kind of memory, and memory is a subject upon which great interest has been concentrated. All recent attempts to bring out the significance of this fundamental factor of organized life are based upon Hering's essay, originally a lecture, "On Memory as a Function of Organized Matter."¹ Among other works in this line we will mention Semon's interesting book entitled "Mneme as the Preservative Principle in the Change of Organic Action,"² and also Rignano's "On the Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics."³

Rignano has been much before the scientific public on account of his new theory of inheritance which he calls centro-epigenesis and which is intended to be a conciliation between preformism and epigenesis. In making the attempt at overbridging the gulf between these two hypotheses, Rignano has worked out his theory with a great mass of detail which renders his book valuable, if for no other reason, as a collection of the most important data and propositions as well as theories proposed on this much mooted subject.

It is noteworthy that Rignano is not originally a biologist but an engineer and has for a large part of his life devoted special attention to physics. This had influenced him in so far as he falls back upon physical allegories of which his comparison of memory to electric currents appears in his conception to be more than a mere comparison.

Rignano is greatly influenced by Weismann whose belief in the isolation of germ plasma he incorporates into his own theory not to its whole extent but only so far as to assume that not the entire germ plasma but only its central zone remains isolated and is therefore stable and not subject to change. This theory of the existence of a stable central zone induces him to call his theory the hypothesis of centro-epigenesis.

It is well known that Weismann tries to explain in this way the rigid stability of heredity. His favorite evidences are found in

¹ Published in an English translation by The Open Court Publishing Co. in 1902.

² *Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip*. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908.

³ An English translation by Basil Harvey to be published by the Open Court Publishing Company is in preparation.

the beehive and the ant-hill where the queen bee and the queen ant are independent individuals and absolutely separate from the workers. So if a community either of bees or ants changes conditions unsuited for their lives the race would die out if they depended on the transmission of new characters acquired by the workers and not by the queen. Facts compel us to assume that bees and ants do adapt themselves to new conditions, for changes set in in the workers although they can not possibly have been transferred by them upon the queen; and in the same way Weismann believes that the germ cells are independent organs, which cannot be affected by the experience or new acquisitions of the rest of the body, the so-called somatic cells.

Rignano differs from Weismann in assuming that only the central zone of the germ plasma remains stable and continues to consist of the same substance, remaining isolated except for periodic impulses which it gives to somatic life, in this way directing them on to the ontogenetic development of the individual according to the phylogenetic development of the race.

The theory of a central zone is extremely doubtful and it is scarcely probable that further investigations will bear out either assumption, that of a special memory substance which has been deposited after the fashion of galvanic currents, or that heredity is due to the existence of a special germ plasma with a stable and isolated central zone. Rignano's book contains much material of great interest but its value consists not in what he says but in how he says it, for it will certainly stimulate inquiry.

According to our opinion memory is not due to an identity of substance, but to a preservation of form. The same is true of heredity which is a memory transmitted from the parent organism to its offspring, and for the sake of proving the preservation of form in a constant change of substance we must bear in mind that it is characteristic of all life. In order to understand that the race memory is stronger than the memory of a single individual, we have simply to assume that the characteristics of forms, consisting ultimately of millions and millions of generations, are so much stronger than those fewer ones of one generation which we see before us in the parent organism. In fact it stands to reason that the germ plasma representing the innumerable ancestors of the race should be overwhelmingly more vigorous than any amount of characteristics acquired during life. This principle would not exclude that once in a while acquired characteristics can be transmitted, and we may add that they are transmitted

only in cases where the germ plasma of the individual is favorably predisposed for receiving them. In our opinion this proposition would solve the problem of preformism against epigenesis in the simplest and most satisfactory way. At any rate it disposes of the extravagant claim of Weismannism.

Rignano accepts the vaguest part of Weismannism by assuming a bodily identity and isolation of the germ plasma. This hypothesis is the more improbable as all life produces a change of substance, and it seems all but impossible that one part, and in fact the most important part, of an organism should remain isolated, stable and unchanged. Rignano escapes some of the difficulties of Weismann by reducing the isolation of the germ plasma and conceiving it only as relatively stable.

Rignano declares that both preformism and epigenesis are untenable in their extreme forms, and that though both theories are commonly assumed to exclude one another each contains in its way an important truth. In his defence of preformism Rignano falls back again on Roux who by extirpation produced half-embryos and created otherwise perfect organisms which only lack definite organs. These experiments allow no other interpretation than that definite portions of the germ are preformed.

The explanation of memory as due to a preservation of form seems not only simpler but more probable than any other hypothesis which is based upon mere assumption. The stability of form preserved in the flux of sentient substance is no less persevering than the stability of a substance which in living organisms is, to say the least, very improbable.

Rignano argues that since the organs of an organism are always in equilibrium they cannot cause the changes of a further development. Therefore he accepts the conclusion that there must be a special zone of substance which remains constant and unchanged during the development of the individual, and that this zone sends out the stimuli which dominate the progress of organisms from stage to stage. Finally he identifies this central zone with Weismann's germ plasma which represents the phylogenetic factors and remains separate from the ontogenetic fate of the individual. But Rignano differs from Weismann by assuming that not the whole germ plasma but only its center remains isolated, which isolation, however, does not exclude that from time to time it sends out impulses and effects the individual somatic conditions without being reacted upon. This is claimed to explain the several facts which

have troubled biologists, both the preformists and the believers in epigenesis.

Rignano finds a proof of his theory in Roux's experiments of post-generation. The salamander's amputated feet grow again, so do the lenses of the triton's eyes, which indicates that the factor of generation does not lie in the destroyed organs but has its source in some other part of the body according to Weismann, the germ plasma.

Rignano, having devoted much of his thought to physics, falls back upon a physical explanation of memory which in our opinion is rather unfortunate. Instead of regarding memory as a preservation of forms in sentient substance he compares the nervous activity to the currents of accumulators, which deposit a substance capable of reproducing the same current. A discharge can take place only if resistance is sufficiently weak. Thereby Rignano explains how the different nervous currents of ontogenesis follow each other in the definite succession of their phylogenesis. Every nervous current reproduces the analogous state of evolution which the discharge of the accumulated elements render possible. These considerations induce Rignano to explain the phenomena of memory as resting on the same foundation. The nervous current which corresponds to a definite sensation also deposits a specific substance, which later on reproduces an analogous nervous process and with it an analogous elements of consciousness. This reproduction actually takes place if the resistance to a discharge is sufficiently weak, which means that the former nervous situation repeats itself in the same or partly the same way.

Mr. Rignano writes in a private letter to the author: "Naturally what interested me more than all is what you say concerning biological memory, and you have understood perfectly that the basis of memory resides in the anabolic processes of a restoration of living substance. A little step further and you will perceive memory as a process of specific accumulation, which means that this conception of memory is an accumulation of energy. The transition of it from a potential to an actual state constitutes what is called mnemonic evocation, which seems preferable to the old conception of memory as a trace. This becomes evident in my article on 'The Mnemonic Origin and Mnemonic Nature of Affective Tendencies,' for every one admits that these affective tendencies are only accumulations of energy, and if they are of a mnemonic origin it means that the

mnemonic phenomenon itself is also in its essence only a phenomenon of accumulation."

It is possible that the old view of memory conceived as a trace may have been insufficient, and may have interpreted it as a dead inactive impression like that of a seal, but a careful consideration of the facts will show that form is the indispensable and most important feature in the preservation of memory. As I conceive the nature of memory it is a form, not only of substance, but also of energy. Whatever energy may be stored up, the character of energy, its significance, its meaning, does not depend on any kind of force, be it electrical, or vital or mechanical but on the form of force, which again is dependent upon the impression preserved in the brain substance.

It has been my endeavor to bring out the all-importance of form, which theory becomes most apparent in biology.

Rignano's explanation of the way in which the germ plasma reproduces the succession of specific nervous currents which have been produced by phylogenesis appears to me somewhat stilted and could be greatly simplified by seeking the cause of memory purely in form and not in a specific substance deposited by a kind of nervous accumulator.

There is a third hypothesis proposed by Rignano which conceives the life process, especially assimilation, as "an internuclear oscillating nervous discharge," but Rignano himself considers the proposition a bold one and points out that the two other hypotheses are independent of the third. His work in this line is more tentative than safe in its constructions and we may add that in all his labors his criticism is the most valuable part of his work. Rignano is well read in the literature of his subject, perhaps more so than others, for the horizon of specialists is often limited to the publications that appear in their own native language. Rignano's book bristles with references to facts and experiments of great significance, and this feature of his labors alone would render his presentation both instructive and stimulating whether or not his two main theories are right.

P. C.

ECCENTRIC LITERATURE.

The authors of eccentric literature are usually cranks or matroids.¹

¹ The term "mattoid" is preferable to "crank," which is misused.

This literature is characterized by an association of false ideas based upon false premises, but which may be logically deduced. It is usually written in disregard of all known rules of composition and style, and its purpose is often difficult to discover. It is full of extravagant statements and visionary matter in philosophy, science, religion and politics. Eccentric literature has been called heterodox, but it has been remarked, that it is usually "heterodox ignorance."

As early as 1785, Adelung,² a German author, published a work of seven volumes on the "History of Fools," by which he meant biographies of "celebrated necromancers, alchemists, exorcists, conjurers, astrologers, soothsayers, prophets, fanatics, visionaries, fortune-tellers, prognosticators and other philosophical monsters." The author of this pioneer work said he desired to present to the public an assemblage of men who made it their business to oppose philosophy and sound reason, and thereby to imagine themselves great philosophers, but who rather brought philosophy into contempt.

One difficulty in selecting eccentric literature is due to the fact that some great minds, known to history, have manifested in their writings symptoms of eccentricity of all degrees until in some instances insanity has been reached. In fact, there are few sane people who have not during their lives been under the influence of some momentary illusion or hallucination. The greatest and wisest men have at times expressed such foolish ideas as not even ordinary people would have thought of saying. Highest reason has its freaks.

Eccentricity and deranged mentality, as manifested in geniuses, have been treated at length by the writer in another place;³ the intention here is to consider the writings of those whose eccentricity is more of a permanent nature and where minds are much less powerful, brilliant and durable, though their delirious ideas are sometimes expounded with much plainness and animation. Many aberrated persons with literary claims and scientific associations, produce volumes, in which the steps from eccentricity to partial or complete insanity can be traced. There is enough of such curious

² *Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit*, etc., Leipsic, 1785.

³ See chapter on "Genius and Insanity" in Senate Document (187, 58th Congress, 3d Session), entitled *Man and Abnormal Man* (780 pages).

This document may be obtained gratis through any United States Senator or Representative, or by sending its price (40 cents) to the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

and eccentric literature almost to make a library. There are at least 284 authors who have written eccentric literature.

The following is a table giving the number of eccentric books according to subjects. It will be seen that religious works predominate; books on spiritism, which are numerous, have not been collected.

CLASS	NO.
Theology	82
Prophecy	44
Philosophy	36
Politics	28
Poetry and Drama	9
Language and Grammar	8
Miscellaneous subjects	20
	227

SYMPTOMS OF ECCENTRIC LITERATURE.

Some cranks in their writings continually play upon words to absurdity, or use large numbers of words to no purpose, even writing volumes full of redundancy. Others repeat ideas of great statesmen or philosophers, but distort them by exaggeration, often making them ridiculous. Another symptom of eccentric literature is a use of stereotyped phrases in a peculiar sense and repeated many times with useless details. Many words are underscored, and the writing is in different characters. Even the pages may have various colors. As an illustration of profuseness of writings, one work consisted of 117 volumes. In addition to prolixity, the purpose is not only absurd, but the nature of the books is often entirely foreign to the education of their authors. Thus a physician writes concerning geometry, and a cook on political economy. A pseudo-geologist discovers a secret way of embalming bodies that is known to any demonstrator of anatomy; a university professor in a treatise mentions the exhalations of the fish as an advantage of sea-bathing, and yet his book contained many good things, reaching a second edition.

The ideas of eccentric writers are not only exaggerated but there is sometimes a painful disproportion in them; thus after ex-

pressing a sublime conception, they suddenly descend to trite ideas which are usually opposed to the views of most people. Some choose difficult subjects, as the exposition of the Apocalypse or the squaring of the circle, possibly to give the impression of mental profundity. Books on machines for perpetual motion are of the eccentric type; so, also, are odd interpretations of scripture. Cranks try to prove great men mistaken. It attracts attention and seems flattering to them. For instance, much has been written to prove Newton wrong. Some simply dispute the statements of authorities in order to bring themselves into notoriety. Some persons also regard the Bacon-Shakespeare controversies as eccentric literature.

ECCENTRIC TITLES.

Eccentric books frequently have very long titles, and some are so peculiar as to leave no doubt as to the nature of the work. *Pneumatology of Spirits and their Fluid Manifestations*, is one illustration. Another book has nine titles and is dedicated to as many kings. The following is a title: "Problem of the Law of Justice solved by Arithmetic. Statement of what passed for many years between Dr. John Dee and some Spirits." Another work is dedicated to "Father and Mother, to Paris and the Universe." This title is sufficient: "A Doctrine where Chaos will replace Order, and Time put an end to our Aberrations: God, Destiny, Equity. By Equity to accomplish our Destiny, the Will of God."

SCULPTURE.

Artistic cranks entered the public competition at Rome, for a proposed monument to Victor Emanuel. Their productions were characterized by stupidity. Some of the designs were grotesque and the inscriptions irrelevant, referring to the artist himself and showing excessive vanity. Many who submitted designs were ignorant of art, being teachers of grammar, mathematics, medicine, law and military science.

POETRY AND LITERATURE.

It has been said of certain decadent poets, that it is very difficult to make anything out of their series of words, which being connected together according to the laws of syntax might be supposed to have some sense but have none, keeping one's mind on the stretch in a vacuum, like a conundrum without any answer.

In literature proper the mental aberrations of authors are less

concentrated than in philosophy and theology. The mind touches rather upon the surface of things. The figures, tropes and analogies are strange. Forms and expressions of ideas, rather than their abstract nature and value are considered. Long speculations are rare.

As an illustration of eccentricity in literature proper, a professor of history in the sixteenth century, when attacked with melancholia, employed his time on a work entitled, "Program of Universal History." He had the fixed idea that the annals of the Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Romans were composed by fanatics and people without sense. As a matter of fact, he said, men have existed from eternity.

One author writes poetry on an enormous number of subjects, until he passes into mental ramblings and absurdities, yet through it all he preserves the rhythm. Another considering himself the greatest poet who ever existed, composes a heterogeneous mass of malice, pride, talent, vile defects and great qualities.

Walt Whitman's spirit of individuality, exaltation of ego, principle of pride and revolt caused him to become unbalanced. In him are symptoms found in those who proclaim themselves great men and universal reformers. Whitman says: "I have the idea of all. I know all. I am divine, without and within; I make all divine, that which I touch and all that touches me. My head is more than the churches, Bible and symbol of faith."

In certain individuals there seems to be a close relation between poetic power and insanity.

There are rare cases in which insanity increases intellectual power. Here is a case reported by physician. A very pious lady gradually became oppressed with a deep melancholic feeling, causing her mind to be deranged so that it was necessary to place her in an asylum. While there she expressed such remarkable ideas in verse, that they were written down. After she had recovered from her trouble she had no recollection of the matter and was not able to write with such elegance as when she had been deranged.

Another illustration is the composition by a lady confined in an insane asylum. The cause was the loss of her pet bird "Goldie":

"Wise people I know believe
That birds, when they have ceased to breathe,
Will never more revive;
But though I cannot tell you why,
I hope though Goldie chanced to die,
To see him yet alive.

"May there not be, if heaven please,
In Paradise both birds and trees?"

A young man who had become insane through disappointment in love, wrote this among other verses:

"Whene'er I hear the wild birds lay
And the echo in the grove,
And see the face of Nature gay
With beauty and with love,
I'll think that thou art with me still
By vale and murmuring stream,
And o'er the past my soul will dwell
In faint collected dream.
When all the charms of nature fade,
And Autumn leaf is strewn,
One charm will still be mine, sweet maid,
To dream of thee alone."

A graduate of Cambridge University, England, and winner of the best prize for the poem, became insane and was confined in an asylum. Though he had no paper, ink or pen, he wrote on the wooden panels of his room, by the aid of a key, a poem to the glory of King David, the Prophet. The following is the first stanza:

"He sang of God the mighty source,
Of all things, the stupendous force
On which all strength depends,
From whose right arm, beneath whose eyes,
All pride, all power and enterprise
Commences, reigns and ends."

POLITICAL LITERATURE.

Political and sociological subjects are perhaps the most difficult to write about, requiring not only the highest rationality, but a practical and sound sense in adapting ideas to actual conditions in which passion and sentiment play an important rôle.

Those who go to political and sociological extremes or eccentricities usually have an appearance of calm when in the public eye. This may indicate a strong conviction based upon intense feeling, and when partisanship, personal interests and ambitions are involved, they furnish a subject attractive to disordered minds.

Demons, Counsellor in Amiens, France, published works, one of the titles of which is: "The Demonstration of the Fourth Part of Nothing and Something; and All; and the Quintessence taken from the Fourth Part of Nothing and its Dependencies containing the

Precepts of Sanctified Magic and Devout Invocation of *Demons*, in order to find the origin of the Evils of France and the Remedies for them. (8°, 1594, 78 pages and one error)."

The author, Demons, said that he had determined to bring to light a classification of the shades of his timid obscurity in the quintessence which he had taken from nothing and to give an explanation of the enigma of his invention.

Francis Davene, a fanatic dreamer, published much in verse and prose at Paris in 1649 to 1651. He wrote to indicate the royalty which he claimed God had given to him. He desired to prove that the world would end in 1655, and in his "Harmony of Love and Justice" he endeavored to show that Louis XIV could not be the son of Louis XIII. He was persuaded that he himself would supplant Louis XIV.

"Addressed to All the Powers of Europe." The author of this epistle was born at Copenhagen in 1644. At the age of 12, he had visions. He was proud to have made a compact with God, to expel the Turks from Europe and deliver Judea. In spite of his many visions, he lived to be 98 years of age.

Hoverland (born 1758) was strictly of the old regime, detesting new ideas, execrating those whom he called revolters. For thirty years he breathed calumnies and injury against those of his compatriots, whom he accused of liberalism. He manifested his eccentricity by walking in the streets dressed like a savage. He was a lawyer and member of the council of 500. After having exercised different public functions he wrote a history of his native town (Tournay) consisting of not less than 117 volumes, without order, plan or reason, an undigested mass of documents, full of calumnies, forgetting no one whom he did not like.

Herpain, a Belgian, called Usamer (1848), with a mind unbalanced by ideas of social progress, endeavored to have adopted universally, what he called a physiological language, so that his ideas might be comprehended by every one. He developed his system in an article which he sent in this language to the legislative assemblies of different countries. The following is the Invocation: "As soon as Your Majestic Presence had illumined the nothing, the nothing was made the means of existence. Then you willed to reign favorably over the essences and principles of beings were produced."

Another author dedicates his book on "Demons and Spirits," to all the sovereigns, king, emperors and princes of the four parts

of the world. He held that everything was spirit, as the falling of a cat from the roof, or smoke coming from a chimney.

PHILOSOPHY.

One of the most significant symptoms of mental lack of equilibrium is weakness in that logical faculty upon which philosophy especially depends. For it deals with abstract and speculative subjects, where the mind has less to restrain it from aberrations. Unbalanced persons have produced less intelligible results in philosophy than other subjects.

In 1792 an author of natural history made interesting researches on the antiquity of Brittany, but he developed theories on man, the universe and the spiritual world in eight large volumes called *The New Jerusalem*, in which he claimed to establish an harmonious union of the world of bodies with that of spirits; stating that the spirit of John the Baptist would manifest itself to him on the 26th, and that of Peter on the 30th of June 1861.

Another author (1852) finds in names and dates, seven harmonic laws, which rule in the events of history. He said there would be 278 popes, no more, no less.

Wronski, a Polish philosopher and visionary mathematician (born 1788, died 1853) claimed to have created a universal religion, made over the mathematical sciences and organized politics on a new basis. He placed himself in the attitude of a Messiah and another Newton. He boasted of revealing the definite theory of numbers and giving the solution of the existence of matter in its three states, solid, liquid and fluid of air. The titles of two of his works were as follows: "Messianicism, Final Union of Philosophy and Religion, Constituting the Absolute Philosophy" (Paris, 1831-39, 2. vols. 4°) and "The Political Secret of Napoleon as basis of the future morality of the world" (Paris, 1837, 8°).

Such titles are sufficient to indicate the strangeness of Wronski's ideas.

SCIENCE.

A German physician published (1595) at Leipsic, a book concerning a child born with a golden tooth, which he attributed to the influence of the stars.

Deyraux entitled his book (1855) "Discovery of the Veritable Astronomy, based upon the Law common to Movement of Bodies." In a footnote he says that this important discovery of the true

astronomy can aid investigation and account for the facts. Until this day, he adds, the origin of the facts has been ignored by all ancient and modern astronomers.

A certain member of the Academy of Sciences of Lisbon and Counsellor of the Legation at Paris, in spite of all his titles and honors, must be classed among writers whose compositions are eccentric.

This academician filled his large apartment at Paris with birds in order to study their customs. He finally formulated a theory of determining the physical and moral dispositions of animals according to analogies, dress and colors, entering into details as to feathers and bills. He drew some peculiar conclusions. One was that if speech is wanting to the monkey, it is an advantage, because it preserves his liberty.

A learned and distinguished Orientalist (born 1663) presented the French Academy a memoir in which he claimed to show that Adam was 140 feet in height, Noah 50, Abraham 40 and Moses 25.

Jerome Cardan, a celebrated Italian physician, philosopher and charlatan, claimed the future was revealed to him by dreams and by marks upon his finger nails.

Another Italian physician, confined in an asylum, wrote works in 1496, on the Aristotelian philosophy, but endeavored to prove that Aristotle never existed.

Paracelsus (1536) was an alchemist, physician and philosopher. He was also a charlatan, but with undisputed talent and rambling mind. He wrote some 250 treatises. He peopled the world with demons and geniuses, and affirmed that he was in communication with celebrated personages of the other world.

Another author of a book entitled *The Great Scientific Restoration, Philosophic Mineralogy*, gave at the end a list of 52 different works, which he announced he would write on scientific questions.

Thomas Wirgman, with a capital of more than \$200,000, expended it all for printing his books, which were published in London at the commencement of this century. Not more than twenty copies were ever sold. The title of one of his books was *Grammar of Six Senses*, based upon three ideas, "time, space and eternity." The work was unintelligible. The author was fully convinced that when his ideas were universally adopted they would produce peace and harmony on earth and virtue would take the place of crime. In his application for the chair of philosophy at the University of Lon-

don, he wrote, "So long as I have a breath of life, I will not cease communicating to a new world the source of happiness." He wrote to George IV that if he did not adopt the principles of his books, neither he nor any of his subjects would be saved in the other world. One reason why his works cost him so much money was that he had special paper made and the pages colored differently, sometimes even with two colors on the same page; and when they did not please him, he would have others made.

William Martin entitled one of his works, *A New System of Natural Philosophy on the Principle of Perpetual Motion*, published at Newcastle in 1821.

He said perpetual motion was impossible through machinery, but added, "I had a strange dream...and after awaking was absolutely convinced that I was the man whom Divine Majesty had chosen to discover the great secondary cause of all things and the veritable perpetual motion."

In an introduction to another work, he wishes long life and prosperity to the Ruler of Ireland, who knows that he, William Martin, has "completely effaced Newton, Bacon, Boyle and Lord Bolingbroke."

John Steward (born 1822) had a mania for traveling. He left his business in India, and walked through many parts of the earth. He then wrote books, of which two of the titles are: *Voyages to Discover the Source of Moral Movement* (300 pages) and *Books of Intellectual Life or Sun of the Moral World*, Published in the Year of Common Sense 7000 of the Astronomical History of the Chinese Tables."

In one of his works he places himself above Socrates. In another he claims to be the only man of nature, who has ever appeared in the world. As indicating still greater conceit and mental aberration he had the idea that all kings of the earth were conspiring to destroy his works, and he therefore besought his friends to preserve a few copies, and after wrapping them up carefully, to bury them seven or eight feet under the ground, taking care not to let the place be known until on their death bed, and then only as a secret.

RELIGION.

The aberrations of religious mattoids consist in emotions, passions and instinctive impulsions of the soul. This is a realm almost without limit, where hopes and fears take all forms in the flights of the imagination.

In fanaticism the realities of the material world disappear, not by the flight of reason but because the fanatic believes it is his duty to annihilate it in the interest of his soul. His whole existence is absorbed in his thought, which not only influences his aberrations but modifies all the phases of the external manifestations of his mind. His conjectures have no limit and his doctrines can become so exaggerated by intense enthusiasm or imagination, that they become not only eccentric, but so extreme as to border on insanity. As an illustration we have works such as the one with regard to "the mouth or nose of the glorious Virgin," or a sermon by Baxter of England on "Hooks and Eyes for Believers' Trousers." These are not only eccentric, but vulgar, and sometimes immoral.

A theologian wrote a book to show that the aborigines of South America were the direct descendant of the devil and one of the daughters of Noah, and that consequently it was impossible for South Americans to obtain either salvation or grace.

ISAAC NEWTON.

Isaac Newton in his commentary on Daniel and the Apocalypse (London, 1733) interpreted the expressions of the Hebrew prophets, "one time, two times and a half a time," to mean 1260 solar years, beginning with the year 800 A. D. Newton fixed the destruction of the Papacy in the year 2060. He also attempted to determine the time for the destruction of the world, and the coming of a new world where justice would reign.

It has been asked why such a distinguished mathematician should occupy himself with such visionary ideas. Some say it indicated a decline in his genius; others, that he acceded to the surroundings in which he lived. Philomneste⁴ does not accept those reasons, but says that Newton like all men with real genius believed himself invested with a divine mission. This belief increases with age; he sought an expression of it in the prophecies of the Bible where numbers, which had been the joy of his life, played a great rôle.

Peter Leroux, a visionary who mixed philosophical ideas, defined love as "the ideality of the reality of a part of the Infinite Being, reunited to the objectivity of the ego."

William Blake, a talented painter, engineer and poet, who saw and heard supernatural beings, reproduced them in crayon and then engraved them.

⁴ *Les Fous littéraires*, Brussels, 1880.

It is surprising that a clear-sighted *juris consul* in his latter days should allow himself to announce that he had received a messianic message.

The author of *Faith Disclosed by Reason in the Knowledge of God, of His Mysteries and of His Nature* (1680, 280 pages) was a grave man and counsellor of the King; nevertheless he was unbalanced, believing he held in his hand the truth of truths. His mental wanderings were unintelligible. He found in matter the three elements of the Trinity: (1) Salt, the generator of things corresponding to God the Father; (2) mercury, where extreme fluidity represents God the Son spread in the whole universe, and (3) sulphur, which by its property of uniting salt and mercury represents the Holy Spirit. His works were condemned.

Gleizes (born 1773, died 1845) wrote works on vegetarianism. He deserted his wife, whom he loved, because she would not cease eating meat. He said meat was atheistic, but fruits contained the true religion, and that vegetables were an antidote for all evils. He left ten volumes.

The writings of aberrated esthetics and mystics constitute many eccentric books, the extravagancies of which have been injurious to religion.

Another religious author fixed six thousand years as the duration of the world, saying that the man of sin, the anti-Christ, would appear in 1912 and rule forty-five years, and be exterminated in 1957.

As an illustration of wisdom mixed with absurdity, there was a distinguished Lutheran theologian of the 17th century who wrote learnedly on New Testament Greek, but subsequently became exalted and prophesied that the end of the world would come in the year 2000.

John Humphrey Noyes, who claimed the gift of prophecy, founded a sect of biblical perfectionists or communists called the Oneida Community. He claimed to have established a divine government on earth, declaring that marriage was a theft and fraud, just as property was. He did not recognize human legislation. Everything, including insignificant details, was designated as an inspiration from heaven.

While attending a clinic of Professor Flechsig on insanity at the University of Leipsic, the writer heard an address of a theological student who had become insane. The patient talked about twenty minutes on the doctrines of the Trinity in a most learned

way, insisting that a great error had been made, for instead of three there were really four persons in the Trinity. After finishing his somewhat incomprehensible arguments his last words as he left the room were: "Gentlemen, I am the fourth person."

WRITINGS ON ECCENTRIC LITERATURE.

As the number of writings on eccentric literature is not large, a list of the principal ones is given here:

- Achard. *Dictionnaire des Hommes illustres de la Provence*, Marseilles, 1736.
 Adelung. *Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit*, etc., Leipsic, 1785 (7 vols.).
American Journal of Insanity, 1848. Illustrations of insanity furnished by letters and writings of the insane.
 "Cent et Un." Paris, *L'advocat*, 1832.
 Delepierre, Octave. *Histoire littéraire des fous*, London, 1860, pp. 184.
 De Bure. *Bibliographie instructive*.
 Erdan, M. *La France mystique*, 1858.
 Grégoire, B. H. "L'histoire des sectes religieuses," Paris, *L'Intermédiaire des chercheurs et des curieux*.
Mélanges de littérature maronique, 1852.
 Moreau, C. *Bibliographie des Mazarindes*.
 Nodier. *Bulletin du bibliophile*.
 Oettinger, E. M., *Bedlam littéraire*, 1809.
 Philomneste Junior. *Les fous littéraires*, Brussels, 1880, pp. 227.
 Polain, Louis A. *Catalogue*. Liège, 1842.
 Quérard. *Supercherries littéraires dévoilées*.

ARTHUR MACDONALD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE LOGIC OF LUNACY.

The nature of reason is consistency and we are convinced that all attempts to construct a logic which would stand in contradiction to the old-fashioned so-called Aristotelian logic must necessarily end in failure.

Aristotelian logic can be expanded. A logic of probability may be developed and the rules of inductive logic can be more and more perfected and added to the old trite deductive system of syllogisms. The laws of actual thought have been investigated, a grammar of science has been written, an algebra of logic has been worked out, a logic of relatives has been conceived, a system of logical graphs has been invented, and the names of such men as Leibnitz and Lambert, George Boole, Karl Pierson, Ernst Schroeder, Louis Couturat and Charles S. Peirce are well known as promoters of this new

branch of scientific thought. But so far all their work is an elaboration of the old logic, and no non-Aristotelian logic has yet become recognized.

Nevertheless there is a possibility of tracing the operations of a logic that would not be consistent, a logic that would not recognize the principle of identity, that would reject continuity or ignore the principle of the conservation of matter and energy, a logic of fairyland. This kind of logic contradicts reality and is not consistent with experience except on the conditions of fallacious observation. But fallacious observation and immature judgment are by no means impossible. On the contrary they belong to the most frequent occurrences in the domain of mental activity, and if we recognize provisionally the assumption of fallacious reasoning, we can very well build up systems of thought which would fall into the category of curved logic.

A large field for logic that follows its own line and is characterized by an erratic freedom is found in dreamland. The logic of dreams has been subject to frequent inquiry and many good observations have been made in this special line which is typical for kindred conditions in a waking state. It occurs quite frequently in the psychology of children, in moments of excitement, and generally in hysterical persons.

Consistency is indispensable for any kind of logic and even an inconsistent logic ought to have some rule in its inconsistency. In other words, its inconsistency should be relative and ought to be governed by a principle. To put it bluntly, the inconsistency should be carried out with consistency.

The most extreme form of an inconsistent logic would be the logic of the insane, who, though illogical in the common acceptance of the word, follow in their arguments definite rules, and if we possess the clue to their aberrations, we can foretell the conclusion at which they arrive and also their actions. It stands to reason that in almost every single case there will be method in their madness.

When we bear in mind the consistency with which the insane argue, we feel justified in coining the term "logic of lunacy" and would say that in the sense of the present explanations this term has a deep meaning. A study of the logic of lunacy would form an important branch of psychology as well as abstract logic. It would not be correct logic, but it would be a logic that actually exists and is obeyed according to rules of its own.

There are certain rules in grammar according to which devia-

tions from correct speaking are made by unschooled persons, and the most important source of these errors is false analogy. Lunatic logic similarly obeys the rules of its own false analogy. Alienists know very well that insane people frequently argue as sharply and consistently as sane people but their arguments have a twist. In addition to false analogy they suffer from false generalization and other errors. Similarly a wrong logic dominates the mind of primitive man, whose explanations of nature may appear extremely comical to us and certainly are erroneous, but the savage takes them seriously. From his standpoint, with his limited knowledge, with his lack of discrimination and his wrong application of logical principles, he must fall into exactly those errors, for instance animism and the idea that the planets, because they move, are living and thinking beings. We may call such modes of thinking the logic of primitive man.

A peculiar kind of reasoning underlies the several systems of magic and the main principle is a belief in the efficiency of the symbol. The Indians symbolize rain in a rain dance and are confident that rain will come. A witch burns a wax figure representing the person whom she desires to kill, and she believes that a burning fever will destroy his health.

It will pay the historian to ransack the records of almost all the sciences in their prescientific state for indications of a twisted logic. The very symbols of alchemy are based upon the idea that there are kindred tendencies in different things which for some reason or other have received the same name or have been connected with the same patron divinity whether in the shape of a patron god or a Christian saint. Thus the god Mercury, the metal mercury, the planet, and all that is connected with the name Mercury in any shape are considered akin and in order to produce a desired effect one can be replaced by another. The symbol of Mercury, two serpents twined about a rod, stands for all of them and is as efficient as the objects which it represents.

Prescientific medicine is based on the same principle. A lion's heart produces courage, a hare's leg makes rapid runners, etc. Some of the strongest drugs can be traced back to a primitive conception of the efficacy of certain objects. The logic of astrology belongs to the same class and belief in it has not yet died out, as can be seen by the number of astrological books published and sold at the present time. All fortune telling by cards and otherwise is based on this twisted logic which symbolizes certain events and personal-

ities in the different cards and tries to reproduce an analogous outline of the life of the person who consults the fortune-teller.

How deeply these notions of a twisted logic are rooted in the human mind appears from the fact that a man of such high standing as Schopenhauer was affected by it and seriously believed that the will in its metaphysical quality as will-in-itself can work miracles after the fashion of the ancient magic. The will-in-itself is above time and space and so can break through its limitations. The will can effect others at a distance and a somnabulist can have visions of events distant in time and space. He endorses Bacon's proposition that "magic is practical metaphysics" (*Par. u. Par.*, I, 320 and 283). Indeed Schopenhauer insists that magic effects can be produced with the assistance of symbolic representations, declaring that though physically impossible they can only be explained by metaphysics; that magic has a causality of its own which makes *actio in distans* possible. According to Schopenhauer magic refutes materialism and even naturalism; it throws light on the efficiency of magnetism and would prove that there was a truth in the medieval belief in witchcraft.

One curious form of twisted logic is the identification of thought and being, of statement and objective reality. Ideas are the stuff of our intellectual life. We are made of ideas, and sensations are the actualities of our surroundings. If that is so, we can manufacture our own world, and in a sense this is quite true; but he who can not heed the difference will live in a world of illusions. The Egyptians painted food for the dead in the tombs and the ghosts were supposed to feed on these painted viands. This is quite an original notion and yet it crops out in all other countries among all the nations of the earth, wherever human minds possess a similar twist of logic and wherever their notions as to the nature of the soul are limited.

Why are most of the productions of erratic minds so very similar? Why are there so many circle squarers who are bent on solving a problem whose very significance they do not understand? Why are there so many who agree in general tendencies in their explanations of the meaning of that mysterious book, *The Revelation of St. John the Divine*? Why are all expositions of theories of this kind so very similar? Their authors mean to be very original and in a sense they are. They try to strike out into new paths which lead away from the common trivial truth which the professional scientist discovers. Yea, the very itching for originality is

typical and so it happens that even this longing and all its several expressions can be classified according to general rules.

Psychologists have here to deal with rules of typical mistakes. The twist in them is that feature which, in its extreme case, is called lunacy, and if a logician would concentrate his mind on false analogies and the other typical twists which dominate these wrong arguments, he would work out what might properly be called the logic of lunacy.

The logic of lunacy might have a very practical application. We would be able not only to understand the mind of an insane person and trace part of his insanity; we would be able not only to see how, from his standpoint, his argument must appear sound, just as in the days of savagery the conclusions of the savage appeared as deep philosophy, but we would also learn how to treat and even cure those who are afflicted with such twists in their logic.

I will conclude these comments with a short anecdote about an alienist whose quickness in comprehending the mind of an insane person saved his life at a critical moment.

In visiting an insane asylum, Dr. R. met at the entrance to the park surrounding the institution, a gentleman to whom he introduced himself, telling him of his desire to visit the asylum. The gentleman welcomed him, introduced himself as the director of the asylum and courteously expressed his willingness to show him around. Having had some talk on insanity, the self-styled director of the asylum led the visitor to a high lookout tower from which the whole institution and grounds could be surveyed. After reaching the top of the tower, this director politely requested his visitor to jump down, and the latter realized at once that he was in the presence of a patient who was on the verge of turning into a maniac. The eyes of the insane man flashed in triumph at having lured his victim to a place from which he could not escape. It was a perilous moment. Escape was impossible, a struggle would have meant death for both, rational argument would be absolutely unavailing. What was to be done? Being accustomed to deal with similar kinds of patients, the alienist remained calm and said quietly, "To jump down from here is nothing extraordinary. I can do something much more remarkable. I can jump up from below. Come along, I will show you." The insane man, attracted by this unique idea and strangely puzzled to know how it could be done, peacefully followed the stranger down the rickety stairs to a place where both were out

of danger. The rest need not be told. At the foot of the tower a warden came along and took charge of "the director."

Human life is full of instances of twisted logic or we might say curved logic: relics of the logic of primitive man, the logic of false analogy, of wrong generalization, of misconception of facts, etc. If we treated these forms of twisted logical theories seriously we could *a priori* develop systems which would be consistent with themselves, but could not be applied to reality. There they would fail because reality has a definite logic which in its applications becomes often very complicated, but is quite plain, quite consistent and let us say straight or even or level in its general principles. I do not mean to say that these original theories of logic are to be condemned and rejected; no, they must be studied and understood. They have their field in the realm of fairy tales and of Utopian romances. They must be taken seriously in the domain of religious mysticism as well as in the symbolic ceremonies of the church. They constitute a world of their own in which another kind of causation is effective and where the mind of man is not bound to respect the character of reality and of natural law, but imposes upon the phantoms of his imagination rules laid down by his own sweet will.

P. C.

THE FETISH OF ORIGINALITY.

"Die Wahrheit war schon längst gefunden,
Hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden;
Das alte Wahre, fass es an!" Goethe.

The notion of spontaneity dies hard. It was at high tide when primitive man read his own abounding vitality into the environment. It has lost caste in these scientific days, and many of us still cling to the belief that we are living in a world of interdependent things, where changes take place not capriciously but according to rule, and where a settled causal order gives us the power both of retrospect and prevision. But the pack of knowledge has been again shuffled, and some are attempting to give us a new deal. So far as the cards have come out, they present unfamiliar signs and pictures that bewilder. We miss, for example, the "things which abide" on which so many of nature's vicissitudes used to be founded; we confront self-originating actions which have no support in objects; indeed, the whole universe, as they tell us, is made up of just such actions

minus things.¹ Substance reappears as an impulse to create, and it is through this *exigence de la création* that chaos passes into cosmos and matter arises. Then the torch of spontaneity is handed on to organisms, making it possible to explain as well as illuminate the mysterious realm of life by what is called *l'élan de la vie*, or *le grand souffle de la vie*. In both inorganic and organic new events constantly start into being; there is an irresistible rush upward and onward of the actions which act; anything old may happen anyhow, something new may suddenly come up anywhen from anywhere. Nature, in a word, is "original." Her supposed link with the past is a scientific superstition soon to be outgrown, and her supposed amenableness to prediction must henceforth rank as crass intellectualism. She is free beyond the wildest dreams of caprice; her wilful products pour forth unceasingly; and it is not her recurrences, her repetitions, her imitations, but her endless "novelties" to which our gaze is directed.

This belief in the spontaneity of nature is of a piece with the idea of self-sufficiency in men. The notion of human originality has survived the exaggerated individualism of the nineteenth century into our own day. The cult of "self-reliance" is still a factor in so-called character-building. We continue to be warned, in various voices and from various quarters, against slavish subservience to inherited modes of action and conventional ways of thought. There is a widespread distrust of "ruts," and a more or less outspoken prejudice against "beaten tracks." The age rings with the praise of originality: It is not the plodding worker, but the man of new ideas who is most in evidence. In art, literature, science, politics, the palm is everywhere awarded to the original mind. There is optimism in this tendency, and its effect in stimulating effort is undoubted. The injunction "Be yourself—do not imitate!" has frequently brought out native powers that might else have slumbered. Even the *délire des grandeurs* must have had its influence upon progress. But how far can the cult of originality make good its claim? To what extent is the individual really self-sourced and spontaneous in his activities? When and where does he cease to be dependent?

Unless all signs are at fault, man himself is an imitation. Not only, by virtue of being an organism, is he separated *toto coelo* from all the forms of non-organic existence; in fundamental characters he at once inherits from and resembles all the living creatures that

¹ Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*. "Il n'y a pas de choses, il n'y a que des actions" (p. 270).

have preceded him. The worm that crawls and the biped who looks up to the heavens carry on the same physiological processes, however these may differ in complexity and incidence; even the non-locomotive plant shares with the higher order of animal the activities which are needed for self-maintenance. The doings of human beings are similarly linked by the bond of likeness. If man is an expanded model of the lower organic life, he is also an imitation of the individuals who belong to his own society. The activities of daily life, vary as they may from place to place and from occupation to occupation, are connected by deep and subtle resemblances. These begin for animal life in periods of rest and wakefulness, of play and food-hunting, of pairing and rearing, estivation and hibernation. For developing man there are the night fire in cave or camp, the division of the bright hours into spaces for work and meals, the daily glow and gloom of the hearthstone, the morning ablution and the evening prayer, the recurring periods of worship and sacrifice, just as for civilized society the week has its theater-going or church attendance, the year its politics and voting, its stock-taking and rent-paying, its fasting and its vacations. Somewhere and sometime people are always doing the same things, always carrying on activities which, on the ground of common elements, can be grouped into great classes. The functions performed may differ, the actions involved may vary, but under analysis the resemblances only grow more profound, and the unlikenesses more superficial, for both are determined by the structural unity of life itself.

Not only is man an imitation of earlier organisms and of other men, he is an imitator of himself. His most spontaneous actions show the recurrence, in however modified a form, of his activities in the past. Habit is heredity writ large; and the growing ease of a direction once taken, enlisting the whole power of the organism in its favor, ensures those repetitions which Kierkegaard has called "the satisfying bread of daily existence." Meanwhile man is being constantly assimilated to his surroundings and his society. As molecules must resemble each other to form any particular substance, so human individuals must be fundamentally alike in ways of acting and thinking if they are to cooperate. The lower animals are born in an advanced state of fitness for life; men need to be "licked into shape." The process of qualifying them for human society begins with home education, through which speech and customs are passed on by the old to the new generation. The schools simply enlarge this process with a formal training directed, not to the encouragement

of originality, but to the moulding of the individual, in knowledge, conduct and ideals, into likeness with the race. The all-potent assimilating forces of every-day life then come into operation. The individual who would be himself yields submission to his social environment in thousands of ways. He acquires habits that are suggested to him; he accommodates himself to customs; swayed by institutions, he is constantly under the domination of laws. If his modes of life are imposed from without, so are his speech, his ideas, and the general trend of his thought. The current words, the street and newspaper slang of a locality, are put into his mouth. As his behavior is dictated by the "good form" of a particular society, so he is influenced to wear clothes generally like those worn by everybody else. Consciously or unconsciously to himself, his home life is also thus regulated. It is the "proper" furniture, carpets and pictures with which he provides his house. He does not spontaneously choose an Aphrodite of Milo or a statue of Nike for ornaments; these are selected for him, little as he is aware of the fact. His very personality belongs, in part at least, to others. It is subject, as the psychologists show, to more or less permanent modification by every other personality with which he happens to have intercourse. A thinks he is always A, yet when he comes into contact with B he becomes C; when D visits him he mysteriously changes into E, and so on all through the alphabet. All the time, if a self-conscious individualist, he is struggling to be "original"; yet all the time, in spite of, or unknown to himself, he is imitating. Even his mental furnishings are largely dictated by others. A work in the hands of a friend, gossip about the latest novel and its phenomenal success, some printed notice of the week's "best seller," perhaps merely the glittering cover in a bookseller's store—these are among the influences which now and then bind even the sturdiest individualist captive to his *milieu*. As for opinions, he would fain be "original" in them, but the ease of thinking as others think is so alluring, the difficulty of differing from them so disagreeable, that his best laid plans for independent judgments "gang aft agley." The wisest of his conclusions in the most lucid of his intervals are meanwhile buttressed in the judgments of the race.

The larger angles of human life are also being worn down. If the nation is an imitation of previous stages of national existence, repeating, with whatever variations and modifications, the ideas, customs, institutions of those stages, so is the nation more and more an imitation of other nations. In the earlier days of the race, seas,

mountains, rivers, were effective barriers to intercourse, and the separated peoples grew up in an individualism of life and thought, of costume as well as custom, which still lingers here and there in Europe and the Orient. But the science which binds continents together with railways, which pierces mountains and navigates the most distant oceans, bids fair to diminish national "originality" almost to the point of disappearance. Nor is the movement less in evidence where the changes wrought take the direction of progress. Cities catch from each other the methods that make for social and political advance; industrial improvements pass from country to country; new ideas of government, especially of democracy in government, are rapidly becoming the common property and heritage of all the peoples. Yet through it all, whether we call it "standardizing," holding-down, or levelling-up, the process is one which insists on the assimilation of each group to the general life of all the groups. The nation may plume itself on its "originality"—may determine to be itself and only itself. It must yield, and is constantly yielding, to the influences that reach it from without. For it is not in the superficial differences that linger, nor yet in the progressive variations sure to arise, but in the fundamental likenesses which co-operation at once requires and helps to produce, that the hope of a world democracy is bound up.

But there is surely scope for originality in the free life of the spirit, in the products of the mind. Admitted that language itself was a joint creation, the great ideas of the race must have flashed up suddenly in the brain of some supremely endowed individual. How suddenly? The existence and unity of Deity were proclaimed more than 3000 years ago by the Hindu Vedas; at least as ancient is the pantheism which teaches the oneness of God and the world. The conception of an ether system from which all matter arises and to which it returns may be found, in however rude a form, in the *apeiron* of Anaximander. The modern scientific teleology which with Naegeli and Haeckel endows the atoms with elementary feeling, had its anticipation in the hylozoism of the Greeks. Newton's law of the equality of action and reaction was implied in the strife which Heraclitus read into the very constitution of things. The principle of the conservation of energy, "discovered" or experimentally demonstrated by Mayer, Helmholtz, Colding and Joule, may be found in Descartes, Kant, Huygens, and Leibnitz; the earliest suggestions of it date back to Aristotle, who spoke of the maintenance of the whole amid change of the parts, and to Telesius, who traced the

unchanging "mass" of matter to a power of conservation. The atomic theory, which is still the fundamental creed of modern chemistry, was proclaimed by Leucippus and Democritus, who also clearly formulated the causal law which excludes chance from the natural order. The latest and "newest" theory in physics is the electron theory of matter, yet Lord Kelvin in his essay "Æpinus Atomized" traced its main features to Franz Hoch who wrote in 1759. Nor is the doctrine of evolution new in either its general or its special aspects. Not only did ancient thought contain the notion of the origin of life from the inanimate, it adumbrated, however imperfectly, the idea of the progression of life forms through natural selection. Democritus taught that living beings arose from slime, Anaxagoras that organisms came from the damp earth under the influence of warmth. Both Heraclitus and Empedocles announced the germ of Darwinism in their assertion that forms unsuited to the conditions perished, while forms suited to them were maintained.

Perhaps we find more originality in the sciences. Strictly delimited from each other by name and "special" to an extent not altogether good for them, they touch and interpenetrate each other at a thousand points. Proud in their isolated preoccupations, they are borrowers *à haute volée*. Each transmits by a sort of osmosis to the sciences most nearly related to it, and all benefit more or less from the contributions of each. The astronomer must be something of a mathematician and geometer, of a physicist and chemist; the physicist must know something of the inorganic sciences. What would the biologist do without chemistry, the paleontologist without geology, the sociologist without biology, anthropology and linguistics? Is it because science is modern that the sciences are interdependent? Mathematics and geometry come up to us from the dim beginnings of civilization, and despite up-to-date theories of hyperspace, Euclid is still a name to conjure with. We have spectroscopic analysis and heaven-piercing mirrors, yet astronomy was practiced in the ancient worlds of Chaldea, Babylonia, Assyria, and Egypt, and our star maps are still scattered over with Arabic and Latin names. The Chaldeans knew of the phases of Venus over 4000 years before Galilei saw them through his glass; the rotundity of the earth was reasoned out by the Greeks centuries before Magellan's ship circumnavigated the globe. We discuss the ether and its properties, call new compounds to the aid of our industries, watch the process of cell division through our microscopes, and gather endless materials for the sciences of mind and society; yet

there have been physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, by whatever names they called themselves, since nature-study began.

The sciences as "applied" ought to yield us the required evidence of spontaneity. Even here the bond with past achievement is unmistakable. Telescope, steam engine, telegraph—all the great "innovations" that impress us in the history of scientific progress—become intelligible only in the light of their historic background. The telescope no more came full-fledged from the brain of an inventor than did the spectacle-glass, and both had centuries of experiment in optics behind them. The magnifying lense focussed the solar ray amid Assyrian darkness, and the sun-dial which tells the bright hours in our summer gardens pointed its shadowy finger to "the time" at least half a century before Christ. The steam-engine was anticipated in the aeoliple of Heron; navigation had the magnetic needle in second-century Cathay; telegraph, telephone and dynamo were implicit in Gilbert and lay in the experiment of Oersted like the statue in the block of marble. The thonged pebble preceded the Nasmyth hammer, as the clepsydra with toothed wheel preceded the clock, and as the rude brick printing of Babylonia preceded the movable types of Forster and Gutenberg. We may call the digging stick of the Australian savage the ancestor of the steam plough; the stone sickle, the roasting tray, and later the tribulum, as Mason reminds us, were the progenitors of the steam harvester. The mechanically driven street carriage gave a good account of itself in pagan times, and one of the labors of Rameses II—to say nothing of Xerxes—anticipated by more than 3000 years the modern canal-piercing operations at Suez and Panama. The Greeks had sails when the Pleiades were named; the seas are still white with canvass.

Will not the wonder-world of machinery give us some glimpse of the innovator depending wholly upon himself? Modern machines are vastly more complex than those known to the ancients, yet they are all products of cooperative effort resting on past achievement, and there is some justification for the claim that they embody a series of improvements rather than a succession of absolutely new creations. "Examine at random," says W. H. Smyth, "any one of half a dozen lines of mechanical invention. One characteristic common to them all will instantly arrest attention. They present nothing more than a mere outgrowth of the manual processes and machines of earlier times. Some operation, once performed by hand tools, is expedited by a device which enables the foot as well as the

hand to be employed. Then power is applied; the hand or foot operation, or both, are made automatic, and possibly, as a still further improvement, several of these automatic devices are combined into one. All the while the fundamental basis is the old, original hand process; hence—except in the extremely improbable event that this was the best method—all the successive improvements are simply in the direction, not of real novelty, but of mere modification and multiplication."

Not only must the new machine, however "original," be founded on experience of all past machines; its "innovation" must take the course traced out for it, on the one hand by the properties of matter and the nature of energy, on the other by the underlying structural unity of all life. It is this unity, and not anything like voluntary choice, which makes man an unconscious imitator of mechanical contrivances first developed by organisms much lower in the scale of existence than himself. Hydrostatic principles are followed in the flow of blood through the arteries and veins; mechanical principles find illustration in the interplay of muscles, sinews and bones; the lever is a large factor in the movements of animals, and there is a ball-bearing at every joint. The awl and the saw were brought to perfection by the boring insect, the beginnings of navigation are to be found in the floating pupa skin of the gnat and the sail of the nautilus. Uncounted ages before the African laid his earth traps, the dark continent was honeycombed with the pitfalls of the ant-lion. The climbing hooks of the tiger-beetle antedated grappling irons, as the scale armor of the armadillo preceded the soldier's cuirass. Poison was used by plant and animal long before the savage tipped his arrows with it; the gymnotus and his congeners invented the electric battery. The lowly fire-fly still outdoes man's highest powers of contrivance with a method of producing light without heat.

If the appeal be made to the fine arts, what does architecture say? Here there is indeed variation from age to age, yet through all mutations due to fashion or taste the laws of stability and proportion persist. Our decorative public buildings continue to remind us of Greece and Rome or of the Middle Ages. What is our "high-style" architecture other than Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, Romanesque, Gothic, Italian, or of endless minglings and modifications of these? No wonder that Fergusson distinguished between "the true and the copying or imitative styles" when he wrote: "It is not perhaps too much to say that no perfectly truthful architectural building has been erected in Europe since the Reformation. . . . In modern designs

there is always an effort to reproduce the style of some foreign country or that of some bygone age—frequently both." Nor is the critic of to-day any the less emphatic. "Since the close of the 18th century," says Arthur L. Frothingham, "there has been no true style anywhere, but simply a series of fashions chasing each other across the background of equally mutable social conditions." "It has been a trouble to many," writes Russell Sturgis, "that in our recent American architecture a whole building, or a large and showy member of a building, should have been so closely copied from some fine old structure in Europe that it is easy of recognition. But those who are greatly exercised about this should not need to be told that such close copying has long been the rule in details. For what purpose are used those large photographs of small details of which every architect has as many as he can afford? . . . One need hardly fear contradiction in saying that in the majority of cases they are simply used for copying."

Sculpture and painting, essentially imitative arts, have models common to all. If it be said that the originality in this field consists in an unexcelled closeness of imitation, we may fairly ask to have the superiority indicated to us. The modern artist has undoubtedly outdone his predecessor in giving us "real" views of natural objects. But how modern is the realism? Man of the flint-chipping age carved figures on bone with a fidelity to life which anthropologists never tire of admiring. "Nearly every great group of animals," says A. C. Haddon, "is represented in native art, and often so faithfully that it is possible for the naturalist to give the animals their scientific names." Is it, then, in the ideal, the subjective element that we are to find spontaneity? Why have we not surpassed Phidias, Michel Angelo and Canova in sculpture, Raphael and Leonardo da Vinci in painting? Nor is decorative art in any better case. A vast number of our modern patterns in ornamentation are to be found in the art of primitive peoples. The inventors of "new designs" in our art schools and elsewhere make a liberal use of the same natural objects which have served their clan in all the ages.

In music the notion of merely imitative effects seems overwhelmed by the thought of enormous resources of combination. Yet the recombining depends for its newness, so-called, only upon the total structure of the composition, since all compositions consist of series of notes which have been repeated and re-repeated since drums were first sounded and stringed instruments came into ex-

istence. Within the general repetitions, moreover, there are special resemblances which connect the great compositions with the link, not only of heredity, but also of family likeness. The historians of the art are not content merely to ask what Richard Strauss, Brahms, Wagner, Mendelssohn, Chopin, Schumann, even Beethoven would be without Bach. They rearrange the imitations and redistribute the indebtedness. Mozart and Philipp Emanuel Bach are brought in to explain Haydn. Chopin's harmonic system is re-discovered in Wagner. Handel, as well as Bach, reappear in Elijah, the Saint Paul, and the Reformation Symphony of Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. If Beethoven "seems to have included in his mighty symphonies all that had been," the same critic assures us that "in his ninth symphony and last piano sonatas may be found the seeds that sprouted into the luxuriant forests of the Wagner music, and gave birth to the dream-haunted imaginings of Chopin, Schumann and Berlioz." Everywhere we hear the "dominant note" gathering the past to its timbre, but only to sound down again through the ages. "Originality" and indebtedness in music refuse to be disassociated. Note the dedication of a recent book on *Grieg and His Music* to "Edward MacDowell, America's most original composer, who was more influenced by Edvard Grieg than by any other master!"

The chosen home of spontaneity, then, must be literature, since here we recognize the actual workings of the individual mind. The fundamental likenesses of nature and man predestined the family resemblances of *belles lettres* the world over from the beginnings. The Mahabharata tells us all that we need to know of their antiquity. The ancients—India, Greece, Persia, Arabia—have given us not only inspiration, but also style and material. Philostratus, the Athenian, supplied B. C. 170 the original for Ben Jonson's "Song to Celia"; the Book of Job and the old Hindu theater gave Goethe the idea for the Faust prologue. That the Iliad and the Odyssey are the chief sources of all later story writing has become a literary commonplace. It was this universal indebtedness to Homer which led Voltaire to write, "If this father of poetry could recover from his descendants all they have borrowed from him, what would remain of the Æneid, of the Jerusalem Delivered, of Roland, of the Lusiade, of the Henriade, and of all the things of this kind one dare name?" Virgil imitated Theocritus, says M. Benoist, "not only in the choice of subjects, but also in the details of his style and of his personification; he borrows verses sometimes entirely, being content only to translate." And Eichhoff adds the accusation that the

great Latin poet copied from his compatriots Ennius, Attius, Catullus, and Nevius.

The moderns begin, but do not end, with the imitation of antiquity. Chénier, says B. de Fougère, "has not a scene which he has not borrowed from the ancients," and it is the opinion of Alfred de Musset that "Greek tragedy, that majestic and sublime ocean, gave birth to both Racine and Alfieri." The "Wasps" of Aristophanes reappear in Racine's "Les Plaideurs," as the fables of Æsop and Phædrus reappear in Gellert, La Fontaine, Kryloff, and Afanasieff. Boccaccio gave rise to a host of imitations, among them the Canterbury Tales of Chaucer, and sixteenth century English poets did not disdain to polish their compositions under the light shed by Dante, Ariosto and Petrarch. Spanish romances were the foundation of Spenser's *Faerie Queen*, and Spenser himself had an imitator in Phineas Fletcher. Milton looked for sources and suggestions to Homer, Virgil, Tasso, the plays of Pindar, and the Old and New Testament. Renz de Gourman calls Fénelon's "Télémaque," itself a borrowed style, "the most imitated work, phrase for phrase, in all literature." As Shakespeare's "Comedy of Errors" had its source in Plautus, so Corneille's "Cid" has been traced to a Spanish drama by Guillen de Castro. "Dryden's second best play," says Saintsbury, "is built with an audacity to which only great genius or great folly could lead, on the lines of Shakespeare. His longest and most ambitious poem follows with surprising faithfulness the lines of Chaucer. His most effective piece of tragic description is a versified paraphrase—the most magnificent paraphrase perhaps ever written—of the prose of Boccaccio." "The imitation of Pope," according to Edmund Gosse, "grew to be a rage from Sweden to Italy," yet the brilliant Pope was himself an imitator. His "January and May" is a modernized version of Chaucer's "Merchant's Tale"; his "Dunciad" was modelled upon the "MacFlecknoe" of Dryden. If Pope sat at the feet of Horace, Sterne borrowed from Rabelais, Montaigne, and half a dozen others. Defoe studied Bunyan assiduously, "hence the excellence of Robinson Crusoe." In the writings of Charles Lamb look for Sir Thomas Browne, Fuller, Earle and Overbury, Burton and Isaak Walton. And so the story goes on.

How far a great writer who compels others to copy him may himself be a borrower is conspicuously seen in the case of Goethe. "The air which Goethe breathed," says Hermann Grimm, "was filled with Rousseau's spirit; and we have only to compare Werther and Lotte with St. Preux and Julie to be convinced that without

the latter the former would never have been created. The heroes of the "Nouvelle Héloïse" and of Goethe's romance, if their silhouettes could be placed side by side, would be found to coincide line for line. If St. Preux and Werther had met in life they would have regarded each other with the terror with which one meets his double. . . . What Goethe added from his own character and Jerusalem's personality appear only like the accident of custom and situation. . . . It seemed to Goethe as if a special providence had thrown Rousseau's romance into his hands, and he felt compelled to adhere to his model. But not alone for the conception of the characters in Werther is Goethe indebted to Rousseau. He is in fact in quite as great a measure dependent upon him for the color."

The fervid and far-famed Chateaubriand took Bernardin de St. Pierre for his model, yet "you will not find a single page in all our writers," says Sainte-Beuve, "which has not had its germ in Chateaubriand"; and it is to Chateaubriand that Lanson traces Victor Hugo, "alike in his picturesque descriptions, his epic visions, and the use he makes of historic erudition." Jeffrey called Lord Byron "a mere mimic of styles and manners, and a great borrower of external character," adding, "He and Scott, accordingly, are full of imitations of all the writers from whom they ever derived gratification, and the two most original writers of the age who would thus appear to superficial observers to be the most deeply indebted to their predecessors." Yet the wave of Byronic influence not only overwhelmed Pushkin and Lermontoff in Russia, Mickiewicz, Gagarinski and Krasinski in Poland—it moved Victor Hugo, Alfred de Musset and Dudevant in France, and reached Heine in Germany. It was Mickiewicz who once said that Byron was the secret link which bound the whole literature of the Slavs to the West. And if we were to pursue still further this interesting study, we should read of Coleridge lighting his fire from the candle of William Lisle Bowles, of De Quincey "preferring the ornate manner of Jeremy Taylor, Sir Thomas Browne, and their contemporaries," of Shelley embodying in his "Alastor" and the lyrics echoes from Wordsworth and Moore, and of "suggestions which it is difficult to believe that Thackeray did not in the first instance owe to Dickens." "Who," asks A. W. Ward, "would venture to call Capt. Costigan a plagiarism from Mr. Snevellici, or to affect that Wenham and Wagg were copied from Pyke and Pluck, or that Major Pendennis was founded upon Major Bagstock, or the Old Campaigner in the Newcomes on the Old Soldier in Copperfield? But that suggestions were in these,

and perhaps a few other instances, derived from Dickens by Thackeray it would, I think, be idle to deny."

In numerous cases there is affirmation, rather than denial, by the authors themselves. "I copied my personages," says Racine, "from the greatest painter of antiquity—I mean Tacitus; and I was then so full of my reading of this excellent historian that there is scarcely a brilliant touch in my tragedies of which he did not give me the idea." Dr. Johnson told Boswell that his style was founded on Sir William Temple. Southey, writing of his own work, says, "I see in 'The Doctor' a little of Rabelais, but not much; more of 'Tristram Shandy,' somewhat of Burton, perhaps more of Montaigne." "I am neither actor nor poet," Lessing tells us, "but I should be so poor, so short-sighted, if I had not learned in some degree to borrow others' wealth, to warm myself at others' fire, and to strengthen my eyes with the lenses of art." Goethe said to Eckermann one day, "We bring capacities with us, but we owe our development to a thousand influences from the great world out of which we appropriate what we can and what is suited to us. I owe much to the Greeks and the French; my debt to Shakespeare, Sterne and Goldsmith is infinite." John Stuart Mill admits that he rendered his style "at times lively and almost light" by the study of writers "who combined, in a remarkable degree, ease with force," among them Goldsmith and Fielding, Pascal and Voltaire. "Whenever I read a book or a composition that particularly pleased me," says Robert Louis Stevenson, "I must sit down at once and set myself to imitating that quality of propriety or conspicuous force, or happy distinction in style. I was unsuccessful at the commencement of it, but I got some practice in these vain bouts in rhythm, in harmony, in construction, and in coordination of parts. I have thus played the sedulous ape to Hazlitt, Lamb, to Wordsworth, to Browne and Defoe, to Hawthorne, to Baudelaire and to Obermann."

From such salient examples and opinions—the examples offered to suggest an unexhausted wealth of illustrative material, the opinions cited from experts writing with no special view of imitation in mind—it should be evident that spontaneity of product forms but a limited factor in individual achievement. In presence of them the whole edifice of so-called originality crumbles before our eyes as we examine it, but it crumbles only to be built up again on a more reasonable and enduring basis. A foundation of imitation, of repetition, of submission to habit and subjection to convention is required at the outset. The mass of social units must repeat their

community with a close approximation to faithfulness. It is out of the general level thus secured that progressive variations take their rise, and it is among these variations that the claim for at least a relative spontaneity of individual achievement finds its greatest strength. Yet even here, in the common acceptance of the term, originality is not a true, but a pseudo-idea. The law of consciousness itself misleads us into diminishing race contributions and magnifying individual contributions. Not only do differences—variations from the customary—impress the average mind much more profoundly than likenesses, but phenomena in the present are vastly more easy to realize and appreciate than the long elapsed phenomena of the past. It was because the reflective grasp of the intellect matures only slowly that insight into evolutionary processes came late in the history of the race. The hypothesis of the origin of natural products by abrupt and sudden creative acts was a realizable—the only realizable—view of nature in an earlier stage of intellectual development; with the growth of mental power it became crude and unsatisfactory. When men progressed to the idea of metamorphosis by physical change the mind rested for a while in the notion of catastrophic vicissitudes, periodical upheavals that changed the face of the world. It took ages to reach the thought of evolution as the result of very slight changes accumulated through long intervals of time. So in our estimation of human products, it is vastly easier to regard them as arising suddenly and spontaneously as the creation of particular individuals, than to recognize them as the outcome of contributions made by all individuals.

Nor is it only that appreciation of the dependence of the present on the past grows with the progress of the race; the dependence itself is an increasing quantity. It was Comte who said that the longer our species lasts and the more civilized it becomes, the more does the influence of past generations over the present, and of mankind *en masse* over every individual in it, predominate over other forces. With the advancing unification of the race the scope for really "original" achievements by individuals is a diminishing, not an increasing quantity. And this is true in the realm of action, as well as in that of thought. The isolations of the tribe, making the subjection of its members all the more easy, gave opportunities for the development of the "strong man" which are not yielded by modern society. The captain of industry, the prominent statesman, the successful general, conspicuous as their doings may be, achieve results under an increasing control, and must more than every acknowledge

the final domination of the masses whom they are supposed to wield. In the isolation of peoples and races the world had its Ghingis Khans, its Tamerlanes, its Alexanders, its Fredericks; the new international configurations make another Napoleon an impossibility. The old order in science brought forth individual inquirers who knew little or nothing of what others were doing, whereas to-day scientific discoveries, universally diffused, become the common property of all, and the investigators of nature are joined together, not merely by the printing press, but by national and international scientific organizations. The separate compartment method of study so favorable to individual variations in science has also passed for literature. In earlier times, when education was costly and rare, individual writers stood out like giants above the mass of their contemporaries. For the one thus conspicuous we now have hundreds in every large community who can write well and with some degree of literary power. And if we turn to the nations which have given us our greatest books in the past, we find them nurturing, not figures isolated by surpassing gifts, but swarms of able *litterateurs* who compel our attention without always dazzling us with their genius. The danger of our distributed culture is not that it may produce too many great names, but that such few as give promise of appearing will find themselves swamped in the dead level of literary mediocrity.

We have now seen, not only that the "new things" of human contriving are all of them based on older things, but that even the newest of them spring far less from a single personal source than from the individual "originator" plus the whole of his contemporaries and predecessors. Originality is of the race, and not in any valid sense of the individual. The progressive variation subsumes and requires the whole hierarchy of such variations in the past. The ascending step of the innovator is indeed indispensable to advance, but it can be taken only with the whole stairway of previous human progress for its substructure. As the most striking individual traits of the human countenance would be lost in a composite photograph which included all living men, so the individual achievement dwindles into comparative insignificance when viewed against the background of all human achievements. The story of man's dependence upon his kind is really the story of nature writ large. The vibrating electron, the revolving planet, the rushing star, the gathering nebula—these would be powerless and motionless without the universe. The topmost peak that pierces so proudly into the sky requires the

vast bulk of supporting mountain for its elevation; the wave-front which wastes a cliff or destroys a breakwater has the whole length of thundering ocean behind it. The wonderful adaptations of the individual plant would be impossible without the long travail of the species to which it belongs. Is it less reasonable to say that the most brilliant achievement of the human individual receives its impulse and derives its possibility from the total life out of which it also emerges?

Nor does the power of initiative, of self-reliance, lose anything by being regarded not as self-sourced, but as system-sourced. It rather gains immensely from recognition of the mighty reservoir which may be depended upon and drawn from for individual human effort. In the new conception of originality which science has done so much to develop, each man will more than ever look for his salvation to the larger self which is outside; and it is within this wider framework of opportunity that the determination to be "original" will find increased scope for exercise. The individual contribution is to grow rather than diminish, but it will grow just because the streams that feed it flow in from the present and up from the past in ever augmented volume. The progressive variation is to have a value unheard of before, yet its blessing will be multiplied, not by any solitary virtue of the individual, but by the accumulated richness of human powers and the advancing unification of mankind. The innovator most likely to be "original" in the future is not he who, in mistaken independence, lays claim to a lawless spontaneity of production unrelated to the total yield of human effort but the man who, most completely realizing and utilizing that yield, goes forth armed with the whole power of the race.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

THE FIRST GRAMMAR OF THE LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY THE BONTOC IGOROT. With a Vocabulary and Texts, Mythology, Folklore, Historical Episodes, Songs. By *Dr. Carl Wilhelm Seidenadel*. Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1910. Pages i-xxiv; 1-583. 12 full page illustrations; *Addenda Corrigenda*: pp. 587-588.

This monumental work is divided into three parts as follows: Part I, pp. 1-270, Grammar; Part II, pp. 275-475, Vocabulary; Part III, pp. 481-583, Texts. The material was obtained by the author personally from various members of the Bontoc Igorot groups who were on exhibition in Chicago in 1906-1907. These people, who come from the interior of N. Luzon, one of the Philippine Islands, speak a language whose intricacies and general character it has been reserved for Dr. Seidenadel to present to the scientific world. To state that his task has been well done would be far too meagre a modicum of praise for this painstaking and thorough philological enthusiast who has left no stone unturned in order to make clear, even to his lay readers, the peculiarities of the particular Malayo-Polynesian dialect which he has, we may well say, discovered. He has, however, made little or no attempt to connect the Bontoc Igorot, nor to formulate its relationship, with its sister Austronesian idioms. It will be sufficient in this recension to note some of the main features of the Bontoc-Igorot, as presented by Seidenadel and to comment upon them, so far as the writer of this review feels himself competent to do, from a general philological point of view.

With regard to the phonetics of the dialect, the consonantal interchanges: *f—b*; *p—b*; *k—g*; *t—d*; *dj—d*, noted, p. 5, are all common to the Malayo-Polynesian group (see especially the Comparative Table in this review).

The glottal check (p. 9), probably identical in sound with the Arabic '*Ayin*', is not indicated by Prof. P. W. Schmidt (*Die Mon-Khmer Völker, Archiv für Anthrop.*, XXXIII, pp. 84-85), but it may be equivalent to the guttural *kh* of some of the Austronesian and Indonesian dialects. A further study of Filipino and kindred idioms might perhaps throw additional light on this point.

The vowel written by Seidenadel *æ*, a fluctuation between *o* and *u*, is clearly allied to Schmidt's *a*, a fluctuation between *ā* and *a* (p. 85). I represent this in the following table by *ö*.

The elements of the Bontoc-Igorot articles *nan*, *san*, *si*, *tja* all appear in other MP. idioms, as in the Malay indefinite *sa*, Formosan *Amia chi*, etc. (see below Table *s*. "One"). I call especial attention to Seidenadel's chapter

on the B. I. ligatures (pp. 14-16), which constitute a system of phonetic copula.

The B. I. substantive, as in all the other MP. idioms, occasionally partially reduplicates for the plural (p. 17). Furthermore, the B. I., like its sister Austronesian tongues, forms its substantive by means of prefixes, infixes, reduplication of the stem, and suffixes (pp. 18 ff.), hereby demonstrating its Austronesian character, as distinct from the Mon-Khmer tongues, described by Schmidt (*op. cit.*). These last mentioned languages, spoken on the Assam Peninsula, Schmidt has shown to be a connecting link between the people of Central Asia and Austronesia. He demonstrates, for example, by exhaustive comparisons (*op. cit.*, pp. 83 ff.), that the roots are essentially the same on the continent and islands and that the chief and fundamental difference between the Austronesian languages and the Indo-Assamese representatives of this group lies in the fact, that the Austronesian tongues seldom use the simple stem as a word, but almost always employ prefixes and infixes, while, in the Indo-Assamese idioms of this family, particularly in the Nikobar and Mon-Khmer, the stem frequently appears as an independent word. Whether the pure root-forms are the original, or whether they constitute a degradation of an older form with additions to the root, it is, as yet, impossible to predicate. Personally, the writer of the present review is inclined to the opinion that the more complicated forms are always the original, or at least are older than the simpler forms, since primitive man probably spoke articulate language, before he was able mentally to arrange an orderly system of grammatical speech. There can be no doubt, however, of the connection between the Malayo-Polynesian group, more especially its Austronesian branch, and the Mon-Khmer, which Schmidt compares with the Nikobar, Santali, Khasi, Bahnar and Stieng dialects.

Bontoc-Igorot has a system of possessive suffixes both for nouns (pp. 34 ff) and verbs (pp. 54 ff), a remnant of which probably original common MP. peculiarity, remains in the simplified Malay: *rumah-ku, rumah-mu, rumah-nya*, "my, thy, his (her, its) house," respectively. In fact, the distinction between the noun (adjective) and the verb in B. I., as in its sister idioms, is not really made, any more than is the case in other primitive speech-types (cf. my papers on the Eastern Algonquin languages in the *Amer. Anthropologist*, and note Seidenadel's remarks, pp. 51 ff.). The noun-adjective or verb in B. I. is a vocable composed of a stem with a prefix, infix or suffix. The B. I. possessive verb (pp. 67 ff.), which is a participialized verbal root with a possessive suffix, or addition, is an excellent illustration of this fact. Here should be noted the existence of an inclusive and exclusive first person plural suffix in B. I., peculiar to other MP. tongues, as well as to certain American idioms (as Algonquin). Of course, in American idioms pronominal incorporation takes place almost invariably by means of prefixation, infixation and suffixation, all of which phenomena do not appear in Malayo-Polynesian.

It will be observed that B. I. actually conjugates its verb according to a complicated system, altering the root materially for the suffix (pp. 74 ff.), as *Vkaeb*, "make," but *kápek*, "I make." This seems also to be the case in the Formosan native Austronesian dialects; cf. Paiwan *vaik*, "I go" (cf. Table, s. "go").

Dr. Seidenadel's chapters on prefixation (pp. 109-117) and on the modi-

fyng auxiliary (pp. 117-134) are most illuminating. He treats exhaustively the B. I. complex system of modifying verbs (pp. 134-138); negatives (pp. 138-148); the equivalents for relative clauses, expressed usually by participial periphrases, as in other agglutinative languages (pp. 149-158); the indirect question (pp. 177-179); the method of expressing "to be" and the copula (pp. 179-186); "to have" (pp. 187-189); numerals (pp. 189-195); prepositions (pp. 196-222); adverbial expression (pp. 222-232, 233-241); conjunctions (pp. 242-257); conditional sentences (pp. 257-266) and interjections (pp. 267 ff). I cite all these instances, in order to demonstrate how very thoroughly he has done his work.

In connection with his Vocabulary, Part II, pp. 275-475, he very properly warns the student on no account to attempt to use his word-list until the preceding grammatical sections are mastered. It is, however, permissible, I think, for me to attempt to point out by means of the following Comparative Table between B. I. and six other MP. languages, the probable position of Bontoc-Igorot in the Austronesian speech-group. The Formosan material (Paiwan, Tipun, Amia) I have taken from G. Taylor's list which was originally intended to supplement his *Rambles in Southern Formosa*, but which was not published in that work, but later in the *China Review*, XVII, pp. 109-111. This Formosan material is probably approximately correct, owing to its evidently cognate character with the Austronesian languages, Malay, Javanese and the Filipino Tagalog.

	B.-I.	TAG.	JAV.	P.	T.	AM.	MAL.
Ant	<i>káyim</i> <i>kásim</i> ¹			<i>sàsek</i>		<i>kakunak</i>	
Ashes	<i>tjəpə</i> ²	<i>saging</i>		<i>sàke</i>	<i>nasok</i>	<i>sàke</i>	
Banana	<i>fálad</i>			<i>velivel</i>	<i>velivel</i>	<i>pwile</i>	
Bird (see Fowl)	<i>aydyam</i>			<i>kaiaikaia</i>	<i>kaiaia</i>	<i>aiam</i>	
Black	<i>ngltid</i> ³	<i>nioh</i>		<i>kutzingel</i>		<i>koataengai</i>	
Blood	<i>djila</i>	<i>aro</i>		<i>diamok</i>	<i>thzdra</i> ⁴		<i>darak</i>
Body	<i>awak</i>	<i>pakpak</i>	<i>awah</i>		<i>varik</i> ⁵		
Bone	<i>tunga</i>		<i>balong</i>		<i>toelang</i>		<i>tulung</i>
Bow	<i>bandalay</i> (<i>locano</i>)		<i>panah</i>			<i>pana</i>	<i>panah</i>
Butterfly	<i>akdkob</i> ⁴	<i>dugo</i>	<i>kupu</i>				<i>kupukupu</i>
Cat	<i>kòska</i> ⁵ (loan word)	<i>katoman</i>	<i>kuching</i>	<i>nau</i>	<i>nauw</i>	<i>pushi</i>	<i>kuching</i>
Child	<i>anak</i>		<i>anak</i>		<i>ilidlak</i>		<i>anak</i>
Cocoanut	<i>inyug</i> (<i>niyog</i>)					<i>avinong</i>	
Cold	<i>lateng</i>			<i>lialdkat</i>			
Come	<i>umáliak</i> <i>paalik</i>		<i>marcin</i>			<i>paia</i>	<i>mari</i>

¹ Owing to typographical difficulties I have been unable to indicate any Bontoc-Igorot quantities in the comparative table. P., T. and A. = Paiwan, Tipun and Amia.

"Ant" = *káyim*; the root *ku* appears in B.-I. and Amia. *Kásim*, B.-I. has the root *s* in B.-I. and P. *sàsek*.

² *Tjəpə*. Note here the variations *tj=s* (Tag., P., and Am.) with metathetic *nasok*, in T.

³ *Ngltid*: *ng* common to P. and Am. with metathetic *nioh* in Tag. A similar metathesis is seen in B.-I. *Akdkob*: *kob=kup* in J. and Mal., but *dugo* in Tag.

⁴ *Djila*. Note the variations *dj=T*, *ths=P*, *di* (palatalization) and Mal. *d* in *darak*.

⁵ All foreign words. Note P. and T. *nau*, *nauw*=Chinese *mau* 'cat'.

	B.-I.	TAG.	JAV.	P.	T.	AM.	MAL.
Day	<i>dkyus</i> ⁶			<i>kadow</i>			<i>hari</i>
Deer	<i>agsa</i>		<i>rusa</i>				<i>rusa</i>
Dog	<i>dsot</i>		<i>asu</i>	<i>vatu</i>	<i>suau</i>	<i>atsu</i>	
Door	<i>panguan</i> ⁸		<i>lawang</i>				
Ear	<i>kdweng</i> ⁹			<i>tsalinga</i>	<i>tangera</i>	<i>tangila</i>	<i>telinga</i>
Egg	<i>dtlog</i>		<i>undok</i>	<i>katchilo</i>	<i>utinun</i>	<i>vitaui</i>	
Eight	<i>vdlo</i>	<i>valo</i>	<i>wola</i>	<i>valu</i>	<i>valu</i>	<i>varo</i>	<i>delapan</i>
Eleven	(<i>simplo</i> <i>ya isa</i>)	<i>labing isa</i>	<i>sivalas</i>	<i>tapulo ita</i>	<i>tapulo ita</i>	(<i>savou</i> <i>chitsai</i>)	(<i>sapulo</i> <i>satu</i>)
Eye	<i>mala</i>	<i>butu</i>	<i>moto</i>	<i>matsa</i>	<i>mata</i>	<i>mata</i>	<i>mata</i>
Father	<i>dma</i>			<i>ama</i>	<i>ama</i>	<i>ina</i>	
Fire	<i>apuy</i>			<i>zapor</i>	<i>apoe</i>		<i>api</i>
Fish	<i>lkan</i>			<i>chikao</i>			<i>ikan</i>
Five (see Hand)	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>
Flower	<i>ftnga</i>			<i>toalingin</i> ¹⁰			<i>bunga</i>
Foot	<i>tjapán</i>	<i>pa</i> ¹⁰		<i>karopupan</i>		<i>saripat</i>	
Four	<i>ipát</i>	<i>apat</i>	<i>papat</i>	<i>sipat</i>	<i>sipat</i>	<i>sipat</i>	<i>empat</i>
Fowl (see Bird)	<i>aydyam</i> <i>mónok</i> (chicken)	<i>momok</i>		<i>kaikakaia</i>	<i>kaia</i>	<i>aia</i>	
Go	<i>ámuyak</i>			<i>vaik</i>			
Good	<i>kawtsil</i>					<i>ngdai</i>	
Hand (see Five)	<i>lima</i> ¹²			<i>lima</i>	<i>lima</i>		
Hard	<i>inkôtsú</i>	<i>malakas</i>	<i>kras</i>	<i>kutseol</i>			<i>krass</i>
Head	<i>ólólú</i> <i>ténged</i> (back of the head)	<i>ulo</i>		<i>kuro</i>	<i>tangurul</i> ¹³		<i>kapala</i>
Hog	<i>jútug</i>			<i>vavui</i>	<i>vavui</i>	<i>vavui</i>	<i>babui</i>
Honey (see Water) = 'water of the bee'.	(<i>tjtnam</i> <i>si yúkan</i>)			<i>tsacnan</i> (water?)			
Hundred	<i>sin lashót</i>					<i>simocout</i>	
Husband	(<i>asá vva</i> <i>ay laldki</i>)	(<i>assoua</i> <i>lailaikai</i>)	<i>assoua</i>				
Large	<i>tsaktsaki</i>		<i>gedel</i> ¹⁴	<i>katsa</i>		<i>takai</i>	
Leaf	<i>týfolú</i>	<i>dahun</i>					<i>dawn</i>
Little	<i>akht</i>		<i>chili</i>	<i>kidi</i>	<i>makiting</i>		<i>kitchil</i>
Louse	<i>kótóló</i>	<i>kutu</i>	<i>kutu</i>	<i>kutso</i>	<i>kuto</i>	<i>kutu</i>	<i>kutu</i>

⁶ *Akyu* seems metathetically connected with P. *kadow*. The Mal. *hari* is, no doubt, the same root: *h=k* and *d=r* (?).

⁷ The element *su(tu)* appears to mean 'dog'; cf. also Mal. *andj-ing* clearly the same stem, by metathesis *andj=ndja=su(tu)*.

⁸ Common stem *ang*.

⁹ Common stem *ng*.

¹⁰ There is no connection between these *pa*-stems and the Hind. *pa'on* 'foot'.

¹¹ Stem *ka=nga*.

¹² Three out of the seven languages here compared regard the hand as a bunch of five (fingers).

¹³ *Olo*, *ulo=k-uro*, *kaf-ala*. B.-I. *ténged=tan* in T. *tanguru*.

¹⁴ Note J. *ged-e* P. *k-t*=metathetically B.-I. *ts-k*, Am. *t-k*.

¹⁵ B.-I. *týfo=J. dahun*; i. e., *t=d* and B.-I. *f=h* (*dahun*), seen also between Hawaiian *wahini* and Samoan: *fafini* 'woman'. In Mal. *dawn*, the aspirate has disappeared.

¹⁶ *Koto*: stem to (*s'*); cf. Santali: *se* 'louse' and Mon-Khmer: *chai*; Bantar: *si*, Khasi: *kri*, the latter with the *k-Anlaut*, as in the forms given above; (cf. Prof. P. W. Schmidt, *Archiv für Anthropol.*, XXXIII. p. 97).

	B.-I.	TAG.	JAV.	P.	T.	AM.	MAL.
Male	<i>laldki</i>			<i>okadilai</i>			
Man	<i>laldki</i>	<i>laldki</i>		<i>okadilai</i>			<i>lakilaki</i>
Mosquito	<i>kōmaa</i>		<i>nyamok</i> ¹⁷				<i>nyamok</i>
Mother	<i>ina</i>	<i>ina</i>	<i>mbol</i> ¹⁸	<i>kina</i>	<i>ina</i>	<i>ina</i>	<i>ma</i> ¹⁸
Nail (hand or foot)	<i>kōko</i>		<i>kuku</i>				<i>kuku</i>
Nine	<i>siam</i>	<i>siam</i>	<i>sanga</i>	<i>siva</i>	<i>siva</i>	<i>siwa</i>	<i>sambilan</i>
Nose	<i>lleng</i>		<i>ilong</i>				<i>idong</i>
Oil (Cocanut)	<i>lāna</i>	<i>longis</i>	<i>lungo</i>	<i>liaotiao</i>	<i>liaotiao</i>	<i>liaotiao</i>	
One	<i>isa</i>	<i>isa</i>	<i>sa</i>	<i>ita</i>	<i>ita</i>	<i>chitsai</i> ¹⁹	<i>satul</i> ¹⁹
Pig (see Hog)							
Rain	<i>ōtjan</i>	<i>ulan</i> ²⁰	<i>hudam</i>	<i>kumudjel</i>	<i>kumudjel</i>	<i>ural</i>	<i>hudjan</i>
Rat	<i>ōtot</i>					<i>itu</i>	
River	<i>wōnga</i>			<i>pana</i> ²¹			
Road	<i>dōdāw</i>	<i>dam</i>	<i>malaku</i>	<i>diaran</i>	<i>varan</i>	<i>lalan</i>	<i>jalan</i>
Saliva	<i>tōbfa</i>					<i>supa</i> ²²	
Salt	<i>asin</i>	<i>assin</i>				<i>china</i>	
Seven	<i>pītō</i>	<i>pito</i>	<i>pitu</i>	<i>pita</i>	<i>pita</i>	<i>pito</i>	<i>tujuh</i>
Silver	<i>blak</i>	<i>pilak</i>	<i>perak</i>	<i>pero</i>	<i>pero</i>	<i>pero</i>	<i>perak</i>
Six	<i>inim</i>	<i>anim</i>	<i>nanam</i>	<i>unum</i>	<i>unum</i>	<i>unum</i>	<i>enam</i>
Skin (of buffalo, etc.)	<i>kōtjil</i>	<i>balat</i>	<i>kulit</i> ²³	<i>kalits</i>			<i>kulit</i>
Smoke	<i>tjubldek</i>			<i>tsuvuil</i>		<i>atsuvuil</i>	
Sour	<i>impakash- eng</i>		<i>asam</i> ²⁴		<i>hasim</i>	<i>atchichem</i>	<i>masam</i>
Sun (see Day)	<i>ākyu</i>			<i>kadow</i>	<i>kadow</i>		
Ten	<i>pōlo</i>	<i>sampo</i>	<i>pulah</i>	<i>pulo</i>	<i>pulo</i>	<i>pulo</i>	<i>sapulo</i>
Thirty	<i>tolōn pō'o</i>	(<i>tallo ampo</i>)	<i>talupulah</i>	<i>tułupulo</i>	<i>tułupulo</i>	<i>tułupulo</i>	<i>tigapulo</i>
Thousand	<i>lfo</i>	<i>isanitō</i>					
Three	<i>tōlo</i>	<i>tallo</i>	<i>tain</i>	<i>tuł</i>	<i>tuł</i>	<i>tolu</i>	<i>tiga</i>
Tongue	<i>djila</i>	<i>dila</i>	<i>ilait</i> ²³	<i>lidan</i> ²³			<i>lidah</i>
Twelve	(<i>sin pōlo ya djila</i>)	(<i>labing deloua</i>)	<i>rolas</i>	<i>tapulo nusa</i>	<i>tapulo nusa</i>	(<i>tusa kotsavon</i>)	<i>sapulodua</i>
Twenty	<i>djūdn pō'o</i>	<i>dicuaampo</i>	<i>rongpuluh</i>	<i>nusapulo</i>	<i>nusapulo</i>	<i>tusapulo</i>	<i>duapulo</i>
Two	<i>djila</i>	<i>diloua</i>	<i>loro</i>	<i>nusa</i>	<i>nusa</i>	<i>tusa</i>	<i>dua</i>
Water	<i>tjēnum</i> ²⁵		<i>banyu</i>	<i>lalium</i>	<i>ranu</i>	<i>nanum</i>	
Woman ²⁶	<i>fafdyi</i>	<i>baibai</i>		<i>vavaien</i>	<i>vavaien</i>	<i>vavaien</i>	<i>bini</i> (wife)

The following significant fact then becomes at once apparent.

From the eighty of Seidenadel's Bontoc-Igorot words compared and

¹⁷ Metathesis between B.-I.: *kōmaa* and J.: *nyamok*.

¹⁸ Note the variant *m* in J. and Malay.

¹⁹ Amia and Malay have the demonstrative elements resp. *chi* and *sa* before the stem *s=ts*.

²⁰ The changes *l=d=dj=r* are common in the MP. languages.

²¹ Paiwan: *pana* is the same word as B.-I. *wōnga*. There is no connection with Hind *pani* 'water'.

²² Am. *supa* clearly contains all the elements of B.-I. *tōbfa*.

²³ Note the metathesis: *tjil=lit, lits*.

²⁴ The common stem-elements seem to be sibilant + nasal (*m, ng*); viz., B.-I.: *shūng=*
sam=sim=chem.

²⁵ The stem denoting 'water' seems to be *n* (*ly, ny*) *n* (*m*).

²⁶ The stem *fa* appears also in B.-I.: *fa/i si ongonga* 'womb'. This stem *a* clearly=
P., T., Am., *va*; also Tag. and Mal. *b*. Note also Hawaiian: *wahini*; Samoan: *faftni* 'woman'

discussed herein, it appears that the three Formosan dialects above mentioned preponderate in resemblance to B. I. over Tagalog, Javanese and Malay, there being a hundred and eighteen resemblances to B. I. in Paiwan, Tipun and Amia, as opposed to eighty-four in Tagalog, Javanese and Malay. The following small table will illustrate the number of close and fairly close resemblances to B. I. of the six MP. languages compared in the Comparative Table:

TAG.	JAV.	PAIWAN	TIPUN	AMIA	MALAY	
18	17	21	22	22	16	Close
10	13	23	14	16	10	Fairly Close

I am not prepared to state what conclusion should be drawn from such a phenomenon. Formosa was probably populated originally both from the Chinese side and from the East. It seems possible that the eastern colonists were of an Austronesian substock not far removed from that of the Igorots. A subsequent investigation of other Igorot dialects might throw a valuable light on this subject, and it is to be hoped that Dr. Seidenadel will be able to prosecute his labors still further in this direction.

Dr. Seidenadel's third part (pp. 481-583) consists of texts, all new and valuable from the point of view of folk-lore and linguistics. One could wish that he had also collected the melodies to a few songs, as an illustration of this remarkable people's musical development.

This work stands forth as a noteworthy contribution to the still involved science of the Malayo-Polynesian languages, and Seidenadel's labors cannot be overlooked by any conscientious specialist in this group. What the author's English style here and there lacks (as, for example, p. 277) is amply compensated for by the thorough erudition he has displayed in handling an absolutely new material, collected most expertly by himself.

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TILL DET ANDLIGA LIVVETS FILOSOFI. By *Allen Vannérus*. Stockholm: A. Bonnier.

This work, the latest of a long series of philosophical works by this writer, contains in its preface a criticism of contemporary Swedish philosophy, which the author finds lacking in actuality and life, with "no spiritual energy, no fermenting ideas, no problems under debate, no criticism, nothing actuated by a strong will, much less anything that is struggling forward with spontaneous force." There is no encouragement for philosophical research in Sweden. When not long ago the Rector of the University of Stockholm gave out a statement of the needs of the institution, he did not even mention philosophy, though that subject has no representative on the faculty of the university. "Statistics and other such blessings must come first. This is very natural and consistent. We live in the age of social utilitarianism. 'Social' has a religious meaning. Little houses and gardens where one may go out and dig, that is something holy. (Of course, I do not criticize, I only state facts.) Here we stand before a revolution in the appraisal of material and spiritual values to which there are few counterparts in the world's history. But wait. *Philosophie muss sein*. It is a necessary part of higher spiritual culture." The author feels the need of a philosophical renaissance in Sweden, of a regen-

erating genius, "a great systematician, a representative of the type of Hegel, Comte, Spencer, Wundt."

I have quoted at length from this preface because it brings out, from the author's particular point of view, a feeling that seems to be growing among all classes in Sweden, that an awakening is needed, a stirring up of the national life of the people, a quickening of the social conscience, a feeling that the whole nation is in need of a regenerator, a genius, "coming like a flash" to point the way, upward and inward.

Vannérus's new book is one of a series of works in which he has given a presentation of his philosophical system. The other volumes are: *Filosofiska konturer*, published in 1902; *Vetenskapssystematik*, 1907; *Den empiriska naturuppfattningen*, 1902; *Vid studiet af Wundts psykologi*, 1896; *Kunskapslära*, 1905; here enumerated in the order of their arrangement in the system, the new work having its place as the next to the last. To be complete, the system ought to include two more volumes, a metaphysics, and a theory of values, but these, the author says, he hardly expects to complete. Another task is nearer to his heart, namely to reissue what he has already published in new and revised editions, as parts of a coherent system. As a systematizer Vannérus is unique among Swedish philosophers; no one else has attempted the task which he has brought so near completion. But he does not expect that his philosophy will ever obtain a far-reaching influence. It is, he says, "too abstract and prosaic, has too little of romance and sentiment, it does not carry everything before it, it is not fascinating, not resplendent, nor 'genial,' to quote the common phrases of pretension and resplendence." But he is not without his enthusiasms, though they are intellectual, rather than emotional. He is a representative of that evolutionary idealism which is taking hold of so many in our days who do not feel satisfied with the materialistic naturalism of the last century, but for whom supernaturalism has no attractions. He belongs to the group of thinkers among whom the foremost names are Wilhelm Ostwald and William James.

A. G. S. JOSEPHSON.

DAS PROBLEM DES PYTHAGORAS. Von Dr. H. A. Naber. Harlem: Visser, 1908. Pp. 239. Price 4 fl.

This famous theorem (Euclid I, 47), which states the fundamental law that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides, is here restored in its original form and is regarded as the foundation or kernel of the entire Pythagorean system of philosophy. Dr. Naber states that Pythagoras has received a degree of recognition to which even Plato has not attained. His character was unimpeachable, his knowledge all-comprehensive, both theoretical and practical, his teaching an overwhelming whole which began with the moths in a sunbeam and ended only with Olympus. He was fair alike to the natural and the supernatural, and thus was able to become the soul of a republic, a spiritual leader of the highest rank, the head of a nobility which resembled that of the Grail in its high ideals and severe prescriptions. The topics discussed in this volume cover a wide range of subjects dear to the heart of the mathematician. Among many others treated in the forty-odd sections we find the orientation of temples, the value of π , the golden mean, logarithmic spirals, the pyramid of Cheops, the

trisection of an angle, the Limaçon, Abracadabra, the number 5, the tektratys and evolution as taught by Pythagoras.

PSYCHOTHERAPY. By *Hugo Münsterberg*. New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1909. Pages 401. Price \$2.00 net.

However stringent may be the criticisms brought against Christian Science, and however short may prove its nominal domination over the minds of man, the ultimate judgment of its worth or worthlessness will have to concede that it has served the cause of science and civilization in so far as it has given impetus to the application of psychological principles to the healing of disease. It has awakened both the medical and clerical professions to their responsibilities in determining how far suggestion and other psychical influences should be used to supplement the regular remedial agencies. In the volume before us Dr. Münsterberg discusses for the general public the practical applications of modern psychology in this line. His position is clearly set forth in the concluding paragraph of the Preface:

"The chief aim of this book is twofold. It is a negative one: I want to counteract the misunderstandings which overflow the whole field, especially by the careless mixing of mental and moral influence. And a positive one: I want to strengthen the public feeling that the time has come when every physician should systematically study psychology, the normal in the college years and the abnormal in the medical school. This demand of medical education cannot be postponed any longer. The aim of the book is not to fight the Emmanuel Church Movement, or even Christian Science or any other psychotherapeutic tendency outside of the field of scientific medicine. I see the element of truth in all of them, but they ought to be symptoms of transition. Scientific medicine should take hold of psychotherapeutics now or a most deplorable disorganization will set in, the symptoms of which no one ought to overlook to-day."

THE PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATISM. By *H. Heath Bawden*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910. Pp. 364. Price \$1.50 net.

Since even in the minds of professed exponents of pragmatism many contradictory interpretations of its terms and aims have arisen, Mr. H. Heath Bawden sets himself the task of clarifying the meaning of this new philosophy. In nine chapters he goes over the whole field, explaining Philosophy, Experience, Consciousness, Feeling, Thinking, Truth, Reality, Evolution and the Absolute, and Mind and Matter. In our opinion the task is more difficult than the author thinks, for the movement is still in a process of fermentation, and we feel confident that when this stage is over the new philosophy will appear very much less original than now.

As a sample of how the subject is treated we quote the following passages on truth. Mr. Bawden condemns the old definition, saying:

"The ordinary conception of the test of truth regards it as the agreement of the idea with the thing, of perception with the object, of knowledge with reality. This is the naive, unreflective view of common sense, known in philosophy as the representative or copy theory of knowledge.... It is not uncommon to hear even men of science declare that fact is the test of truth. 'Here are the facts. There is your theory. Test your theory by the facts.'

But it is obvious, upon reflection, that the facts as they are in themselves are a mere abstraction. They have become facts only in the process of knowledge, and cannot therefore be used as an external test of the validity of that process."

Following the pragmatic method he replaces this "naive conception of truth" by the following proposition:

"The criterion is the habit brought to consciousness. The most comprehensive habit or system of habits, taking form in consciousness as an image or idea, is the ultimate standard. Primitive peoples and children have no criterion: they act on impulse. There is little or no reflection or prospection. But in the reflective consciousness the conflict of habits produces the image or idea which becomes an ideal or standard, a guide or norm. An ideal is ordinarily thought of as having reference to an act which is yet to be performed, while a standard is regarded as the test of acts that have already taken place. But in the larger sense, which embraces the reference forward and backward, the standard is only the generalized ideal, while the ideal is the specific definition of the standard."

MEDICINE AND THE CHURCH. By *Sir Clifford Allbutt* and others. Edited with an introduction by *Geoffrey Rhodes*. London: Kegan Paul, 1910. Pp. 298. Price, 6s. net.

This book consists of a series of studies on the relationship between the practice of medicine and the church's ministry to the sick written by English clergymen and physicians of standing and authority. Clearly the purpose of the book is to combat the increasing influence of Christian Science by showing that the same good results may be and are attained by intelligent physicians and the ministry of clergymen, and also to urge further cooperation of these professions to the same end. Ostensibly the main objection made to Christian Science is that although it "undoubtedly does overcome some cases of nervous trouble, these in no sense outweigh the mischief done by its followers in denying the sick medical care;" but the feeling against the cult is strong to the point of bitterness. For instance when the editor says in his introduction that "There is nothing new in Christian Science except the colossal impudence of its pretensions."

The spirit of the book is as a partisan both of the medical profession, that the necessity and value of its ministrations be appreciated, and of orthodox theology, on the ground that the Christian Scientists claim for themselves the power of miraculous healing that was given and belongs only to Christ. The Bishop of Winchester whose advice and aid throughout the compilation is acknowledged by the editor, says in his Foreword that "the temper of our age favors an inquiry conducted in a spirit which will neither disregard the requirements of science, nor rule miracles out of court as impossible." Many of the separate articles are of interest and value as contributions to the literature of mental therapeutics.

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S KAMPF UM EINEN NEUEN IDEALISMUS. Von *Emile Boutroux*. Uebersetzt von *J. Benrubi*. Leipzig: Veit, 1911. Pp. 32.

Emile Boutroux, the French philosopher who has written this essay on Rudolf Eucken and his struggle for a new idealism, holds a similar position in France to that of his German colleague in Germany, insisting on the

spiritual and intellectual values of life in contrast to the one-sided materialism which would resolve all values of life in material possessions and mechanical accomplishments. Eucken does not want to be classified as a dualistic philosopher. He insists that the purpose of man's life must be sought rather in activity than in material culture, and in seeking and attempting, and daring and doing he finds the significance of life. The main books which mark his career cover the following subjects: *The History of Philosophical Terminology* (1879); *The Fundamental Conceptions of the Present Age* (1878, 4th ed. 1909); *The Unity of Spiritual Life in Consciousness and in the Activity of Mankind* (1888); *Great Thinkers' Conceptions of Life* (1890, 9th ed. 1911); *The Struggle for the Spiritual Content of Life* (1896); *The True Value of Religion* (1905); *The Main Problems of the Philosophy of Religion of the Present Age* (1907); *Outlines of a New World-Conception*; and finally *The Meaning of Value and Life*, which in its third edition appeared in 1911.

Professor Eucken is energetically preparing new books which will soon see the light of publication. They are on *The Old and New Christianity* and *a Theory of Cognition*. Many of his books have been translated into English, and he had several invitations to lecture in London and Oxford on philosophical and religious problems. His topic for a recent address delivered on the invitation of the Unitarians was *Religion and Life*. κ

ALLGEMEINE GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE MIT BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER RELIGIONEN. Von Dr. Paul Deussen. Leipsic: Brockhaus, 1911. Pp. 530. Price 6 M., cloth 8 M.

The first volume of this General History of Philosophy was reviewed in *The Monist* some time ago, and we now announce the publication of the first part of the second volume. Readers familiar with the philosophical literature of to-day are aware that Professor Deussen represents a metaphysical conception in philosophy which attributes an objective reality to the *atman*, to the Vedanta philosophy, to the Platonic ideas of ancient Greece and to Kant's things-in-themselves. This explains the feeling of sympathy by which he is induced to classify Jacob Boheme's philosophy as a kind of Vedantic pluralism. We cannot say that Professor Deussen ever followed Professor William James's pragmatism, nor is his pluralism kin to the pluralism of that great American pragmatist, but he has a pluralism of his own after the prototype of the Vedantic theory which recognizes the existence of innumerable souls finding a unit in the universal *atman* which might be called in Emerson's language the "oversoul."

In contrasting the subject of his first volume to the treatment of Greek philosophy discussed in the second volume, Professor Deussen says in the preface: "The Indian has penetrated more deeply into the problems of existence, whereas modern thinkers are more scientific and rigorous; but more beautiful, more luminous, more brilliant philosophy has never been than on the Ionian coasts of Asia Minor and on the shores of Illissos."

This volume covers the several periods of Greek thought. The origin of Greek philosophy—the oldest period, the second period including Plato and Aristotle, and the post-Aristotelian period, the theories of the Epicureans, the Skeptics, the Eleatic philosophies, the Jewish-Alexandrian school, and

neo-Platonism before and after Plotinus. The work is done with care and precision and we have no doubt that the appearance of this volume will be welcome to Professor Deussen's many friends and followers. K

DIE BEGRIFFE UND THEORIEN DER MODERNEN PHYSIK. Von J. B. Stallo. Uebersetzt von Dr. Hans Kleinpeter. 2d ed. Leipsic: Barth, 1911. Pp. 328. Price 7 marks.

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE METAPHYSIK AUF GRUNDLAGE DER ERFAHRUNG. Von Dr. G. Heymans. Leipsic: Barth, 1911. Pp. 364. Price 9 marks.

We announced some time ago the appearance of this German translation of J. B. Stallo's *Modern Physics*, a book of extraordinary importance, containing a preface by Professor Ernst Mach. We are now in possession of a second edition, and we are glad to see that the new world-conception of a scientific philosophy is finding more and more recognition in the Fatherland.

The same house announces the second enlarged edition of Dr. G. Heymans's "Introduction to Metaphysics." Dr. Heymans, professor of philosophy at the University of Groningen, Holland, defines metaphysics as that science which endeavors to propound "the most complete and least relative world-conception possible." Cognition means "to have conceptions which agree with their objects and which we think of as agreeing with them." Heymans discusses realism and dualism, first in their state of naïveté and then as scientifically derived theories. He contrasts them first with a monistic materialism and then with a realistic parallelism. After a review of agnosticism and positivism, he establishes a psychical monism. He finds that all rival theories by a critical development lead to the same conclusion and then ends with the applications of his philosophy to epistemology, ethics, and a philosophical consideration of religion. K

DER MONISMUS UND SEINE PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN. Von Friedrich Klimke, S. J. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1911. St. Louis, Mo., B. Herder. Pp. 620. Price \$3.80 net.

Friedrich Klimke, S. J., the philosopher among the Jesuits, offers this book as a contribution to a criticism of modern thought, and it goes without saying that he condemns modernism in its very principles. Nevertheless he allows monism to stand as a methodological postulate and as an ideal of cognition. Metaphysical monism, however, in whatever form it may be presented finds its refutation. It is perhaps characteristic that the book knows nothing of monism in the United States. The existence of *The Monist*, as well as all the publications of the Open Court Publishing Company are ignored. Haeckel figures conspicuously as a target for refutation.

The writings of the Italian pragmatist G. Vailati, who died two years ago, May 14, 1909, have been collected under the title *Scritti di G. Vailati*, and published in Leipsic by Johann Ambrosius Barth, and in Florence by the successors of B. Seeber in the current year of 1911. They cover a period from the year 1863 to 1908. The book is an enormous royal octavo volume of 972 pages. For its enormous bulk the price is comparatively small, being only 15 francs. K

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